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Abstract
This dissertation is a language-based case study that examines the relationship
between academic research and public policy to understand the role of language and
rhetoric in how academic research influences public policy. Using one Canadian public
inquiry (the Sophonow Inquiry) that clearly resulted in policy uptake of research, this
study examines the manner in which academic knowledge and discourse enter public
policy, the rhetorical transformation of these knowledge and discourse, and the relevant
rhetorical and discourse factors that facilitate policy uptake of research. The analysis in
this dissertation reveals that circulation of knowledge and discourse from academic
research to public policy is mediated by what I call intermediary genres, and these genres
simultaneously filter and validate academic knowledge and discourse into the policy
domain through what Anne Freadman theorized as uptake. But this uptake process
ironically obscures the epistemological origin of those knowledge and discourse by
de-attributing them from academic genres and re-attributing them to other legal or policy
genres. This process creates an impression that academic research is less influential than
it actually is. Along with this description of the uptake process, this dissertation also
identifies a number of rhetorical and discourse factors that facilitate this uptake process.
Some of the factors are broad and theoretical (such as the configuration of the intertextual
relationship), but others are much more specific (such as, rhetorical emphasis and
discourse mode), providing potentially useful information for scholars who are interested
in influencing public policy with their research.
xi
Chapter 1. Introduction
The relationship between research and public policy has long been an object of
study, but the interest in this area has recently intensified with the emergence of science
and technology studies, attracting scholars from various disciplines. Included in this
emergent discipline is rhetoric of science, which seeks to uncover the role of language
and rhetoric in knowledge making as well as negotiation and dissemination of that
knowledge in other domains, including public policy. This dissertation seeks to fulfill this
mission by examining the relationship between academic research and public policy with
special emphasis on the role of language and rhetoric in this relationship. Therefore, the
first two and most broad research questions of the six that will run throughout this
dissertation are:
 How does academic research influence public policy?
 What is the role of language and rhetoric in this process?
This introduction elaborates on these two broad questions, briefly referring to
relevant literature (to be discussed further in Chapter 2) and pointing out the gaps in it.
The first section elaborates on the complexity of the relationship between research and
public policy and presents competing sentiments among policy scholars who look for
influence of research on policy: On the one hand, some researchers focus on the
importance of research on policy while others argue that research has little influence on
policy. The second section discusses the issue of selective use of research knowledge by
public policy, which I will refer to as uptake in this dissertation. The term uptake, as I will
discuss further in Chapter 2, refers to an important rhetorical concept in genre study, and
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it implies repetitions of various ideational and linguistic elements from one text to
another (Freadman, 2002). The concept of uptake is used to discuss the role of language
in the selection process and transformation of knowledge. The last section points out the
theoretical gap in genre theory to account for uptake across genre boundaries. This
theoretical contribution is particularly timely since genre researchers are increasingly
interested in the intersections of genres.
1.1. Paradox in Research and Policy
The literature in political science tells us that the relationship between policy and
research is an ambivalent one. Jasanoff (2005), for example, traces the conflicting
narratives and competing approaches in determining the role of science in society. In the
United States, the state’s funding of science blossomed during the second world war as a
part of the war effort, but this funding continued after the war under the tacit social
contract that science would continue to produce something useful for the state. Under this
social contract, it was assumed that science worked the best when it retained autonomy.
However, this relationship began to change in the 1980s for a number of reasons. For one,
Jasanoff points out various science-related scandals, such as Rachel Carson’s (1962)
Silent Spring, the three mile island accident of 1979, the 1986 Chernobyl accident, all of
which undermined the public trust that was implicit in autonomous science. At the same
time policy makers and industries started to realize that science may be too useful to be
left alone. This sentiment resulted in the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which authorized the
funders to patent the discoveries from the research they funded (Jasanoff, 2005) as well as
the increasing pressure for research institutions (like universities) to adopt corporate
2
values (Faber, 2003). Along with this shift the controlling narrative also shifted from
“How can we maintain the autonomy of science?” to “How can we best control science?”
(Brickmann, Jasanoff, & Ilgen, 1985; Jasanoff, 2005).
This background complicates the relationship between research and policy,
especially in terms of the role of research in public policy. On the one hand, the attempt
to exert more control over research was certainly motivated by the state’s desire to benefit
from research (Jasanoff, 2005), thus increasing its stake and funding1 in basic and applied
sciences. But at the same time, the greater control from the state on research also resulted
in foregrounding of politics, thus enabling policy makers to fund and support research
that was consistent with the policy makers’ agenda and de-funding and ignoring research
that did not (Priven, 2004). Of course, one obvious explanation for this contradictory
impression is that only some research are useful to policy makers, thus used, while others
are not (see the fourth research question). But that is not the whole story. Thus, the third
research question in this dissertation is to uncover the nature of this competing sentiment:
 What is the nature of the relationship between research and policy that seems to
leave this contradictory impression?
1.2. Selective Uptake and Circulation of Knowledge and Discourse
In discussing the third research question, I pointed out that only some research is
utilized in policies while others remain largely ignored. In fact, one study cited in Molas,
Tang, and Morrow (2000) found that only 70 out of 70,000 research projects in education
had significant effects in public policy. This inequality in influence naturally raises the
questions about why certain research projects have the policy uptake while others do not.
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As discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, policy researchers have identified a
number of uptake factors, such as rigor, credibility of evidence (Crewe & Young, 2002),
credibility of researchers (Court, Hovland, & Young, 2005; Stone, 2001), operational
usefulness (Court, Hovland, & Young, 2005), and the intent of the researchers (O’Neil,
2005). Similarly, scholars from the emerging discipline of science and technology studies
(STS) have also provided various theoretical models and approaches to explain this
unequal uptake (Collins & Evans, 2002, Cozzens & Woodhouse, 2002; Galison, 1997).
The aggregate of knowledge from these scholarly work has been certainly beneficial in
understanding the relationship between research and policy, but what is important for us
is that these researchers have also identified language as one of the important factor that
affects uptake (Court, Hovland, & Young, 2005; Crewe & Young, 2002; Figueroa,
Kincaid, Rani, & Lewis, 2002; Fine, Weis, Weseen, & Wong., 2000; Jasanoff, 1987).
Yet, language-based analyses on this research question remain relatively scarce.
One group of scholars in rhetoric of science have focused on the uptake of science
in popular genres (e.g., Charney, 2003; Fahnestock, 1986; MacDonald, 2006). As I will
describe in Chapter 2, their research has revealed much about the manner in which
scientific knowledge is re-represented once it leaves the domain of science, but these
studies have not taken the additional step to see how the scientific knowledge is
represented in the public policy or how that representation of knowledge contributes to
policy changes.
Others, such as Bazerman (1999), Faber (2007) and Spinuzzi (2003), have
focused on the role of technology and the ways in which technology contributes to social
4
change in organizations. In one sense this dissertation seeks to accomplish a similar task
but my interest is in the role of academic research knowledge on policy change.
Perhaps Bazerman, Little, and Chavkin (2003) come the closest to exploring the
same topic, as they have sought to understand the role of Environmental Impact
Statements in disseminating research knowledge. Through a genre analysis, Bazerman et
al. found that the genre of Environmental Impact Statements spawned various related
genres that needed to be filled with research knowledge. Despite this useful finding, they
leave behind several unresolved questions, including how this proliferation of
information leads to and affects policy deliberation (p. 474).
The fourth and fifth research questions, then, continue this line of inquiry 
 What rhetorical factors are relevant in understanding why only some research
results in policy uptake?
 What rhetorical transformations occur to the research knowledge as it enters into
the policy domain?
1.3. Theoretical Gap in Genre Theory
The research questions that I have raised so far are particularly appropriate in relation to
the theoretical developments in genre theory since genre theorists are increasingly
interested in the interactions among various genres. As discussed more fully in Chapter 2,
many genre scholars (e.g., Bazerman, 1994; Bhatia, 2002; Devitt, 1991, 2004; Orlikowski
& Yates, 1994, Spinuzzi, 2004; Spinuzzi & Zachry, 2000) have proposed various
concepts to group a collection of genres in order to understand the relationship among
5
them. In fact, some of the same scholars (e.g., Bazerman et al., 2003; Spinuzzi, 2003)
have used genre theory to understand social change in various settings.
Given this heightened interest, it is perhaps surprising to find gaps in the existing
theories, which was articulated in Faber (2008) in his recent presentation
“Conformity/Mutation: Genre and the Problem of Social Change.” In this presentation
Faber pointed out the usefulness of concepts from genre theory, such as “uptake”
(Freadman, 2002) but lamented insufficient theoretical development on circulation of
knowledge and discourse. As I will elaborate further in Chapter 2, Freadman’s uptake is
important in this study, but it is not meant to be a comprehensive theory or specific
methods that one could follow. Faber’s (personal communication, April 3, 2008) solution
to this problem is to turn to Halliday’s systemic functional grammar and critical discourse
analysis, as he has done so in his 2007 study (Faber, 2007).
Like Faber (2007), I sought beyond the existing genre theory to see if the current
thinking on genre could be enriched to accommodate Freadman’s (2002) uptake. In doing
so, I have appealed to concepts and theorists that are familiar to genre scholars,2 such as
“actor-network” (Latour, 2005) “addressivity” (Bakhtin, 1986), “colonization” (Bhatia,
2002), and “discursive formation” (Foucault, 1972a). The final research question, then, is:
 How can genre theory be expanded to elaborate Freadman’s uptake, accounting
for the circulation of discourse and knowledge?
1.4. Conclusion
This chapter has identified the research problems and articulated research
questions, which are reiterated below:
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1. How does academic research influence public policy?
2. What is the role of language and rhetoric in this process?
3. What is the nature of the relationship between research and policy that seems
to leave the contradictory impression that public policy both uses and ignores
academic research?
4. What rhetorical factors are relevant in understanding why only some research
results in policy uptake?
5. What rhetorical transformations occur to the research knowledge as it enters
into the policy domain?
6. How can genre theory be expanded to elaborate Freadman’s uptake,
accounting for the circulation of discourse and knowledge?
This dissertation answers these research questions through a case study of the
Sophonow case. This case began with a single murder in Winnipeg, Manitoba in 1981,
but it became complicated with a wrongful conviction of Thomas Sophonow, which
escalated to a public inquiry in 2000. As I will describe further in Chapter 3, the
Sophonow case is particularly appropriate in exploring these questions because the public
inquiry report that came out of the inquiry (the Cory report) contained visible influence of
academic research knowledge, and the report was highly influential in effecting policy
changes across Canada.
The dissertation is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 reviews the
relevant literature in political science, expert testimony, science studies, genre studies,
and discourse analysis to provide the theoretical background, further articulates gaps in
7
theory and research knowledge, and points out important concepts for the analysis
chapters. Chapter 3 is a chapter on methods, including a description of the Sophonow
case, the rationale for selecting this case, the materials and analytical tools used, and the
justifications for them. Chapter 4-6 are the analysis chapters, and these chapters are
organized by the scope of the analysis. Chapter 4 is the broadest in its focus, as it analyzes
the macro-level social and discursive network, using genre analysis and theories of uptake
to trace the influence of academic research. Chapter 5 focuses on citation in the Cory
report and provides a quantitative analysis of its discursive context. The focus on Chapter
6 is considerably narrower, focusing on specific rhetorical and discourse elements that
seem to have facilitated uptake of research knowledge through rhetorical and discourse
analyses.
NOTES
1. In 2006 the National Science Foundation spent $342.9 billion in research funding
(National Science Foundation, 2007).
2. Artemeva (2007) provides a list of key concepts in rhetorical genre studies.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The problem of understanding the relationship between academic research and
public policy lies at the intersection of many distinct fields. Reflecting this diversity, this
chapter draws from five distinct areas: (1) political science, (2) expert testimony, (3)
rhetoric of science, (4) genre studies, and (5) discourse analysis.
The general research problem, described in Chapter 1, is elaborated in the political
science section of the literature review, as the discussions in this section establish what
we already know about the relationship between research and policy. In particular, this
section emphasizes the literature that argues for the importance of communication in
understanding the policy uptake of academic research and locates a gap that can be filled
by language analysts.
The literature on expert testimony is used as important background information
for the analysis in this dissertation. As I will elaborate more fully in Chapter 3, the
Sophonow Inquiry adopted a legal procedure that involved the use of expert witnesses
who were direct- and cross-examined. Therefore, we need to understand the relationship
between academic experts and the legal profession before we can appreciate the research
uptake through the Sophonow Inquiry. The information from this section is used
throughout the dissertation to situate the analysis, interpret the data, and inform the
implications of the findings.
The third section draws from the literature in the science and technology studies
beyond rhetoric of science, but the section is labeled as “rhetoric of science” because it
draws primarily from those who focus on issues of language and rhetoric. The literature
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in this section serves two purposes. The first purpose is the theoretical contribution with
the concept such as incommensurability that can frame the research problem in this
dissertation. The other purpose is that the literature provides useful concepts and
approaches that contribute to the analytical concepts and methods in this dissertation.
The last two sections present the literature on genres and circulation of discourse.
As the discussion in these sections show, the literature from these areas provides many
useful concepts in understanding the policy uptake of research. Yet the literature on
genres does not sufficiently theorize uptake, and the literature on circulation of discourse
does not adequately account for the complexity of the textual and generic relationship,
which are articulated by genre theorists. Therefore, these to sections present relevant
concepts for studying the policy uptake of research, and these concepts are combined and
extended in the analysis chapters (especially Chapter 4) to extend our current thinking.
2.1. Literature in Political Science
Traditionally, political scientists imagined the relationship between research and
public policy to be linear. This approach assumed that policy decision making is rational
in that it is logical, ordered, and sequential, and it assesses all available options (Neilson,
2001). Under this linear model, science and social science may be expected to have the
direct influence in guiding the policy decision, but this model does not adequately capture
the policy-making process. In fact, most political scientists today would criticize this
model for overly rational and simplistic (e.g., Edelman, 1964; Grindle & Thomas, 1990;
Jasanoff, 2005; Priven, 2004; Sutton, 1999; Weiss, 1979, Wildavsky, 1979).
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This section of the literature review begins from the responses to the problems of
the linear model and in particular the role of (social) science in the policy-making process
if the linear model does not hold. The middle section briefly summarizes the public policy
research in the past 20 years that has examined factors that contributed to research
utilization by policy makers. The last section describes what policy researchers say about
the role of communication in research utilization. Through this literature review of
political science, not only would I like to provide a useful background of research in this
area but also to point out areas in which rhetoricians and other language specialists can
contribute to this area of research.
2.1.1. Lack of Direct Influence
Caplan (1979) was one of the early political scientists to notice the inadequacy of
the linear model and to theorize the relative scarcity of scientific research in public
policy. His theory, known as the “two-community model,” characterizes scientific
community and policy community as separated by their own sets of ideologies, and this
separation makes it difficult for an idea in one community (science) to be used in another
(policy). Caplan’s model is somewhat similar to the notion of incommensurability in
rhetoric of science (see below) as well as various community terms in rhetoric and
composition (e.g., “discourse community” [Swales, 1990], “community of practice”
[Wenger, 1999], “interpretive community” [Fish, 1989]), and the two community model
suffers from the same weaknesses as all the theories of community for overemphasizing
the intragroup homogeneity and intergroup heterogeneity.
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Similarly, Weiss (1979) notes the fundamental disconnect between values held by
social scientists and policy makers to critique the rationalist model. Based on her three
meta-studies, she argues that social researchers need to work within the framework of
policy makers’ values, and failure to do so will likely to have their research ignored.
While Weiss’ model privileges policymakers over social researchers, she still recognizes
the importance of research in policy making process. But the role of social research is not
that of direct influence but that of enlightenment:
[The enlightenment model] sees a role for research as social criticism. It
finds a place for research based on variant theoretical premises. It implies
that research need not necessarily geared to the operating feasibilities of
today, but that research provides the intellectual background of concepts,
orientations, and empirical generalizations that inform policy. As new
concepts and data emerge, their gradual cumulative effect can be to change
the conventions of policymakers abide by and to reorder the goals and
priorities of the practical policy world (p. 544).
Weiss’ enlightenment model is incorporated in the work of later theorists and
researchers, who went further to theorize the role of context in research utilization. For
example, Kingdon’s (1984) agenda-setting model recognizes three contexts (problem,
policy, political), and the configuration of these contexts occasionally create “policy
windows,” which enables policy changes. Within this model, the configuration of three
contexts play a much greater role than research, which is only a tool that may enable
someone to enact a policy change if the policy window is open. Incidentally, Kingdon’s
theory is similar to Bitzer’s (1968) rhetorical situation in that they both emphasize the
primacy of the existing situation (see endnote 1 in Chapter 4). On the other hand, Jasanoff
(2005) emphasizes political conflicts, processes, and motives among others. Similarly,
Carden (2005) focuses on the context, which includes the stability of decision-making
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institutions and the amount of control exercised by the government (centralization vs.
decentralizatin) as well as individual factors, such as the capacity of policy makers to use
research. Grindle and Thomas (1991), on the other hand, emphasize the individual
interests of policy makers even though they acknowledge the importance of political and
economic contexts.
While these political scientists differ in how they theorize research use, they all
abandon the rationalist model and emphasize factors beyond the control of individual
researchers. The idea that research does not have a direct influence is a recurring theme in
this dissertation, and throughout the analysis Chapters (Chapters 4, 5, and 6), I will point
out places where we can observe the influence of research and describe the nature of the
influence.
2.1.2. Influencing Factors
As political scientists abandoned the rationalist model, they resumed their line of
inquiry to discover the factors that would result in greater research utilization. Haas
(1991), for example, introduced the term epistemic community to refer to a network of
people from both science and policy communities for the purpose of carrying out a policy
change. A similar argument is made in a popular book (which is cited in the political
science literature) by Gladwell (2000), who points out the necessary collaboration among
three types of people, connectors (networkers), mavens (information specialists) and
salesmen (powerful persuaders) in order to effect changes through “stickiness factor” and
“tipping point.”
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Others have focused on factors that are within the control of the social
researchers, such as rigor, credibility of evidence (Crewe & Young 2002), credibility of
researchers (Court, Hovland, & Young, 2005; Stone, 2001), diverse source of evidence
(Court, Hovland, & Young, 2005), operational usefulness (Court, Hovland, & Young,
2005), and the intent of the researchers (O’Neil, 2005).
2.1.3. Role of Language
Many of the political scientists have also noted the importance of communication
in research utilization (Court, Hovland, & Young, 2005; Crewe & Young, 2002;
Figueroa, et al., 2002; Fine, et al.; Jasanoff, 1987). Crewe and Young, for example,
emphasize that the message to the policymakers must be simple. Similarly, Court,
Hovland, and Young argue that the message must be clear to the policy makers. Figueroa
et al. (2002) argue that the communication must be two-way and that social researchers
must solicit feedback from policy makers from the early stages of their research. In
addition, Philo (1996) as well as Court, et al. note the usefulness of visuals in increasing
research utilization.
The literature in political science reveals that the influence of (social) science
research on public policy is not direct, and language is one of many factors that are
important in determining research utilization. However, the political scientists often work
on theoretical models of communication, and their analysis of language is neither
sufficiently detailed nor problematized for those of us who conduct language analysis.
This suggests that language analysts can complement the work of political scientist by
focusing more on the role of language and rhetoric in this process and treating language
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as the object of the analysis rather than the instrument. Therefore, as I will explain further
in Chapter 3, this dissertation spends much of the analysis on language even though it
overlaps with the works of political scientists in some areas, such as the descriptions and
analyses of the macro-level context and perceptions of the participants through
interviews.
2.2. Literature on Expert Testimony
Like the relationship between research and policy, the relationship between research and
law is complicated. As the following literature review illustrates, law has always had an
ambivalent relationship with science and social science. The ambivalence partly comes
from (social) science’s ability to help law in discovering the truth, but at the same time
(social) science can threaten the judicial authority and independence. This section of the
literature review explains the nature of this ambivalent relationship by first describing the
historical development of expert witnesses in the Anglo-American tradition. The
historical account is followed by two sections that explain the contemporary systemic
differences between science and law as well as the reasons and the nature of this
ambivalent relationship. The last two sections examine the legal and discursive
constraints that are placed on the expert witnesses to preserve the judicial authority and
independence and to limit the influence of expert witnesses on law.
The literature review of law is important in this dissertation because the policy
relevant document in the Sophonow case came out of the judicial system, and the process
of research uptake was largely influenced by how the legal system works. While this
process differs from other deliberative processes with policy implications, many
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policy-related deliberation processes contain important elements from the judicial system,
such as the hearing, testimony, evidence, exhibits, and transcripts. The relevance of the
Sophonow Inquiry in other deliberative processes will reappear in the limitation section
of Chapter 7.
The first part of the literature review in this section (historical development and
ambivalent relationship) provides important background information for the analysis
chapters. The last two sections (legal and discursive constraint) are directly relevant in the
analysis of Chapter 6 when we examine specific discourse strategies that influenced
policy uptake of research.
2.2.1. Historical Development
The first section of the literature review in law describes the emergence and development
of expert witness as one of many forms of expert participation. The development of
expert witnesses, coupled with the increasingly adversarial legal context, provides a
historical background for the ambivalent relationship between (social) science and law
that is discussed in the next section.
Historically, expert witness was not the only form of expert participation, and
Golan (2004) uses a series of historical examples to illustrate the ways in which the
Anglo-American legal system dealt with technical and scientific knowledge. For example,
during the Middle Ages, it was not uncommon to have expert juries on trade disputes
with the premise that “those were to be summoned who could best tell the fact, the
veritatem rei” (p. 19). Similarly the courts in various historical periods have relied on
court-appointed experts on matters like medicine. But the most common form of expert
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participation in today’s court is that of expert witnesses, and Golan locates the emergence
of this tradition in the late eighteenth century Folkes v. Chadd in Norfolk, England, also
known as the Wells Harbor case.
The case took place in the town of Wells, which was facing the North Sea in the
eighteenth century, and the city was the host to a very profitable harbor. But in 1719 and
in 1758 the biggest landlord at the time (Sir Thomas Coke and John Turner, respectively)
erected embankments to protect their fertile marshlands from the incoming tides. Soon
after the first embankment, Wells Harbor started to decay to the detriments of the local
merchants and ship owners. A series of negotiations to remove the embankments failed
until they culminated into two trials in 1781 and 1782 as well as an appeal to Lord
Mansfield, the most influential judicial figure on the King’s Bench in the eighteenth
century. The Wells Harbor case is important because it illustrates the role of scientific
experts in the judicial system. Both parties recruited some of the most prominent civil
engineers of the time, and the deciding factor in the second trial was the admissibility of
one of the engineers who argued as a natural philosopher and relied on the invisible laws
of nature and general principles. The presiding judge of that trial denied admissibility of
that expert on the ground that the expert’s argument was not grounded in direct
observation, but Lord Mansfield overturned that verdict in the later appeal.
If Folkes v. Chadd illustrated the importance of the experts as witnesses, it also
signaled the increasingly adversarial role of the expert witnesses. This adversarial trend
and the growing problems that are associated with the trend are documented in Golan’s
(2004) later historical examples, in which the most prominent experts disagree with one
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another not only in their opinions but also in actual experiments. In Svern, King Company
v. Imperial Insurance Company of 1819 and the related trials, prominent chemists from
all over Britain came to testify whether whale oil, when heated to 350oF under certain
conditions, constituted fire hazard. The battle of the experts and their conflicting
experimental results, which were conducted in the courtroom, left the jury thoroughly
confused, and the judges from all the trials were frustrated and disgusted by the whole
spectacle. In the words of one of the trial judges:
But they [the chemists] had, nevertheless, left the Court in a state of utter
uncertainty; and the two days during which the results of their experiments
had been brought into comparison, were days, not of triumph, but of
humiliation to science (cited in Golan, 2004, p. 62).
The problem of adversarial expert witnesses continued to exacerbate as increasing
number of experts from more disciplines (e.g., psychologists in the early twentieth
century) entered the courtroom, and more judicial matters (both civil and criminal) started
to require expert opinions.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the legal profession has developed a
deep suspicion and distrust of (social) science, and the legal profession was not going to
embrace (social) scientific research with open arms. Perhaps one telling example that
Golan (2004) cites is Judge William Foster’s invited speech at the New Hampshire
Medical Society in 1897: “There are three kinds of liars: the common liar, the damned
liar, and the scientific experts” (p. 255).
The historical context, along with the systemic differences between science and
law in the next section, explains the ambivalent relationship between the two that is
discussed below. In addition, the history of expert witness will become relevant in
18
Chapter 4 when the discussion turns to other possible relationships between science and
law.
2.2.2. (Social) Science vs. Law
The previous section documented the historical relationship between (social)
scientific experts and the legal system to describe the historical reasons that law is
skeptical of scientific experts. This section provides some of the fundamental systemic
differences between (social) science and law. These differences are: the overall systemic
approach, the verification method, repeatability of the “experiment,” the criteria, the
conceptualization of “truth,” the source of data (findings), the role of social factors, and
the power relationship. Some of the reasons and the systemic differences are somewhat
reminiscent of the differences between (social) science and policy, but others are unique
to law.
 System: (Social) scientists prefer to seek consensus than to refute their colleagues’
arguments outright. This tendency is evidenced in case studies (Bertin & Henifin,
1994), (social) scientists’ verbal accounts (National Research Council, 2002), and
the textual and generic manifestations of academic writing to respect the
disciplinary traditions (Giltrow, 2002; Graff & Berkenstein, 2006; Swales, 1990).
Another (perhaps more postmodern) reason for (social) scientists to value
consensus is that consensus building is what constitutes knowledge (see Foucault,
1972a, Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1986). By comparison law uses an
adversarial system of discovering truth with the assumption that the truth will
emerge from competing arguments. This assumption is similar to the
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epistemology of pre-Socratic rhetoric, especially that of Protagoras who believed
that truth (orthon) lay somewhere between the competing logoi (Carter, 1988).
 Verification: Science and social science rely on replication and peer-review to
ensure reliability of knowledge. On the other hand, law uses cross-examination to
determine reliability (National Research Council, 2002).
 Repeatability: The verification process of science assumes that experiments are
repeatable, and scientific theories can be proven again through another experiment
at some future time. On the other hand, a legal theory that was proven at a
particular case is not repeatable in the future. Instead, it is the proven legal theory
that compels future cases to conform to the past legal theory.
 Criteria: In science and social science, researchers typically set the alpha level at
.001 or .05. On the other hand, the legal system uses “beyond reasonable doubt”
for criminal cases and “preponderance of evidence” for civil cases. While these
criteria from one domain cannot be easily translated into another, Jasanoff (1995)
observes that science typically requires higher degree of certainty than law does.
The difference in criteria makes it uncomfortable for expert witnesses to make
claims when these claims may meet the legal criteria but do not meet the criteria
of their own disciplines. Similarly lawyers often express frustrations when experts
refuse to make probability claim using the legal criteria and the language of those
criteria (National Research Council, 2002).
 Truth: The tentativeness and mutability of scientific truth is noted by many
scholars (e.g., Bertin & Henifin, 1994; Kuhn, 1962; Popper, 1968). But law
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requires truth to be stable for the purpose of making judgments. Even worse,
Shapiro (1981) notes that Anglo-American courts tend to treat legal facts as
definitive even when these facts have been established under the less rigorous
criteria of preponderance of evidence.
 Findings: (Social) scientists conduct research to advance the state of knowledge
and expect others to use their findings to further advance the state of knowledge.
This forward-looking nature of findings is observable in the genre of academic
writing (Swales, 1990, 2004; Giltrow, 2002), with the introduction that is
supposed to cite and problematize previous research in order to create a “gap” (or
“knowledge deficit”) for the new research. The legal findings are
backward-looking in that they look for precedents to discover findings.
 Social factors: In natural sciences, and social sciences to a lesser extent, social
factors are variables to be controlled. In risk management, Jasanoff (1995) notes
that science tends to focus exclusively on absolute risk and ignore the perception
of risk; in law, perception of risk is important. Other times, law dismisses the
relevance of science in pursuit of social justice. An archtypical case, described in
Jasanoff (1995), is the paternity case against Charlie Chaplin in 1946. In this case,
science clearly ruled out Charlie Chaplin as the father of the child, but the jury
found it fairer to hold him liable for the child support because of his higher social
standing compared to the poor single mother.
 Power: Experts (including medical doctors as well as [social] scientists) often
express discomfort in testifying in the courtroom when their power and social
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status is taken away and their statements are reduced to just another testimony
(Matson, 1999; National Research Council, 2002). 
Table 2.1. Some Critical Differences Between Science and Law
Dialogues are controlled by the
judge and the lawyers (not by the
experts)
Experts are in charge of the
dialogue (and they are roughly
equal)
Power
Social factors and social justice as
integral to the decision making
process.
(in natural science) social factors
and social justice as largely
irrelevant.
Social Factors
Backward-looking (rely on
precedents for “truth”)
Forward-looking (assumes
tentativeness of the present
“truth”)
Findings
Must be final in a short time (for
the purpose of resolving a
dispute)
Tentative and mutableTruth
“beyond reasonable doubt”
“likelier than not”
alpha level, depending on the
discipline (e.g., .05 for social
sciences; .001 for medical)
Criteria
Theories to be proved in the court
occurred in the past and
unrepeatable
Experiments are repeatable (thus
will happen in the future)
Repeatability
Cross-examinationReplication, Peer-reviewVerification
AdversarialConsensus seekingSystem
LawScience
These differences have resulted in what Jasanoff (1995) calls a “culture clash”
between science and law, not dissimilar from Caplan’s (1979) “two communities”
between science and policy. These differences often create tension between judges and
lawyers on the one side and (social) scientists on the other, contributing significantly to
the ambivalent relationship to be described in the next section.
2.2.3. Ambivalent Relationship
Because of the differences listed in the previous section, science and law has an
ambivalent relationship. On the one hand, science and law are both interested in
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determining truth, and they are both interested in resolving disputes so that science can
help law in many different ways (Jasanoff, 1995). On the other hand, the legal community
also saw the growing influence of science as a threat to the integrity and independence of
the judicial system.
One such important case is Frye v. United States, in which James Alphonso Frye
was accused of murder. In preparing his defense, Frye’s attorney used William Marston
as the psychological expert on lie detectors to demonstrate the veracity of Frye’s claim to
innocence. The lie detector was a problem for the court because, as Golan (2004) argues,
it clearly invaded the province of the jury, who should be the sole trier of facts, including
assessment of credibility. Similarly, any attempt to empower the experts by arguing that
the judge and the jury do not possess sufficient knowledge to understand science also
threaten the province of the jury and challenge the Sixth and Seventh Amendment rights
of the U.S. Constitution to have a jury trial.
Other legal observers have gone further to say that science and social science are
merely tools of the judicial system that are used only when it is convenient and beneficial
for the judicial system to do so. Like Priven’s (2004) argument on social science and
public policy, Wisdom (1977) describes the relationship between social science and law
in the following manner:
The social science evidence was the kind of support a court likes to find in
a record to lend factual and scientific aura to a result sustained by other,
perhaps purely abstract and sometimes formalistically legal,
considerations, but dictated by the moral necessity of changing social
attitudes (p. 142).
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Indeed, legal cases are rife with instances in which decisions are made in spite of
scientific evidence. The earlier example of Charlie Chaplin is a classical example of a
judicial decision despite the scientific evidence (Jasanoff, 1995). More recently the first
trial of the Rodney King case found the offending officer to be not guilty even though the
author of the police manual found the offending officers to be using the force that
exceeded of the amount authorized by the manual (Renoe, 1996).
This skepticism toward professional outsiders is not unique to legal and policy
communities. For example, academics are often skeptical of sources that have been
generated outside the academy, and the conventions in academic writing require that we
signal these sources as coming outside the academic disciplinary communities, while the
writer's own disciplinary sources stay unmarked (Giltrow, 2002).
Like the academic convention on citations, law also has a set of conventions to
constrain and domesticate the influence of (social) science. The next two sections focus
on these constraints, first describing the legal constraints and then describing the
discursive constraints. 
2.2.4. Legal Constraints on Expert Witnesses
In the United States, the expert testimony had long been governed by what is
known as the Frye rule, which was established under Frye v. United States in the case I
described earlier. In that trial, the judge dismissed the admissibility of Marston on the
ground that the lie detector lacked “general acceptance.” While Golan (2004) argues the
real reason lay elsewhere, the general acceptance rule became the de jure and de facto
admissibility standard. It was not until the 1990s when three additional criteria were
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established through the Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho cases (collectively known as “the
Supreme Court trilogy”). The three additional criteria from Daubert (known as the
“Daubert criteria”), are whether:
1. the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data
2. the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods
3. the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
(Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702)
These criteria, however, are neither necessary nor sufficient condition for
admissibility. Rather, the federal trial judge is granted with the authority to make
admissibility of an expert, considering these criteria. While the Daubert criteria
established useful guidelines, critics (e.g., Bertin & Henifin, 1994) have questioned that
the trial judge, who is a disciplinary outsider, can adequately evaluate (social) scientific
methods. Yet, the judicial authority was reinforced in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, in
which an electrician filed a complaint against General Electric, alleging that its product
contained a carcinogenic coolant that caused his lung cancer. The plaintiff introduced
four epidemiological studies that linked the chemical (polychlorinated biphenyls) to
cancer with mice, but the court ruled that the epidemiological studies on mice were not
relevant to the case because the plaintiff was an adult human. While the court’s reasoning
to dismiss the scientific studies in this case may have been sound, the case established
that it was the court’s authority, not that of relevant scientific community, to determine
how the Daubert criteria applied. The role of the trial judge was further reinforced in
25
Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, which extended the Daubert criteria to all technical
fields outside of science by applying the admissibility standard to a tire technician. 
Table 2.2. The Supreme Court Trilogy and Admissibility Criteria
The Daubert criteria apply to all technical expert
testimonies.
Kumho Tire Co.
Ltd. v. Carmichael
1999
The case reinforced the responsibility of the judge.General Electric Co.
v. Joiner
1997
The federal trial judge will determine the
admissibility based on:
1. Testable hypothesis
2. Peer review
3. Error rate
4. General acceptance
Daubert v. Merrell
Dow
Pharmaceuticals
1993
Admissibility CriteriaTrials
This unwillingness to give up decision-making authority (even about technical
issues) persists even in cases in which the court found it helpful to admit experts. In the
Rodney King case, described earlier, two experts on police's use of force were called
specifically to "assist" the interpretation of the tape that captured the police action.
Despite the court-sanctioned expertise of those experts, the jury was specifically
instructed by the judge that the jury had no less skill than the experts in adjudicating what
physical act took place in the contested video tape (Renoe, 1996).
The admissibility standard in Canada has been historically somewhat different
from the U.S., but Glancy and Bradford (2007) argue that the Canadian standard is
becoming much closer to the Daubert rules through recent decisions.
Prior to 1994, the Canadian admissibility standard was rather lax, admitting most
experts as long as they were “helpful.” But in R v. Mohan of 1994, the court established
that the admissibility standards were to be based on 1) relevance, 2) necessity, 3) absence
of exculpatory rule, and 4) proper qualification. Similar to the implicit argument behind
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the Frye decision (Golan, 2003), the Court also emphasized that the experts must not
violate the province of the jury.
Perhaps the most important Canadian case occurred in 2000 when Judge Binnie
explicitly referred to the Daubert criteria in R. v. J.. In this case the defendant, who was
accused of sexual assault, called Edouard Beltrami, who conducted a series of psychiatric
tests and penile plethysmography to rule out defendant as somebody who was unlikely to
commit the alleged crime. Justice Binnie noted that Beltrami met the earlier Mohan
criteria but argued that the Mohan criteria were outdated. Instead, he appealed to the
Daubert criteria as the test of reliability in admitting experts and dismissed Beltrami
based on the “general acceptance” standard.
This brief history of admissibility standards illustrate the legal constraints to
ensure judicial authority and domesticate the influence of expert witnesses, and these
constraints are quite similar in the U.S. and Canada even though the admissibility
standards of these countries somewhat differed historically.
2.2.5. Discursive Constraints on Experts
The legal constraints are important and usually most salient as a tool of
constraining experts, but language of the court also plays an important role in
constraining the experts. One obvious discursive control is turn-taking, which is formally
regulated to confer most power to the judge and then to the lawyers. Furthermore, the
discourse of the courtroom creates what conversation analysts (e.g., Sacks, Schegloff, &
Jefferson, 1974; Ten Have, 1999) call “adjacency pair,” which is a paired utterances
across the conversation turn boundary, in which the first-pair part elicits a particular kind
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of response in the second-pair part. This conversation strategy is formally implemented in
the courtroom so that the examining lawyer almost always take the first-pair part to
control the nature and the scope of the expert utterance in the second-pair part.
Lawyers take advantage of this formal discursive arrangement as they have
developed highly sophisticated questioning techniques to control information, especially
during cross-examination. In general, lawyers cross-examine witnesses by asking
questions that already contain completed propositions (Harris, 1984), and the questions
are specifically formulated to prevent the witnesses from telling their stories in their own
words (Luchjenbroers, 1997). Some of those discursive strategies are listed in Gibbons
(2004), such as tag questions of various types and broad question types to control
information:
(2-1a) Well you see, you were saying to your wife, let me go, I want to hit this son of a
bitch, weren't you?
(2-1b) I presume that within that side of your book there were some conclusions?
(2-1c) How far away from her were you when you fired the first shot?
(2-1d) Was anyone else hurt as a result of that first fight?
(pp. 102-107)
These four questions all predispose the listener to answer them in particular
manners. In (2-1a) Gibbons explains that the tag, strong content, and rise-fall intonation
place pressure on the listener to agree. He similarly explains (2-1b) by pointing out the
projected statement in the lower clause (“There were some conclusions within that side of
your book”). This syntactic position (coupled with the declarative mode) makes it
difficult to deny the embedded statement. Gibbons uses (2-1c) and (2-1d) to describe the
difficulty of denying the statement that is presupposed within the questions. In (2-1c), the
statement in the lower clause (you fired the first shot) is presented as a presupposition,
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and in (2-1d) the statement (you had fights) is nominalized as "that first fight" where a
denial of that statement is not discursively offered as a coherent answer.
Similarly, Shuy (2006) and Matson (2000) describe hypothetical questions such as
(2-2) as one of the most difficult questions for the experts to answer because, like (2-1d),
an appropriate answer may not be syntactically coherent.
(2-2) Suppose for a minute that the writer of this business proposal had seen the
cost-pricing estimates produced by government accountants. Would the
defendants then have been more accurate in the budget they submitted? (p. 111)
The question anticipates a yes-no response, and the expert witness is required to answer
the question, but to answer either “yes” or “no” is likely to put the expert in trouble. Shuy
explains that questions like (2-2) force the expert to speculate because it is impossible for
them to know the “correct” answer. Yet, by rules of the court, the experts are not allowed
to speculate.
Matson (2000) describes another strategy, in which the opposing attorney begins a
cross-examination with a series of straightforward factual questions that the expert
witness has already agreed in the direct examinations. The series of “yes” answers to
these easy questions predispose the expert witness to continue the same answer when the
cross-examiner gradually leads the expert to shift his/her agreement into the area that
favors the opposing side.
In addition to these discourse strategies to control information, lawyers also use
more subtle discourse strategies to control impressions of the witnesses. For example,
O’Barr (1982) and Shuy (2006) describes the personalizing strategies by varying
expressions that refer to the defendant. For example, one can refer to the defendant as
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“Joe Smith,” “Joe,” “Mr. Smith,” “the accused,” “the defendant,” but each expression
conveys a different connotation and a different degree of personalization. Furthermore,
Shuy notes the effect on ethos by different forms of address to refer to the expert. He
argues that the title “professor” often evokes the image of an absent-minded professor so
that lawyers is advised to refer to their own expert witnesses as “doctors” and not
“professors.”
These discourse strategies are relevant in understanding the uptake of research
knowledge in the Sophonow case because the experts made their arguments under the
discursive condition similar to that of a courtroom. The discursive constraints described
in this section will be particularly relevant in Chapter 6 when we examine specific
discourse moves by the expert witnesses and the lawyers that have implications for
uptake.
The literature review on expert testimony has described the ambivalent
relationship between science and law as well as the historical development that has led to
the ambivalent relationship and the consequences of that relationship. This information is
important in this dissertation because the Sophonow Inquiry adopted rules and procedures
of a legal proceeding, and all the expert witnesses tried to circulate their knowledge and
discourse from academic research under the constraints described above.
2.3. Literature in Rhetoric of Science
The third important area comes from rhetoric of science. As I will explain shortly
below, one of the major contributions of rhetoric of science is to deconstruct the idealized
notion of science with characteristics, such as objective, disinterested, proven, reliable,
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predictive, and explanatory (Chalmers, 1982; Cook, 2004; Toulmin, 1961). Therefore,
this literature review section on rhetoric of science begins by the work that reveals the
rhetoricity of science but focusing more on rhetorical methods that have been used to
study science. In particular, the first subsection discusses Latour’s modality as a rhetorical
device that can change the status of knowledge to more or less factlike. The concept of
modality will be used in Chapter 5 to analyze citation patterns. The second part focuses
on the concept of “incommensurability.” The term, which was first introduced by Kuhn
(1962), captures the essence of many of the problems in science and technology studies.
In particular Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability and efforts to remedy the
incommensurability addresses the central problem of this dissertation:
incommensurability between academic (social) science and public policy. The third part
of this section focuses on language of science and what happens to that language once we
attempt to let that language cross the boundary, separated by incommensurability.
Although the focus of this dissertation is the language of social science and how it crosses
the boundary into a policy relevant document, most studies in this area have been
conducted on the language of scientific articles and popularized science articles.
Therefore, the last part of this subsection focuses on language differences between these
two genres. This language change and circulation of language is further discussed in 2.5,
which specifically addresses the literature on circulation of discourse.
2.3.1. Rhetoricity in Science
Harris (1997) summarizes rhetoric of science as “the study of how scientists
persuade and dissuade each other and the rest of us about nature—the study of how
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scientists argue in the making of knowledge” (p. xii). This suasive aspect of science is
most prominently illustrated in early ethnographies of science. Following the
ethnographic tradition of “making the familiar strange,” Latour and Woolgar (1986) and
Law (1986) both revealed the centrality of literary activities at the hearts of scientific
laboratories. For example, Law describes that everything else (such as people, chemicals,
machines, and money) seems to come and go even though they are all relevant in one way
or another; but the text always remains in the laboratory. Similarly, Latour and Woolgar
use a manufacturing metaphor to argue that the reports that scientists write are not just
“reports of what has been produced in the factory, [but] members take these papers to be
the product in the factory” (p. 47, emphasis in original). But the most emphatic passage
on the centrality of the text comes from Law when he describes the text as what connects
all lab participants and objects to create structure in science:
It is the text most of all that the laboratory uses to rebuild the world. It is
the text that above all else forces others, willingly or not, to consider the
importance of drug-carrying polymers in the treatment of cancer. It is the
text that boxes in and regulates the points of contact between clinicians
and researchers, patients and fund-raisers, polymers and livers,
laboratories and diseases. In short it is first and foremost the text which
imposes a structure on the world (p. 49).
The centrality of the literary activity led them and others to explore the role of
rhetoric in science. For example, Bazerman (1984) described the genre of experimental
articles in physics as a rhetorical accomplishment of the discipline that has evolved over
the years, and Bazerman (1988) described the ways in which language can constitute
scientific knowledge. Similarly Gieryn (1999) analyzed historical texts (both speech and
writing) on science to uncover the rhetoric of early science advocates to establish the
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epistemic authority of science. From these and many other studies, scholars in science
and technology studies now generally regard science as a rhetorical activity (Latour,
1987; Myers, 1996; Latour & Woolgar, 1986).
This recognition that science is a rhetorical activity has allowed us to import
various concepts and terminology from language studies to illuminate the work of science
(Harris, 2005). For example, Gross (1990) introduces concepts from classical rhetoric,
such arrangement and stasis to analyze scientific prose. Similarly, scholars in Seltzer’s
(1993) anthology use different kinds of rhetorical analysis, such as dramatistic analysis
(Lyne, 1993), genre analysis (Myers, 1993), and citation analysis (Winsor, 1993), to
illuminate the role and nature of rhetoric in science. But one particular approach that is
relevant in this dissertation is put forward by Latour and Woolgar (1986) and (more so)
by Latour (1987), who examined what Latour calls “modalities” (p. 22). Latour’s
modalities, unlike modalities in grammar (Greenbaum & Quirk, 1990), are the textual
contexts that strengthen or weaken a given claim.
Latour illustrates his concept of modality by using (2-3) as a sample statement that
can be later modified with positive or negative modality.
(2-3) New Soviet missiles aimed against Minutemen silos are accurate to 100 metres (p.
22).
Somebody who heard the statement (2-3) may incorporate this statement to make
another argument (2-4). 
(2-4) Since [new Soviet missiles are accurate within 100 metres], this means that
Minutemen are not safe any more, and this is the main reason why the MX
weapon system is necessary (p. 22).
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The statement (2-4) contains the statement (2-3), but the knowledge status of (2-3)
has been altered because the textual context in (2-4) make it so that the statement in (2-3)
is assumed in (2-4). This transformation process is similar to some of the questioning
tactics by lawyers that we saw earlier (2-1), which makes it difficult to question the
statement in an embedded clause. The same phenomenon can also be explained by what
Kolln (2007) calls the “given-new contract,” which is a rhetorical principle to create
textual cohesion. But in this case, the sentence structure of (2-4) makes it so that the
embedded statement is offered as “given” information, thus, making it more difficult to
dispute. For all these reasons, the textual context of (2-4) constitute what Latour calls
positive modality, which makes an embedded statement more difficult to dispute, or make
it more fact-like.
On the other hand, the same statement (2-3) is put in a different textual context in
(2-5).
(2-5) Advocates of the MX in the Pentagon cleverly leak information contending that
[new Soviet missiles are accurate within 100 metres] (p. 22).
Unlike (2-4), which made it more difficult for the reader to question the veracity
of (2-3), (2-5) puts the original statement (2-3) in the textual context to invite questions.
For example, the statement is now attributed to a special interest group (“advocates of the
MX”), with verbs and adjectives that emphasize the motives of the advocates (“cleverly,”
“leak,” “contending”). These elements make the textual context in (2-5) a negative
modality, which casts doubt on the veracity of the embedded statement, making it less
fact-like.
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With the same modality examples, Latour (1987) makes a more important
argument that the use of modality itself constitutes a making (or breaking) of a scientific
fact. In order to do so, Latour applies his concept of modality to scientific literature and
notes the subtle shifts in modality as the statement in question is subtlety, but rhetorically,
pushed toward a fact or an artifact. For example, a statement such as “The primary
structure of Growth-Hormone-Releasing Hormone (GHRH) is
Val-His-Leu-Ser-Ala-Glu-Glu-Lys-Glu-Ala” (p. 23) presupposes a discovery of the
structure of GHRH and undermine the criticism that the sequence is identical to that of
haemoglobin, a common contaminant in a laboratory study. In order for the scientist to
establish this as a fact, he or she needs to convince the scientific community by means of
rhetoric (along with the scientific evidence). In response, other scientists might refer to
this study by writing “so-and-so suggested that the primary structure of GHRH is...,”
making the maker of the knowledge visible with positive or negative modalities to qualify
the statement. If the knowledge is unproblematized, the modality will later subside to
“so-and-so (year) determined the sequence of GHRH: ...” until the modality completely
disappears, and two terms literally become synonymous and used casually like “We
injected 2 mg of GHRH into....”
Latour’s (1987) modality is important because it puts rhetoric in the center of
science, and it explains how (social) scientists use rhetoric (not just conduct experiments)
to argue (not just report) scientific facts. This rhetorical interaction is incorporated into
Latour’s (2005) actor-network theory, which explains social practices (like science) by
examining the ways in which both human and nonhuman participants (called actant) are
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enlisted into the network of social practices. As we will see later in this chapter, Latour’s
theory shares some similarities with Foucault’s discursive formation, and it contrasts with
some theories of genre. But what is important is that Latour’s framework has been
successfully used in Winsor (1993) to document the dissemination of a scientific
argument and to trace the rhetorical transformation from an argument into a fact. In this
dissertation, I am using Latour’s notion of modality in Chapter 5 to trace uptake of ideas
and the nature of that uptake from the testimonies of academic experts to a policy relevant
document. Furthermore, the concept of “enlisting” an actant into the network (albeit into
a different kind of network) is borrowed from Latour during the analysis in Chapter 4.
2.3.2. Incommensurability and Boundary Crossing
If science is a rhetorical activity, then an application of science in other domains
(like law and public policy) is also a rhetorical problem. This issue is labeled as
incommensurability problem in science studies, and there have been efforts to understand
the range and nature of incommensurability and ways of overcoming incommensurability.
The last two subsections on rhetoric of science literature examine incommensurability
and crossing of that incommensurability boundary. In order to do so, this sections begins
by describing the concept of incommensurability and the ways in which this concept is
typically applied to describe incommensurability among scientific paradigms. The
description is followed by Galison’s (1997) model of overcoming the incommensurability
boundary. The last subsection of the science studies literature focuses more on language
to point out rhetorical and linguistic consequences of boundary crossing.
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The term incommensurability is attributed to Kuhn’s (1962) The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, in which he describes science in terms of successive paradigm
shifts rather than a continual progress. One consequence of Kuhnian paradigm shift is that
a same observation signifies something different to the inhabitants of different paradigms.
One of Kuhn’s examples comes from the eighteenth century chemistry and Lavoisier’s
discovery of oxygen. During that period, the dominant theory in chemistry was the
phlogiston theory, which stated that all flammable materials contained phlogiston, and
phlogiston was liberated by burning those materials. Using this theory, the British chemist
Joseph Priestley, isolated the “dephlogisticated air.” But Lavoisier noted the problem of
accounting for the weight under the phlogiston theory and introduced the caloric theory
and identified the new gas as “oxygen.” Such paradigm shift is important because, as
Kuhn argues, paradigm is linked to perception:
Lavoisier, we said, saw oxygen where Priestley had seen dephlogisticated
air and where others had seen nothing at all. In learning to see oxygen,
however, Lavoisier also had to change his view of many other more
familiar substances. He had, for example, to see a compound ore where
Priestley and his contemporaries had seen an elementary earth, and there
were other such changes besides. At the very least, as a result of
discovering oxygen, Lavoisier saw nature differently (p. 118).
Kuhn’s work on paradigm led others to explore the concept of
incommensurability, which is the idea that people from different paradigms do not
understand one another. In its strongest form, which Harris (2005) calls “brick-wall
incommensurability” (p. 115), there are no contacts between the two paradigms, and the
inhabitants from the two paradigms literally cannot understand one another. This level of
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incommensurability is unlikely in any two paradigms, and it is at best a theoretical ideal.
His other types of incommensurabilities are more plausible:
 Cosmic incommensurability: A form of incommensurability based on what is
known as the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis in sociolinguistics (Whorf, 1956). The
Whorf-Sapir hypothesis, in its strong form, states that reality is constructed by
language so that differences in language amount to differences in reality.
 Semantic incommensurability: A form of incommensurability that results from
different understanding of a few key lexical items.
 Pragmatic incommensurability: A form of incommensurability that is grounded in
practice. Misunderstanding can be partly attributed to semantic
incommensurability, but differences in values and practices create a bigger
problem.
 Value incommensurability. A form of incommensurability that results from
incompatible moral values.
 Postmodern incommensurability: A form of incommensurability that results from
postmodern deconstruction of meaning.
These incommensurability terms are useful because they allow us to theorize a
range of problems when science crosses a boundary whether that boundary may be
paradigmatic, disciplinary, or professional. In that sense Kuhn’s paradigm is similar to
Caplan’s (1979) community, and the problem we saw earlier about science-policy and
science-law relationships is an incommensurability problem.
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Although the term incommensurability refers to a lack of understanding across
paradigms and domains, incommensurability is not necessarily debilitating (Harris, 2005).
In fact, the concept is useful precisely because it allows us to imagine how we can
overcome incommensurability.
One theoretical attempt to overcome incommensurability is seen in Galison’s
(1997) theory of trading zone, which relies on sociolinguistic metaphors to compare
language with paradigm. His metaphor is essentially a situation in which there are
multiple linguistic groups1 with no lingua franca to communicate with one another, but
these groups still need to communicate, usually for commercial reasons. Under such
condition these people improvise a rudimentary language-like medium called pidgin to
communicate with one another, and over time, a pidgin may develop into a full-fledged
language called creole. According to Galison, a similar process occurs when there is a
paradigm shift, and people from different paradigms improvise a pidgin-like language to
share concepts across the paradigm boundary. His example comes from nineteenth
century physicists and engineers, who needed to communicate one another from disparate
theoretical framework to collaborate on radar. In the process of doing so, they have
improvised words like “equivalent circuits” to make their collaboration possible.
In Chapter 4, Galison’s trading zone is compared to the preliminary hearing in the
Sophonow Inquiry to say how concepts from academic research are negotiated into the
Cory report. The next section, by contrast, focuses more on the transformation of
rhetorical and linguistic elements that cross an incommensurability boundary from
science.
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2.3.3. Language and Rhetoric in Incommensurability and Boundary Crossing
If overcoming incommensurability depends on pidgin-like contact language in the
trading zone, analyzing lexical items like Galison (1997) did is a promising start. But as
rhetoricians, we have access to more concepts and terminology that allow us to note and
describe many other aspect of that contact language. Therefore, this final section on
rhetoric of science reviews the literature that studied the transformation of language when
scientific ideas left the genre of research articles. While these studies address the research
problem in this dissertation about circulation of knowledge and discourse, the studies in
this area are typically limited to the transformation and re-/misrepresentation of scientific
ideas in the popular genres. But the concepts from these studies are useful in this
dissertation, as I will appeal to some of the same concepts in my analysis, which
document the rhetorical transformation from social science to public policy.
One of the early studies on this topic was conducted by Gilbert and Mulkay
(1984), who noted that scientists used two distinct forms of language. They found that the
rationalist characteristics of scientific language occur only when they are writing
scientific articles. Fahnestock (1986) examined science articles and their popularized
versions in Science and compared paired samples. MacDonald (2005) also studied
science and popular writing, using a report from the Women’s Health Initiative and the
journalistic coverage of that report. These and other scholars have provided evidence that
circulation of knowledge often leaves behind the language and rhetoric that were
originally associated with that knowledge, and this separation between knowledge and
language has consequences for the representations of that knowledge.
40
Perhaps the biggest reason for the shift is the differences in goals and values. Just
as much as the goals and values of policy makers and the legal system differ from those
of (social) science, popular science writers have goals and values that are distinct from
those of scientists. Fahnestock (1986) argues that the goal of popular science is
teleological, and popular science writers often emphasize individual scientists (Charney,
2003) because readers of popular science are typically motivated by factors, such as
utility, personal relevance, and entertainment. By contrast, the goal of research articles is
ontological, and scientists emphasize the collective disciplinary interests in their writing
of research articles. Perhaps as a result, popularized articles tend to focus on uniqueness
of a particular discovery (Fahnestock, 1986), ingenuity of individual scientists
(Fahnestock, 1986), and the story often narrates themes that focus on human agents
(Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Heffer, 2005; MacDonald, 2005; Schnabel, 2003). By
comparison, research articles often appeal to similarities with other studies (Fahnestock,
1986), appeal to the collective values, and erase individuality and personal judgments
through the impersonal style, textually writing themselves out as agents (Fahnestock,
1986; Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984).
Other differences include cohesive ties, which are obvious with common
transitions in popular but obscure in science, requiring specialized knowledge of the
discipline (Myers, 1991). The grammatical subjects in journalistic articles are often
occupied by phenomenal class nouns (nouns that refer to objects and phenomena under
study) while grammatical subjects in scientific articles are filled with what MacDonald
(2005) calls epistemic class nouns: research, researchers, data, schools of thoughts
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(Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; MacDonald, 2005). The sentence structure in scientific articles
is more complex than the one in popular writing (Ellegard, 1978).
Table 2.3. Linguistic and Rhetorical Differences between Science and Popular Writing
The writer narrates
(narrative freedom)
Does not narrate (or
narrative structure is
severely constrained by
IMRAD)
Narration (Heffer, 2005;
MacDonald, 2005)
Personal, dramatizedImpersonal, measuredStyle (Fahnestock, 1986;
Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984)
Less hedgesHedgesHedges (Fahnestock, 1986;
Myers, 1992)
Less embeddingMore embeddingSentence Structure
(Ellegard, 1978)
Humans as agentsData as agentsAgency (Gilbert & Mulkay,
1984)
Phenomenal subjectsEpistemic subjectsGrammatical Subject
(MacDonald, 1992, 2005)
“Obvious” cohesive tiesCohesive ties rely on
specialized knowledge
Cohesion (Myers, 1991)
Emphasis on uniquenessEmphasis on
commonality
Emphasis (Fahnestock, 1986)
Emphasis on individualEmphasis on collectiveValue (Fahnestock, 1986)
TeleologicalOntologicalGoal (Fahnestock, 1986)
PopularScience
These rhetorical and linguistic differences, to a certain extent, illustrate various
types of incommensurability. For example, the different uses of words clearly illustrate
Harris’ (2005) semantic incommensurability, which is also a result of value
incommensurability and pragmatic incommensurability. One could argue that these
differences also amount to cosmic incommensurability if one believes in the strong
version of the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis, but this level of incommensurability is probably
not justified. What this juxtaposition shows, however, is that the incommensurability that
separates science from other domains is not the “brick-wall” variety, and ideas and
language from science do cross the domain boundary. However, the boundary crossing
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seems to necessitate changes in language and rhetoric perhaps as a result of changes in
goals and values.
It is perhaps worth noting the similarity between the above descriptive studies in
rhetoric of science and interview studies in political science, which was discussed at the
beginning of this chapter. Some studies in political science prescriptively conclude that
researchers should adopt the language of the policy makers to facilitate research
utilization (Crewe & Young, 2002; Jasanoff, 2005); descriptive studies in rhetoric of
science found that language of science changes when it crosses the boundary between
science and popular. This issue of rhetorical and linguistic accommodation will be
discussed in Chapter 6, and many of the concepts from this section of the literature
review will be relevant in the analysis in that chapter.
To summarize, scholars in science studies have documented rhetoricity in science,
incommensurability, and consequences of crossing incommensurability boundaries. The
next section of the literature review also examines this boundary crossing phenomenon,
but this phenomenon is examined at the level of genres.
2.4. Literature on Genres and Collection of Genres
The fourth section of the literature review covers theories of genre, focusing
particularly on collection of genres. Genre is a powerful theoretical concept because it
provides a workable solution to the methodological dilemma in rhetoric and composition
to account for the context of writing while maintaining adequate analysis of the text (Paré
& Smart, 1994). In addition, the theories of genre (and of collections of genres) are
particularly helpful in examining and articulating the circulation of discourse and
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knowledge, and this is the basis of my earlier claim that our discipline is uniquely
positioned to contribute to this multi-disciplinary endeavor to study the relationship
between academic research and public policy. The literature in this section is used in this
dissertation as a theoretical framework in Chapter 4 as I conduct a genre-based analysis
on the circulation of knowledge. In addition, this section and the next section on
circulation of discourse indicate rooms for further theorizing in relation to uptake, a point
that is more fully discussed in Chapter 4.
This section begins from Miller’s definition of genre and subsequent theoretical
development. But the definition is followed by an extended discussion on theories that
examine the relationship among genres, such as genre set, genre system, genre repertoire,
genre ecology, and genre colony.
2.4.1. Genre
Traditionally, “genre” was defined in literary studies as a taxonomy based on
certain textual and semantic regularities. However, in the last 25 years the concept of
“genre” has been reconceptualized with Miller’s (1984) seminal essay, which defined
genre as typified rhetorical responses to recurring situations. This redefinition
transformed genre from a literary category of syntax and semantics into a category that is
used to explore social actions.
Miller’s (1984/1994a) new genre is grounded in the rhetorical tradition (esp.
Bitzer, 1968), which emphasizes the pragmatic, rather than the formal, aspect of the
discourse. As a result, Miller proposed a definition of genre that is based on recurrence in
social action that embodied both form and substance, mediated private intentions and
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social exigence, and encompassed the social context of the rhetorical situation. Genre’s
ability to mediate social actions in the society is further elaborated in another essay by
Miller (1994b), which locates genre between the macro-level social context and the
micro-level individual intentions. Drawing from Gidden’s (1981) structuration theory,
Miller argues that genre is simultaneously constructionist and construtivist:
constructionist in the sense that genre, along with its linguistic structures, provides a
readily available social action that embodies the structure of the collective, thus,
necessarily reproducing that structure. But at the same time, genre is also construtivist in
that individuals must create a structure and convince others to recognize that structure (p.
71).
This mediational aspect of genre is noted by other scholars, particularly the ones
who combine genre theory and activity theory (e.g., Artemeva & Freedman, 2001;
Bazerman, 2003; Dias, Freedman, Medway, & Paré, 1999; Russell, 1995, 1997; Russell
& Yañez, 2003; Spinuzzi, 2003; Winsor, 1999). Seen in this framework, genres are
“typified tool-mediated ways of purposefully and dialectically interacting among people
in some social practice (and across various linked social practices)” (Russell, 1997, p.
512).
2.4.2. Genre Set
In our collective pursuit to better understand genres and their mediational roles,
genre scholars have extended their lines of inquiry beyond a single genre to examine the
relationship among related genres. One of the earliest investigations was conducted by
Devitt (1991), who analyzed 13 genres used by tax accountants (e.g., transmittal letters,
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tax reports, proposals) and explained the relationship among them. In doing so, Devitt
proposed the term genre set to refer to a collection of genre that interact “to accomplish
the work of the tax department” (p. 340). While genre set has been useful in that it
allowed us to extend our thinking beyond the description of a single genre, it drew some
criticism from other theorists. For example, Bazerman (1994) argues that genre set only
represents a collection of genre from a single vantage point, in this case from the
perspective of the accounting firm. It obscures genres enacted by other participants, such
as the clients and the IRS. Another criticism of genre set is that it assigns agency to the
individual writer, yet its notion of individual actually suppresses individual variations
(Spinuzzi, 2004).
2.4.3. Genre System
A similar concept is put forward by Bazerman (1994), who introduced genre
system to refer to “interrelated genres that interact with each other in specific settings” (p.
97). The crucial distinction between genre set and genre system is that genre system can
account for “the full set of genres that instantiate the participation of all the parties,” and
it is not limited by a single vantage point. Furthermore, the original Bazerman’s work
emphasizes the linear relationship among genres and appropriateness of speech acts and
rhetorical performance of participants at each juncture. One of the examples that
Bazerman provides is the sequence of genres associated with an assignment in a
university class, which begins with a handout, followed by questions and answers, advice
on completing the assignment, submission of the papers, teacher marginalia, and
evaluations (possibly followed by student complaints, negotiations, and grade appeals) (p.
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98). Through this and other similar examples, Bazerman points out the importance of
sequencing. A student, for example, cannot complain about the grade before submitting
the essay and receiving the evaluation. Through the same example, Bazerman also points
out the relationship among genres in terms of speech act; the speech acts performed by
preceding genres have consequences for succeeding genres.
As I will discuss below, Bazerman’s genre system has been further developed by
other scholars, but Spinuzzi (2004) points out some of the limitations of what he calls the
“original genre system.” For example, he points out that genre system’s communicative
focus does not sufficiently account for the performative and mediational aspects of
genres. Furthermore, its emphasis on sequential relationship obscures the synchronic
overlaps, discussed by others (Orlikowski & Yates, 1994).
Bazerman’s genre system has been embraced by other scholars, particularly by
those who use activity theory, and the “later version” (Spinuzzi’s [2004] term) of genre
system addresses some of these criticisms. But before we can understand the later version
of genre system, we need the basic understanding of activity theory.
Activity theory, which originates in Soviet psychology (Leont’ev, 1978;
Vygotsky, 1978, 1986), is a sociohistorical approach to human activity that is designed to
analyze changes in activities over time (see Cole & Engëström, 1993). The theory has
been widely adopted by genre theorists (e.g., Artemeva & Freedman, 2001; Russell, 1997;
Winsor, 1999) because it complements genre theory in two ways: (1) It theorizes the role
of agency, which has been under-theorized in genre theory (Winsor, 1999), and (2) it
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explains the changes in genres (Artemeva & Freedman, 2001) after they have been
“stabilized for now” (Schryer, 1993, p. 108).
Because of this influence from activity theory, the later version of genre system
overcomes some of the earlier criticisms. For example, Russell’s (1997) analysis of
academic genre system is clearly mediational, as he uses activity theory to interrogate the
relationship among genres within university and genres of related institutions.
Furthermore, his analysis accounts for the synchronic (as well as diachronic) relationship
even though the nature of that relationship is different from the overlapping relationship
in Orlikowski and Yates (1994). Similarly Russell and Yañez (2003) emphasize the
complex network of intertextuality among various synchronic (and diachronic) genres and
contexts that makes it difficult to make writing meaningful to the students, but they
maintain that this difficulty may be overcome by the revelation of the textual pathways to
the students.
While the later version of genre system address the mediational aspect of genres
as well as the synchronic intertextuality among genres, its focus on purpose and its refusal
to grant agency to nonhuman actors are potentially limiting. These limitations come as a
result of a fusion with activity theory. As described earlier, a human activity, in activity
theory, is objective-driven, and it intentionally distinguishes subjects and mediational
tools to preserve agency of the human actors. Perhaps this objective-driven nature of
activity theory and its co-occurrence with genre system may have led Devitt (2004) to
interpret genre system as “a genre set identifiable by those who use it that has clearly
linked genres with a common purpose” (p. 56). Devitt seems to appreciate genre system
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and its ability to capture the regularity and rule-governedness of such genre sets, but she
is ultimately uncomfortable with the term “system” because it implies unnecessary
rigidity.
The second limitation of genre system is that it insists on separating human actors
and other nonhuman actors (like genres), and this problem is elaborated in Latour (1988)
although his criticism was directed toward American sociologists and not genre scholars.
In it, he argues that what matters are the functions of each sociological entity, which he
later calls “actant” (Latour, 2005), and the relationship among these entities, not whether
these entities are made of flesh or metals. A similar critique on genre theories is found in
Spinuzzi (2004), who also argue for the capacity of nonhuman actors to occupy the agent
position.2 Somewhat like Latour, who ascribed traditionally human characteristics to a
door, Spinuzzi also describes the genre of checklists in the following manner:
When Ralph takes up the genres he has been given – such as the checklist
he uses to guide his phone calls – he uses the checklist to mediate (or
control from outside) his actions; he acquiesces to and learns a way of
doing things. One could say that far from performing the genre, Ralph is
being performed by the genre (p. 115, emphasis in original).
The genre’s ability to compel participants to perform an act is relevant to this
dissertation, as the analysis in Chapter 4 discusses the ways in which certain textual
relationships can make certain changes more or less likely.
2.4.4. Genre Repertoire
Another effort to theorize a collection of genres comes from Orlikowski and Yates
(1994), who invented the term genre repertoire to refer to “the set of genres routinely
enacted by a particular community” (p. 546). Unlike Bazerman’s genre system, which
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sought to extend Devitt’s genre set, Orlikowski and Yates’ genre repertoire focuses on
particular aspects and characteristics of a genre set or system.3 Like Bazerman,
Orlikowski and Yates recognize the interdependence of genres in a genre system and how
they collectively enact a particular social action. In addition, Orlikowski and Yates note
that genres can also be collectively mobilized by overlaps and proper inclusion (one genre
contains another genre). This move marked a break from the sequential thinking in the
original genre system and encouraged further theorizations on synchronic textual
interdependence, which is reflected in the later version of the genre system.
But perhaps their most important contribution lies in their attempt to examine the
frequency of certain genres and why certain genres dominate a particular genre system
while other genres occur only periodically or not at all. In doing so, they introduced the
vocabulary, such as dormant genre, which still belongs to the genre system but is seldom
enacted as well as rejected genre, which was once a part of the genre system but was
officially evicted from the system.
2.4.5. Genre Ecology
Spinuzzi and Zachry (2000) introduced the term genre ecology in an attempt to
theorize more on the role of individual improvisations in genre theory. Although Spinuzzi
and Zachry do not cite Winsor (1999) in their article, the impetus for their argument
seems similar to the concerns raised by her that genre theories have typically focused
more on the top-down social constructionist aspect rather than the bottom-up
constructivist aspect even though Miller (1984/1994a, 1994b) was careful to describe the
duality (see above). By advocating the concept of genre ecology, Spinuzzi and Zachry
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want genre scholars to recognize unofficial and improvised genres when analyzing a
human acitivtiy.4
Like the later version of genre system, genre ecology relies on activity theory and
takes the unit of analysis as a human activity, and it treats genres as primarily
mediational. It is also similar to genre repertoire in that it recognizes the overlapping
relationship of genres, but it also focuses on the “intermediational” aspect of genres.
However, what is different from other theories that refer to a collection of genres is that it
takes a more distributed view on agency and recognizes agency in nonhuman actors. 
Distributed agency derives from Hutchins’ (1993) distributed cognition, which
refers to the fact that certain knowledge belongs to the collective rather than individuals.
This concept is illustrated in the six quarter masters he examined, and he argues that the
knowledge of how to navigate a ship does not belong to any of the single quartermasters
but to the collective. In this scenario, two bearing takers report the bearing to the bearing
time recorder who communicates the bearing to the plotter who, in turn, plots the ship’s
position and project that position in the next few observations. The plotter, then, instructs
the helmsman and the lee helmsman to change the direction and the speed of the ship.
Through this example, Hutchins argues that the cognition is distributed among the six
quartermasters. Distributed cognition has been used relatively frequently in genre studies
(e.g., Dias, et al., 1999; Freedman & Smart, 1997, Pare, 2000). However, it is Spinuzzi’s
(2003, 2004) genre ecology, more than anything else, that incorporate the distributed
nature of agency and incorporate it into the theory of genre collections.
51
Assigning agency to nonhuman actors is not new, as mentioned earlier (Latour,
1988), but the idea has not received much attention in genre theory perhaps partly due to
the popularity of activity theory, which insists on separating subjects and mediational
tools. What is interesting about genre ecology is that Spinuzzi (2004) begins from the
same Vygotskian assumption that “genres don’t communicate, they mediate” (p. 114,
emphasis in original) and assigns the agency role to anything (and anyone) that mediates.
By this reasoning, fax cover sheets, checklists, post-it notes, and past due notices all
mediate human activities, and they are all rhetorical agents by that definition.
2.4.6. Genre Colony
Coming from the perspective of applied linguistics,4 Bhatia (2002) sought to
expand the scope of domain specificity of the existing genre terms. Bhatia interprets
genre set and genre system as primarily defined (thus constrained) by a specific
professional activity (pp. 53-54). Therefore, he sees the needs to introduce terminology
that can encompass a greater collection of genres. It is in this context in which Bhatia
introduces disciplinary genres to refer to all genres, “which are used by most of its
members in the achievement of the professional objectives” (p. 54). To work from the
Devitt’s example, a genre set of tax accountants consists of all the typical genres that are
used by accountants to accomplish their work; a genre system (in Bazerman’s original
definition) consists of all the typical genres used by the accountants and other participants
to accomplish the same work; disciplinary genres consists of all the typical genres used in
the profession of accounting. In addition, Bhatia recognizes what he calls super-genre,
which contains recognizable forms and functions across the disciplinary boundary. One
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well-known super-genre Bhatia cites is research article introductions (Swales, 1990),
which clearly share similarities across genre boundaries.
However, the biggest contribution of Bhatia (2002) comes from his theory of
genre colony, which refers to a collection of genres that are characterized by a general
communicative purpose, such as promotion, introduction, and reporting. Because these
purposes are general, genres that belong to each colony cuts across the traditional
disciplinary and professional boundaries. Furthermore, some genres are much more
central to a colony (i.e., the general communicative purpose of the colony strongly
characterize these genres), while others are more peripheral. For example, the
promotional genre colony obviously contains advertisements, sales promotions, reference
letters, and book blurbs, but it also contains annual reports, prefaces (of books), and travel
brochures, which may have different primary general communicative purposes but still
contain some elements of promotion. Because genre colonies enlist genres that only
marginally share their general communicative purposes, there are considerable overlaps
among genre colonies, with a single genre belonging to multiple colonies.
The second characteristic of genre colony is the process of colonization, which
Bhatia derives from Fairclough’s (1992) commodification, which subverts a
non-commercial institutional order of discourse into a commercial one. Therefore,
Bhatia’s genre colony:
involves invasion of the integrity of one genre by another genre or genre
convention, often leading to the creation of a hybrid form, which
eventually shares some of its genre characteristics with the one that
influenced it in the first place (p. 58)
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Bhatia illustrates this colonization process through the advertising genre, which
clearly invaded the territorial integrity of many genres, such as academic, corporate,
political, journalistic, and other genres. As a result, many of these genres now contain a
wide variety of rhetorical and linguistic elements, borrowed from the advertising genre,
expanding the territory of the promotional genre colony.
His concept of colonization becomes important in Chapter 6 when we examine
the uptake of specific micro-level linguistic elements from academic research. I will
argue that the linguistic uptake constitutes a colonization that can potentially influence
legal professionals to adopt values and worldviews of academic research.
Table 2.4. Genre Set, System, Repertoire, Ecology, and Colony
A collection of genres that share a general communicative purpose
that cuts across disciplinary boundaries.
Genre Colony
A collection of official and unofficial genres that mediate human
activities. 
Genre Ecology
A collection of genres that are frequently invoked in a particular
community.
Genre Repertoire
A collection of genres that enacts an articulation of an activity
from all parties. 
Genre System
A collection of genres in a profession to accomplish its work.Genre Set
Characteristics
These theories of genres are useful in that they organize our thinking on genres
and that they help us understand the relationship among different genres. For these
reasons, the theories of genre will fare prominently in Chapter 4 when we examine the
intertextual relationship of the Sophonow case as we trace ideas from research articles
into the Cory report. Bhatia’s genre colony, on the other hand, will resurface again in
Chapter 6 when we focus on specific language elements that seem to invade the generic
integrity of research genre and policy genre. As a single case study, I will not be able to
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make claims about colonization of genres, but the concept of colonization is useful in
analyzing the influence, especially when coupled with circulation of discourse, which is
discussed in the next section.
2.5. Literature on Circulation of Discourse
The final section of the literature review discusses circulation of discourse. The
issue is already partially discussed in the literature on science studies and genre theory,
but this section focuses on the relationship among discourse, knowledge, and ideology.
The literature in this section provides many concepts, such as discursive formations,
addressivity and uptake that are important to understanding the research problem in this
dissertation. However, these concepts do not sufficiently accommodate the complexity
and multiplicity of texts and genres that are outlined earlier in the genre section.
Therefore, in Chapter 4, I will combine some of the concepts from these two sections to
enrich the current thinking on genres and circulation of discourse.
This section of the literature review begins by Foucault’s theory of discursive
formation to establish the epistemic consequences of discursive relationship. Foucault’s
section is followed by the review of sociolinguists and critical discourse analysts who
noted the ideological valence of discourse. After establishing the epistemic and
ideological consequences of the circulation of discourse, we will finally focus on theories
on circulation of discourse, with special attention to Freadman’s (2002) uptake.
2.5.1. Discursive Formations
The relationship among discourse, knowledge, and ideology is most articulated in
Foucault (1972a), who interrogated the role of discourse in history. While I do not intend
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to provide a comprehensive account of Foucault’s theory of discourse, this section
describes his theory of discourse and knowledge, which leads to the relationship between
discourse and ideology in the next section.
Foucault argues that the formation of objects, concepts, and knowledge is not
determined by their internal properties, coherence, or rigor. Rather, they are the products
of discursive relations that make their formations possible. As an example of the
formation of an object, Foucault draws from his earlier study (1965) on psychopathology
to illustrate the role of discourse in the ontological origin of “madness.” Foucault argues
that its emergence as objects derive from (a) the normative discourse (of the family, work,
religious communities, etc.), which defined the threshold of deviance, and beyond that
point, a phenomenon required an explanation (1972a, p. 41); (b) the authority of
delimitation (the medical profession), which was authorized by public opinion, law, and
government, to name, define, and establish “madness” as an object (pp. 41-42); and (c)
the grid of specification, which located and created a discursive space for madness in
relation to other words/objects and generated words/objects in relation to madness.
Furthermore, the discursive formation of madness was made possible by the discursive
relationship in the related disciplines, such as law and law enforcement. What we need to
take away from Foucault’s argument is the centrality of discourse in generating objects,
concepts, and knowledge.
After establishing the centrality of discourse, Foucault (1972a) later introduces the
concept “positivity” (p.125) to refer to what cannot be accounted for, what is rarefied, or
what is marginalized by the normative discourse. The concept of positivity becomes
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important later in his book in which Foucault discusses the role of discourse in science
and knowledge. There, he argues that discursive positivities themselves are neither
knowledge nor a precursor of science, but it is the first threshold of becoming a
knowledge, “the precondition of what is later revealed and which later functions as an
item of knowledge or an illusion, an accepted truth or an exposed error, a definitive
acquisition or an obstacle surmounted” (p. 182). A similar observation on discursive
relationship leads us to uncover other thresholds, such as the “threshold of formalization”
(p. 187) and “threshold of epistemolization” (p. 187), which are all relevant discursive
formation in creating scientific knowledge.
In his appended essay, Foucault (1972b) notices a particular shift in authority
from the author to the statement. He illustrates this point with Greek poets, who
determined truthfulness of the statements by the speakers and the manners of their
speeches. Yet, the truthfulness, which had derived from the speaker, was later ascribed to
the internal property of the statement itself. This process of separating and obscuring the
source of authority is further developed with the sixteenth and seventeenth century
English scientists, who rhetorically constructed measurements, classification schemata,
particular viewpoints, and terminologies (e.g., “look rather than read, verify rather than
comment” [p. 218]) to satisfy their will to knowledge. Like Latour’s rhetorical modality,
the will to knowledge and the will to truth populates the discursive formation of science
to hide the rhetoricity from the system:
True discourse, liberated by the nature of its form from desire and power,
is incapable of recognising the will to truth which pervades it; and the will
to truth, having imposed itself upon us for so long, is such that the truth it
seeks to reveal cannot fail to mask it (p. 219).
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This will to truth and will to knowledge are also used in the judicial system to
obscure the source of knowledge. This theoretical framework will be applied in Chapter 4
to reveal this process in the Sophonow case and unmask the influence of academic
research.
2.5.2. Ideological Consequences
If knowledge-making is discursive, so is creation and maintenance of power, and
Foucault (1972a) points out the ideological nature of scientific knowledge. Using (again)
“madness” as an example, Foucault contrasts the discursive formations of the medical
knowledge in the classical time and that of psychopathology in the nineteenth century to
point out that scientific discourse in the nineteenth century psychopathology is a localized
discursive formation within a larger discursive formations. According to Foucault
(1972b), power is accrued in this theoretical framework by this discursive relationship
and the rules of exclusions that regulate what can be spoken of, where and how it can be
spoken, and who is authorized to speak of it (p. 216). His example comes from Mendel,
whose work on heredity was unappreciated by the early nineteenth century botanist.
Foucault argues that these rules of exclusion prohibited Mendel from participating the
discursive formations (or actor-network in Latour’s framework) because Mendel
discussed his work, using theories and terminology that were not part of the discipline of
botany in his time. Foucault’s rules of exclusion have implications for studying academic
research and public policy, and these concepts will be used throughout the analysis
chapters.
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This connection between discourse and ideology was important in development of
critical discourse analysis, which analyzes “opaque as well as transparent structural
relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language”
(Wodak, 1995, p. 204). From this tradition, Fairclough (1992) theorized three approaches
to discourse: discourse as text, discourse as discursive practice, and discourse as social
practice. While all three approaches are important for critical discourse analysis, what is
interesting for us is the last two approaches because it allows us to see the connection
between discourse and ideology. Discourse-as-discursive-practice takes specific linguistic
objects (such as lexical items, syntax, and cohesion) and examines the ways in which
these objects are produced, circulated, and consumed. It is in this context in which
Fairclough introduces manifest intertextuality (and its subtypes) to emphasize “how
quoted utterances are selected, changed, [and] contextualized” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 29).
Fairclough’s last approach to discourse, discourse-as-social-practice, focuses on the
ideological aspect of discourse. Citing theories of hegemony (e.g., Gramsci, 1971; Laclau
& Mouffe, 1985 as cited in Fairclough, 1992), Fairclough identifies discursive practice,
its production, circulation, and reproduction as contributing to the hegemonic struggle.
The idea that language is ideologically charged is now widely shared by other
discourse analysts, applied linguists, compositionists, and genre scholars (e.g., Bhatia,
2002; Devitt, 2004; Dijk, 2001; Fishman & McCarthy, 2002; Huckin, 2002; Scollon &
Scollon, 2001; Wodak, 1995). Devitt summarizes it concisely when she writes “A genre
reflects, constructs, and reinforces the values, epistemology, and power relationships of the
group from which it developed and for which it functions” (p. 64). What this means for us is
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that circulation of discourse, is not merely a circulation of ideas. Understanding
circulation of discourse is important because it implies circulation of ideology,
epistemology, and power relationship, and this assumption is critical to the analysis in
Chapter 6.
2.5.3. Rhetorical Expectations and Uptake
Bakhtin (1986) also noted the relationship among texts by forwarding the concept
of dialogism (from the word dialogue), which assumes that any utterance is a rejoinder to
the existing dialogue, and only the mythical Adam could have escaped this dialogic
orientation (p. 279). In his oft-quoted passage, Bakhtin reveals intertextuality and the
importance of uptake:
Any speaker is himself a respondent to a greater or lesser degree. He is
not, after all, the first speaker, the one who disturbs the eternal silence of
the universe. And he presupposes not only the existence of the language
system he is using, but also the existence of preceding utterances—his
own and others’—with which his given utterance enters into one kind of
relation or another (builds on them, polemicizes with them, or simply
presumes that they are already known to the listener.) Any utterance is a
link in a very complexly organized chain of other utterances (p. 69).
Bakhtin’s intertextuality is secured by what he calls addressivity, “the quality of
being directed to someone” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 95). In his view, addressivity is the quality
that makes it possible for an utterance to anticipate future utterances, and, thus, it already
incorporates features of these future utterances that are not yet made.
This intertextual relationship and the importance of securing uptake is further
articulated by Freadman (1987, 1994, 2002), who uses the tennis metaphor to argue, like
Bakhtin, that we analyze a text in relation to other texts that anticipate and that are
anticipated by it as well as the texts that surround them. Just as much as we don’t
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understand a game of tennis by focusing on a single tennis shot, we don’t understand a
genre by focusing on a single text. If we want to understand the game of tennis, we need
to study the relationship among consecutive tennis shots, their relationship to the rules,
social and ceremonial events (like opponent selections, opening ceremonies) that situate
the match, and so on. Similarly, if we want to understand genres, we need to study (1) the
ways in which a text is taken up and represented; (2) the manner in which a text acquires
significance from its discursive position in an intertextual chain; and (3) the collective
social action that is performed by that discursive chain.
In one sense, Freadman’s uptake is similar to Bakhtin’s (1986) addressivity and
Fairclough’s (1992) manifest intertextuality in that they all seek to understand the manner
in which discourses are linked. However, Freadman’s uptake differs from Bakhtin’s
addressivity in that she provides more concrete elements that allow us to observe the
intertextual relationship. Freadman’s uptake also differs from Fairclough’s manifest
intertextuality in that uptake encompasses both linguistic and semiotic texts, and it
focuses more on mediating social actions than describing textual patterns.
These emphases may be most pronounced in her more recent work, in which
Freadman (2002) used the concept of uptake to analyze how a death sentence was
transformed into execution in the Ryan hanging6 despite massive efforts to thwart this
transformation.
While many factors played a role in the uptake of the death sentence, Freadman
locates the crux of the matter in the struggle between the judicial and the executive
branches of the government. Judge Starke was a vocal opponent of death penalty, who
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was forced to pronounce a death sentence to Ryan because the Australian criminal law at
the time did not allow any other options for murder. The death sentence, of course,
legislatively enables the premier to perform an execution, but this uptake had not been
performed in the previous 16 years despite the 35 death sentences during the period.
Premier Bolte, however, wanted to use the Ryan case to assert executive authority, so he
made sure that none of the appeals would succeed.
The crucial moment (at least from the genre theory’s perspective) occurred in the
eve of the execution when the State Premier Bolte summoned Judge Stork to the cabinet
and asked if he agreed with the original verdict. The meeting was irregular, but it carried
no legal significance, so Judge Starke agreed. Freadman analyzes this event as a pastiche
genre, an imitation genre that superficially resembles a court trial. In this pastiche genre,
Premier Bolte occupied the role of a judge, and Judge Starke was forced to play the role
of a witness, repeat the death sentence, and support the prosecution. In the classic speech
act theory (Austin, 1962), such repetition would not perform a speech act since it does not
meet the felicity condition. But Freadman argues that this repetition, which crossed the
generic boundary between the judicial and the executive branch, was the uptake that
transformed the death sentence into the execution of Ryan.
The literature review on circulation of discourse has emphasized the role of
discourse in knowledge and ideology. This means that circulation of discourse is not
simply a dissemination of language but also of knowledge and ideology. This assumption
is used in Chapter 6 to justify the tracing of linguistic items across textual boundaries.
Theories on intertextuality and particularly the concept of “uptake” will recur throughout
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this dissertation, but the theoretical aspect of these concepts are particularly
problematized in Chapter 4 to point out the limitations of these theories and ways of
extending them.
2.6. Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the relevant literature from political science, expert
testimony, rhetoric of science, genre studies, and circulation of discourse to frame the
case study in this dissertation. The literature review in political science was used to
establish our current status of knowledge on the policy uptake of academic research and
point out the important but unfulfilled gap in the role of language and rhetoric in this
area. The promise of fulfilling this gap is articulated in the literature on rhetoric of
science, genres, and circulation of discourse by providing useful concepts and relevant
research that is applicable to the research questions in this dissertation. The literature
reviews from these three areas were also important in pointing out the theoretical gaps in
our current thinking of genres and uptake as well as establishing language-based methods
of investigating academic influence on policy, which are discussed more fully in the next
chapter. The literature on expert testimony is crucial to understanding the context of the
Sophonow case, which is a public inquiry based on judicial processes. The Sophonow
case will be fully described in the next chapter along with the methods I used to analyze
the case in this dissertation.
NOTES
1. Traditionally, the concept of agency is theorized to be a property of an individual
rhetor. However, Herndl and Licona (2007) recently theorized rhetorical agency as a
rhetorical position that one occupies.
2. To be technically accurate, Galison’s metaphor requires at least three distinct
language groups, none of which is dominant, in order for a pidgin to emerge.
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However, Galison is only using sociolinguistic as a metaphor, so his argument still
applies when there are only two paradigms.
3. Orlikowski and Yates (1994) invoke both Devitt’s genre set and Bazerman’s genre
system, but they do not focus on their differences.
4. Bhatia explicitly takes a systemic functional approach by citing scholars like Halliday
(1994). In this framework, the term genre refers to staged, goal-oriented social
processes” (Martin, 1993, p. 121). Compared to the rhetorical genre theory, the
systemic functional approach places a greater emphasis on textual form and less on
rhetorical function.
5. Spinuzzi and Zachry (2000) do not refer to activity theory in their article, but Spinuzzi
(2003, 2004) makes explicit connections between genre ecology and activity system. 
6. The Ryan hanging refers to the last execution in Australia before the practice was
discontinued (see Freadman, 1999).
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Chapter 3: Method
I have outlined the general problem and the research question in Chapter 1 and
discussed the relevant literature in Chapter 2. This chapter describes the methods used in
answering the research questions and how the literature is incorporated into these
methods. The chapter is organized in the following manner. The first section provides a
broad justification for using a qualitative case study, focusing on language with analytical
methods that are both quantitative and qualitative. The second section describes the
Sophonow case in detail to explain why this case was chosen for the purpose of
examining the relationship between academic research and public policy. The second
section also provides a detailed description of the case so that the reader can appreciate
the context of this study as well as its limitations. The third section lists the materials that
were used in this study, and the fourth section describes the analytical tools with an
extended discussion on citation analysis as a method.
3.1. Overall Method
The overall method of this study is qualitative even though one of the components
of this study is quantitative. The overall qualitative orientation of this study is partly
determined by the nature of the research questions. Dabbs (1982) argues that qualitative
methods are better suited for answering questions that begin with what, how, where, and
where. Furthermore, qualitative methodologists like Berg (2004) and Miles and
Huberman (1994) argue that qualitative approach can capture complex social phenomena
without oversimplifying them. Therefore, the research questions that seek to uncover the
complex nature (how) of the relationship between academic research and public policy
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are more appropriately answered by a qualitative approach. Furthermore, many studies on
this topic (see Chapter 2) use qualitative methods, so one could argue that the current
study follows the qualitative “tradition” even though the tradition comes from disparate
areas of study.
The decision to use a case study approach is informed by the fact that the
approach is capable of capturing “nuances, patterns, and latent elements that other
research approaches might overlook” (Berg, 2004, p. 251). Furthermore, Yin (2003)
argues that the case study approach is most appropriate when the researcher has little to
no control over the studied event, and the research requires multiple sources of evidence,
including documents, artifacts, interviews, and observation. As I will describe the case
below, the Sophonow Inquiry took place in the past, so it was clearly an event beyond the
researcher’s control. Even the influence of ideas and the circulation of discourse that
emerged from the case and that are still ongoing today are also beyond the researcher’s
control. In addition, the research on this topic that focuses on language is scarce (see
Chapter 2); therefore, I was not prepared to narrow down prematurely potential variables
that might illuminate our understanding of the relationship between academic research
and public policy, thus requiring a flexible approach that can handle multiple sources of
evidence.
The capacity of the case study approach to handle multiple sources of evidence
amounts to triangulation, which is the key to attaining validity and reliability in a
qualitative research (Berg, 2004; Miles & Huberman; Yin, 2003). Triangulation is
attained in this study by using multiple research materials and multiple analytical tools
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(see below). In particular, combining a quantitative method1 among other qualitative
methods diversify the overall method, thus contributing to further triangulation.
Finally, the focus on language is the gap in the literature in political science. As
described more fully in Chapter 2, research on this topic widely recognizes the
importance of language, yet no enough research has been conducted in this area that
provides an in-depth analysis on language.
3.2. Case Selection
In order to study the influence of academic research into policy, I needed a case in
which (1) the influence of research was clearly visible; (2) the case had significant policy
implications; and (3) the materials in the case were accessible. The Sophonow Inquiry
meets the first criteria since the inquiry invited various academic experts from
psychology, forensic psychiatry, and law to inform the inquiry report, and the report
contains obvious signs of influence by these experts. In addition, a social scientist at the
Scientific Evidence Workshop (National Research Council, 2002) described the changes
in police lineup procedure as one of the most successful changes in the legal system that
originated from academic research. This social scientist noted the concerted effort in
psychology to point out the weaknesses of a police lineup procedure that shows all the
participants at once. This procedure is problematic because eye witnesses compare the
suspect and fillers and choose whom they think as the closest even though the “closest”
may not be close enough. Therefore, psychologists have advocated a procedure in which
eye witnesses see one person at a time to avoid making the relative comparison. In terms
of the second criteria, the inquiry report made visible changes to the Winnipeg police
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guidelines on handling eye witnesses and conducting police-lineups, which was one of
the intended results of the inquiry. But in addition to this immediate change, the
recommendations of the Cory report were cited by a position paper by the heads of
federal, provincial, and territorial (FPT) prosecutors in 2005, which endorsed Cory’s
recommendations. Furthermore the recommendations from the Cory report have been
used in many future court cases (e.g., R. v. Boyer [2006] O.N.S.C.; R. v. Zurowski,
[2002] M.B.Q.B.; Regina v. Ellard, [2005] B.C.S.C) and in at least one future public
inquiry (Milgaard Inquiry, see Chapter 4 for details). Some popular media even reported
that the Sophonow Inquiry contributed to the adaptation of an amendment to the Criminal
Codes, known as the Section 690, which grants the Justice Minister a discretionary power
to respond to the suspected cases of wrongful convictions (Wrongfully, 2008). The
recommendations in the Cory report seem to continue its influence on changing police
guidelines elsewhere in Canada. In terms of the third criteria, the Sophonow Inquiry was
accessible because it was a public inquiry so that the public was entitled to the
information. In this regard, the inquiry report is freely available online
(http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/publications/sophonow/), and the transcripts from the
preliminary hearing is also publicly accessible (for a fee).
3.2.1. Case: The Sophonow Case
The Sophonow case began on December 23, 1981 when Barbara Stoppel, a
sixteen-year-old employee at the Ideal Donut Shop in Winnipeg, Manitoba, was strangled
in the women’s washroom. Eye witnesses reported seeing a tall man with a cowboy hat,
suspiciously closing the shop and leaving the scene. One witness in particular, John
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Doerksen, claimed to have followed the cowboy, picked up a baseball bat along the way,
and struggled with the cowboy on the bridge from which the cowboy threw out the gloves
and twines he used during the crime. The subsequent police investigation led to the arrest
and conviction of Thomas Sophonow in 1983, and Sophonow endured three trials and
four years in jail.
However, there were many troubling aspects of Sophonow's convictions. First and
foremost, Doerksen did not, in fact, struggle with the cowboy; instead when he could not
find the cowboy, he went home and had five beers. Furthermore, Doerksen was
hypnotized at University of Manitoba to recount variations of his original stories. Soon
afterward, Doerksen started identifying almost every tall man as the killer, yet he did not
identify Sophonow at the first police lineup. But on March 15, 1982, Doerksen was taken
to the Public Safety Building in Winnipeg for unpaid traffic fines and met Sophonow face
to face while holding a Winnipeg newspaper, which contained a picture of Sophonow as
the prime suspect for the murder. It was only then when Doerksen decided that Sophonow
was the killer.
Other witnesses had trouble identifying Sophonow at the first lineup as well. It
was only through biased police lineups, repeated suggestions from the police, and through
the media exposure that the witnesses identified Sophonow as the perpetrator. Even then,
their verbal descriptions of the identification were tentative. But at the three trials, all eye
witnesses became increasingly certain as they testified through three trials. Even worse,
once it became clear that it was very difficult (if not impossible) for Sophonow to have
committed the crime because of his alibi, the eyewitnesses changed the time of the crime
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between the first and the second trials so that Sophonow could have made it to the crime
scene on time.
Other problems include the police and the crown prosecutors, who withheld
exculpatory information, used multiple jailhouse informants, and added a baseless
accusation that the trial judge specifically forbade them to introduce. The senior
prosecutor in the third trial even tried to explain the gloves that were several sizes too
small for Sophonow by saying that the prosecutor was Sophonow’s height and build and
that the gloves fit his hand; so the gloves must fit Sophonow’s hands whether or not they
actually fit Sophonow’s hands. The judges were also problematic. The judge in the
second trial made derogative comments on the defense’s key witness but did not
comment on the prosecution’s jailhouse informant. The judge in the third trial did not
object to the prosecution’s glove logic, and he dismissed one of the jurors who did not
support the guilty verdict.
For these and many other reasons, the Appeal Court overturned the conviction in
1985. The Crown appealed the decision, but the Supreme Court supported the Appeal
Court’s decision in 1986. Sophonow was acquitted but only after spending four years in
jail. But, the acquittal was not the end of the story for Sophonow, who lived under the
suspicion of his neighbors and colleagues as somebody who was acquitted on
technicalities, and it was not until 2000 when the Winnipeg police finally apologized in
their newsletter and exonerated Sophonow.
The Sophonow case was highly publicized in the media with sufficient public
interests, prompting a public inquiry. The inquiry was established to determine the causes
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of the wrongful conviction and to propose solutions that would prevent future
miscarriages of justice.
However, what is remarkable about the case for our purpose is that it illuminates a
relatively clear process in which expert knowledge is incorporated into a policy relevant
document. In preparation for writing the commission report, the Commissioner Cory held
a preliminary hearing, inviting the following expert witnesses:
 Joel Grimaloski: counseling psychologist
 Adrian Grounds: professor of forensic psychiatry
 Elizabeth Loftus: professor of psychology
 Sheila Martin: professor of law
 Peter Neufeld: professor of law
 Roy O’Shaughnessy: forensic psychiatrist
 Clifford Silverthorne: family physician
The testimonies from these experts were used selectively in the Cory report, and,
as described earlier, the recommendations from the Cory report had visible influence on
many future documents.
This section provided a description of the Sophonow case, but we need to
understand more about public inquiry as a process. This understanding is important
because a public inquiry has a clear policy implication even though its procedure has
more in common with judicial processes. Therefore, the next section provides a
description of how public inquiry works and how the Sophonow case compares to other
public inquiries in Canada. The description of public inquiry as a genre will become
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important in Chapter 4 when we examine the role of this genre in contributing to the
uptake of research knowledge.
3.2.2. Public Inquiry as a Process
Public inquiry is a government-initiated review that establishes facts and causes of
an event of some public significance and makes recommendations to the government.
Public inquiries can occur at any level of government of Canada (federal, provincial, or
territorial), and they are divided into two types of inquiries: policy inquiries and
investigative inquiries (d’Ombrain, 1997). Policy inquiries, as the name suggests, are
specifically established for the purpose of effecting policy changes while investigative
inquiries investigate some wrongdoing of the government body. The investigative
inquiry, including the Sophonow Inquiry, is not explicitly defined as a tool for policy
changes, but investigative public inquiries also produce commission report that typically
include recommendations that call for specific policy changes.
Public inquiries are regulated by the Inquiries Act for federal public inquiries and
by similar provincial/territorial laws for provincial and territorial inquiries. These laws
authorize the “Governor in Council” (for federal) or the “Lieutenant Governor in
Council” (for provincial and territorial) to initiate a public inquiry. The triggering
condition for a public inquiry, however, is rather vaguely defined in the Inquiries Act,
R.S.C., ch. I-11 (1985) as “any matter connected with the good government of Canada or
the conduct of any part of the public business thereof.”
Perhaps as a result of this broad triggering condition, Smith (1982) observes that
public inquiry is “a favorite instrument of government in Canada" (p. 565), and it is
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estimated that 1200 to 1600 major public inquiries took place since 1867 (Salter, 1981).
Notable public inquiries include: the Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in
Canada (the Krever Commission), which investigated the contamination of the Canadian
blood bank with HIV and hepatitis C; the Commission Inquiry into the Deployment of
Canadian Forces in Somalia, which investigated the practices of the Canadian armed
forces when they were involved in the beating death of a Somali teenager during the
Operation Deliverance; the Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and
Advertising, which investigated the Liberal Party’s abuse of the sponsorship program (the
Gomery Commission).
Table 3.1. Notable Public Inquiries in Canada
Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising
Activities
2004-2006
Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada2000-2002
Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada1995-97
Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces in
Somalia
1994-97
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples1989-91
Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospect
for Canada
1982-85
Royal Commission on the Status of Women1967-70
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism1963-67
Royal Commission on Health Services1961-64
Royal Commission on National Development of the Arts, Letters and
Sciences
1945-51
Public InquiriesYears
Among those public inquiries, there is a subset of public inquiries that are relevant
to this dissertation. This subset consists of all recent public inquiries on wrongful
conviction (see Table 4.2). By the time the Sophonow Inquiry began in 2000, there were
already two public inquiries on wrongful conviction (the Marshall Inquiry and the Morin
Inquiry), and two more were soon to follow. Given the similarity in purpose and speech
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act, it is reasonable to argue that these public inquiries on wrongful convictions form a
genre, as defined in Chapter 2.
Table 3.2. Public Inquiries Resulting from Wrongful convictions in Canada
SaskatchewanNF &
Labrador
ManitobaOntarioNova ScotiaProvince
Pending2005200119981989Year of Report
Alberta Court
of Queen’s
Bench
Supreme
Court of
Canada Chief
Justice
Former
Supreme
Court
Justice
Former
judge of QC
Court of
Appeal
Judges
Positions
(Commissioners)
MacCallum
(AB)
LamerCoryKaufman
(QC)
Hickman
(NF)
Poitras (QC)
Evans (ON)
Names
(Commissioners)
MilgaardParsons
Druken
Dalton
SophonowMorinMarshall
Victims
MilgaardNF/LabradorSophonowMorinMarshallCase
The genre of investigative public inquiries resembles the genre of bench trials in
many respects. For example, the commissioner of a public inquiry is granted the authority
to access any public office or institution and have the authority to subpoena any fact and
expert witnesses. In this respect, the commissioner is like a judge except that s/he reports
his/her recommendations to the government and the recommendations are not legally
binding. Yet, the recommendations from public inquires have a good chance of being
incorporated into some meaningful policy changes. For example, the Morin report
resulted in changes regarding the admissibility of jailhouse informants; the Gomery
inquiry cost Liberal Party an election, and “Federal Accountability Act” incorporated
about half (but not all) of the recommendations from the Gomery report.
Another important similarity between public inquiries and trials is the fact-finding
process. Many investigative public inquiries (including the Sophonow Inquiry) have
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adopted the court-like procedures in the preliminary hearing, in which the commissioner
regulates the hearing like a trial judge and the counsels like lawyers representing various
parties. Similarly, the expert witnesses are treated and handled like expert witnesses in
trials (see Chapter 2), following the standard procedures. Similar to Shuy’s (2006)
description of a court trial, the preliminary hearing of the Sophonow Inquiry began each
expert testimony with the qualification period where his or her credentials, such as
academic positions, publications, and grants received, are enumerated. However, there
was no evidence of the process known as “voir dire,” which is often conducted by the
opposing attorney to downplay or discredit the credentials of the expert. The qualification
period and the following direct examination was conducted by one of the commission
members, and this direct examination was followed by a series of cross-examinations by
all other participants, including other members of the commission except Commissioner
Cory.
This section has described the Sophonow case and explained how an investigative
public inquiry works. These descriptions illustrate, to a certain extent, peculiarities of the
Sophonow case and the public inquiry as a method of effecting policy changes. However,
the process has sufficient similarities with other venues of policy changes so that the
findings from this case study can suggest the factors that facilitate the uptake of research
in other judicial and legislative contexts. These potential insights and limitations will be
discussed further in the concluding chapter (Chapter 7) as we examine the applicability of
the findings in other contexts.
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3.3. Materials
The following materials were used in this study:
 The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow, the commission report from the
Inquiry (the Cory report)
 The expert segments of the transcript from the preliminary hearing
 Additional texts that cite or are cited by the Cory report and the preliminary
hearing, including scholarly articles, trade journals, and newspaper articles. These
texts were located through database searches as well as manual searches of
reading the transcript from preliminary hearing and reading the CVs of the
experts.
 Interviews with Commissioner Peter Cory, the lead counsel Richard Wolson, and
the two of the expert witnesses (psychologist Elizabeth Loftus and forensic
psychiatrist Adrian Grounds)
3.4. Analysis
This study used multiple analytical tools. These analytical tools are: genre
analysis, citation analysis, rhetorical analysis, discourse analysis, and interviewing. This
section describes these analytical tools in the order they appear in the analysis chapters
(Chapter 4-6) except interviewing is discussed at the end because it was used as a
secondary method to supplement the primary analysis, conducted with other tools.
3.4.1. Genre Analysis
As described in Chapter 2, an analysis of texts needs to be accompanied by the
analysis of the context. Therefore, the first analysis chapter of my dissertation (Chapter 4)
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draws from theories of genre to analyze the social and discursive context of the
Sophonow Inquiry and the ways in which ideas from research articles made it to the Cory
report.
3.4.2. Citation Analysis
After a broader analysis of both context and text in Chapter 4, the second analysis
section focuses specifically on citations in the Cory report. The rationale for focusing on
citation is twofold: (1) Citation analysis offers a readily available analytical tool for
“trac[ing] the major networks of influence, collaboration, and dependence (Swales, 1986,
p. 39); (2) the method offers a systematic means of capturing those networks. In order to
provide the rationale for the particular method of citation analysis in this study, this
section provides descriptions of various approaches to citation analysis and describes the
theoretical appropriateness of the specific analytical method in this study based on the
theoretical overview in Chapter 2.
3.4.2.1. Approaches to citation analysis.
Citation analysis began in the middle of the twentieth century2 to describe the pattern of
information flow in scientific disciplines. The enterprise of studying citations flourished
since the last 20 years of the twentieth century with more advanced computing
technology, and citation analysts have found ways to apply this tool to diverse uses, such
as measuring academic performance of a scholar or measuring the impact of a particular
scholarly journal.
While the method of citation analysis has gained considerable popularity, its
independent development and employment in diverse disciplines (e.g., information
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science, sociology, linguistics, rhetoric) have created considerable methodological
variations. Furthermore, White’s (2004) meta-analysis of co-citation pattern reveals that
citation analysts are not citing one another to address these methodological variations. As
to confirm this diversity Moed’s literature review (2005) divides the field into four
disciplinary approaches: the physical approach, psychological approach, historical
approach, and sociological approach. While his review is not comprehensive and he omits
authors who are more widely discussed in rhetoric and linguistics (e.g., Bazerman, 1988;
Giltrow, 2001, 2004; Hyland, 2000; Swales, 1986), his four categories are useful in
mapping out the field of citation analysis.
The physical approach is championed by scholars like Price (1978) and van Raan
(1990), who try to create laws of citation patterns modeled after laws of physics.
Therefore, these scholars often invoke physics metaphors in their writing as van Raan did
in comparing co-citation patterns and laws of motion.
The psychological approach, on the other hand, seeks to elicit the citer motivation
by administering questionnaires. For example, Brooks (1986) surveyed 20 scholars to
elicit their motives for their 437 citations and documented the multiplicity of their
motives and correlation among some of the motives. In this dissertation, the
psychological approach was attempted through a discourse-based interview (see below),
but its limitation will become clear during the analysis in Chapter 4.
The historical approach is used by scholars like Garfield, Pudovkin, and Istomin
(2003), who use citation analysis to construct a historiography of a discipline. Through an
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algorithm called HistCite software, Garfield et al. identified key events, authors, and
journals in several disciplines.
The sociological approach takes the act of referencing as a social act and uses
citations to examine the ways in which citation practices contribute to the construction of
knowledge (see the literature review on science studies in Chapter 2). Therefore, the
sociological approach is most consistent with the theoretical framework in rhetoric and
composition, and the number of scholars that I have already cited so far in Chapter 2 (e.g.,
Latour, 1987; Winsor, 1993; Latour & Woolgar, 1986) would fall under this approach.
For these reasons, this study uses the theoretical assumption of the sociological approach
to construct the analysis method, relying on several categories that had been developed by
citation analysts. These categories and other key concepts are discussed in the next
section, followed by a section that describes the citation analysis design.
3.4.2.2. Context of citation.
The previous section and the literature review in Chapter 2 discussed the
importance of seeing citation as a social and rhetorical act. This assumption leads us to
examine not simply the instantiation of citation but also the ways in which a particular
source is cited. Advocating this view, Moravcsik and Murugesan (1975) introduced the
term “context of citation” to refer to the text that surrounds an instance of citation.3, 4 The
importance of this context of citation is supported by others, such as Tannen (1989), who
uses Bakhtin’s intertextuality (see Chapter 2) to say that “in the deepest sense the words
have ceased to be those of the speaker to whom they are attributed, having been
appropriated by the speaker who is repeating them” (p. 101). Similarly, Giltrow (2001,
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2002, 2004) notes the citer’s rhetorical awareness and strategies in appropriating the
words of others and the textual manifestations of these strategies in the context of
citation. Others have commented that the context of citation amounts to a shift in what is
represented by the sentence. Steingberg (1982) argued that quotation is marked by a shift
from the representation of things to the representation of discourse while Myers (1999)
explained the shifts in terms of Goffmanian framing. MacDonald (1992) described the
shift in terms of knowledge-making whereas a sentence like “Children do X” represents
some ideas and phenomena in the world (thus belonging to a “phenomenal class”) while a
sentence like “Psychologists say children do X” represents disciplinary knowledge (thus
belonging to an “epistemic class”).
In an effort to classify the context of citation, Moravcsik and Murugesan (1975)
proposed the following four variables: 1. conceptual/operational/neither, 2.
organic/perfunctory/neither, 3. evolutionary/juxtapositional/neither, 4.
confirmative/negational/neither.
1. Is the reference conceptual or operational? In other words, is the
reference made in connection with a concept or theory that is used in
the referring paper, or is it made I connection with a tool or physical
technique used in the referring paper? ...
2. Is the reference organic or perfunctory? In other words, is the reference
truly needed for understanding of the referring paper ..., or is it mainly
an acknowledgment that some other work in the same general area has
been performed?
3. Is the reference evolutionary or juxtapositional? In other words, is the
referring paper built on the foundations provided by the reference, or is
it an alternative to it?
4. Is the reference confirmative or negational? In other words, is it claimed
by the referring paper that the reference is correct, or is its correctness
disputed?
(p. 88)
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While Moravcsik and Murugesan’s (1975) scheme is one of many categories that
have been proposed to classify the contexts of citation, Small’s (1982) meta-study of
eight such frameworks found that most frameworks are examining the same set of
qualities in the context of citation.
Moravcsik and Murugesan’s categories proved useful in Swales’ (1986)
exploratory analysis to examine the influence of one particular idea in applied linguistics.
For his study, Swales chose Munby (1978) as the original source and examined 44 essays
that cited Munby. Through his analysis Swales found certain variables from Moravcsik
and Murugesan to be problematic. One difficulty was the conceptual/operation
distinction, which Swales argues as not applicable outside of science. He proposed that
this variable be dropped when analyzing citation practices in applied linguistics papers.
Similarly, he was unable to maintain the organic/perfunctory/neither distinctions because
of the inherent subjectivity in making this distinction. Instead he proposed that the
variable be replaced with extended/short, which is determined by the length of the citing
sentence: If the cited article is discussed in one sentence or less, it is short; if it is
discussed in more than one sentence, it is long.
3.4.2.3. Citation analysis design.
The citation analysis in this study was applied to the Cory report, and the method
largely follows Swales’ (1986) adaptation of Moravcsik and Murugesan’s (1975) original
categories with some minor modifications and additions based on some of the literature in
Chapter 2 and to accommodate the nature of the research data (see Chapter 5 for details).
 Positive/Neutral/Negative
81
The first variable is similar to Moravcsik and Murugesan’s (1975)
confirmational/negational distinction, but the category is reframed as Latour’s (1987)
modalities, which was discussed fully in Chapter 2. The difference is that Latour’s
positive/neutral/negative modalities emphasizes rhetorical construction of fact and
knowledge more than Moravcsik and Murugesan’s confirmational/negational, which
seems to focus more on the citer’s approval of the source. For theoretical reasons that
were enumerated in Chapter 2 that circulation of discourse is epistemic, Latour’s
modalities seem more appropriate in handling this variable. Thus, to repeat from Chapter
2, positive modality makes the original statement (or the idea in the cited source) more
like a fact, and negative modality makes the original statement less like a fact.
 Evolutionary/Zero/Juxtapositional
This variable is unchanged from Moravcsik and Murugesan (1975). An
evolutionary use occurs when the citer uses the source’s idea to make an argument. A
juxtapositional use occurs when the citer dismisses the source’s idea and make an
alternative argument. A zero use occurs when the citer uses the source in a way that is
unrelated to making an argument, for example, as a background information.
 Extended/Short
The variable is unchanged from Swales (1986). An extended citation occurs when
a source is discussed in more than one sentence. A short citation occurs when a source is
discussed in one sentence or less.
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 Formal citation
This variable simply notes whether the source is formally documented or not.
Such a variable is redundant in scholarly essays because scholarly writers are required to
formally document all their sources. However, for reasons that will be discussed fully in
Chapter 5, the Cory report does not formally document all the sources. Therefore,
presence or absence of formal citation amounts to maintaining or obscuring the source of
knowledge. The significance of this distinction will be discussed more fully in Chapter 4
and Chapter 5.
 Direct quote
The last variable is derived from Giltrow (2001, 2004), who studied the ways in
which academics use citations. Her research participants indicated that they were highly
aware of their rhetorical choices surrounding citation, and their choice of who to quote
and what to quote directly is a result of their nuanced positioning and distancing
strategies. For these reasons, I included “direct quote” as a variable.
3.4.2.4. Reliability measure.
In order to ensure reliability of the above categorization, a second rater
independently coded 36 instances of citation on the first three categories
(positive/neutral/negative, evolutionary/zero/juxtapositional, extended/short), resulting in
108 items. The second rater agreed with the researcher on 96 items (Kappa = .865, p <
.001), leaving 12 disagreed items. Most of the disagreements resulted from (1) the second
rater's insufficient familiarity with the case and (2) the failure of the second rater to read
the text that immediately preceded or followed the citation. After discussing the disagreed
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items, the second rater immediately conceded to the researcher's coding in most cases.
The discussion on one item led both the researcher and the second rater to agree on
another category. At the end of the discussion, we still disagreed on only one item.
3.4.3. Rhetorical and Discourse Analysis
The third analytical method was rhetorical and discourse analysis. These
analytical tools were used in Chapter 6 to locate specific rhetorical and discourse
elements that circulated from the experts to the Cory report. In order to do so, I have
selected many paired excerpts from the experts’ utterances in the preliminary hearing
transcript and from the Cory report. This juxtaposition shows what rhetorical and
discourse elements circulated into the Cory report along with factors that seem to have
facilitated this circulation. Chapter 6 also provides some counter examples of rhetorical
and discourse elements that could have circulated but did not.
3.4.4. Interviews
Interview data are used in this study to supplement the above three analyses.
Initially I attempted to contact the Commissioner Cory, two commission counsels, and all
academic expert witnesses. However, I received communication from the Commissioner,
one commission counsel, and two of the expert witnesses.
These interviews are:
 One two-hour face-to-face interview with Commissioner Cory.
 One fifteen minute telephone interview with the lead counsel Richard Wolson.
 Half-hour telephone interviews with two of the experts: Elizabeth Loftus and
Adrian Grounds.
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The interview with the Commissioner Cory was partly discourse-based interview,
asking him questions about his writing process and rhetorical choices in the Cory report.
However, the interview also elicited his account of the Sophonow Inquiry process. The
interview with the lead counsel Wolson focused on the working of the commission that
may not be obvious from the textual data, such as the selection process of the expert
witnesses and his professional practices that enabled him to be informed about academic
research beyond his are of expertise. The interviews with the expert witnesses elicited on
their rhetorical strategies for presenting research data. All the interviews were
tape-recorded and selectively transcribed.
3.5. Conclusion
This chapter has provided a rationale for using the Sophonow case and for using
both quantitative and qualitative methods that focus on language to explore the
relationship between academic research and public policy. The next three chapter
describes the results and discussions from the analysis. Chapter 4 focuses on the
macro-level social and discursive network, and I will use genre analysis and theories of
uptake to trace the influence of academic research. Chapter 5 focuses on citation in the
Cory report and its discursive context. The citation analysis in Chapter 5 uses the method
outlined in this Chapter (additional descriptions are available in Chapter 5) to determine
the representation of academic research in the Cory report. The analysis in Chapter 5 also
supplements the results from Chapter 4 in documenting the pathway through which
academic research enters a policy relevant document. The focus on Chapter 6 is
considerably narrower, focusing on specific rhetorical and discourse elements through
85
rhetorical and discourse analyses. Chapter 6 reinforces some of the findings in Chapter 4
and 5 but also illuminates specific discourse strategies and rhetorical contexts that seem
to have made a difference in the circulation of discourse.
NOTES
1. As the analysis in Chapter 5 will demonstrate, the citation analysis method in this
study is quantitative. However, some citation analysts (e.g., Moed, 2005) consider the
method as qualitative because it involves human judgment during the coding stage of
the analysis.
2. The Institute of Scientific Information (formerly known as Eugene Garfield
Associates) began in 1954. The company published the first Science Citation Index
(SCI) in 1964.
3. The “context of citation” is also used by Small (1978, 1982) and Latour (1987). More
recently Nakov, Schwartz, & Hearst (2004) invented the word “citance” to refer to the
same textual context.
4. We might object to the use of the term “context” to refer to such a narrow, textcentric
context and argue that such an analysis is inadequate in understanding the larger
context of citation. The larger context is analyzed in Chapter 4 with genre theory,
which I argue as more appropriate. The citation analysis in Chapter 5 is used to
complement the broader analysis in Chapter 4 and rhetorical/discourse analysis in
Chapter 6.
86
Chapter 4: Context and Circulation of Discourse
As discussed in Chapter 2, scholars in genre studies and discourse studies have
become increasingly interested in the relationship of multiple texts and multiple genres.
Chapter 2 discussed scholars like Bakhtin (1981, 1986), Fairclough (1992), and Freadman
(1987, 1994, 2002), who have argued that we need to understand the place of discourse in
the intertextual chain. These concerns are consistent with the most recent development in
genre studies and applied linguistics to theorize the relationship among collections of
genres, such as genre set (Devitt, 1991, 2004), genre system (Bazerman, 1994), genre
repertoire (Orlikowski & Yates, 1994), genre ecology (Spinuzzi & Zachry, 2000), and
genre colony (Bhatia, 2002).
Following this tradition, this first analysis chapter provides a macro-analysis of
the Cory report, describing and analyzing its textual location in the overall context. More
specifically, this chapter describes the intertextual relationship among relevant texts and
examines the significance of that intertextual configuration. By doing so, this chapter
seeks to identify the contextual factors that probably contributed to the uptake of
academic research by the Cory report as well as to contribute to the growing body of
literature that theorizes the interrelationships among a group of genres.
The main argument of this chapter is that uptake is facilitated by the configuration
of the intertextual relationship that I term as an “intertextual network.” As discussed
below, an intertextual network consists of a series of texts that are linked by Bakhtin’s
addressivity and Freadman’s uptake. This uptake process is accomplished by (1) the
varying degrees of rhetorical expectations projected by each text, (2) mediation, and (3)
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accessibility and other contextual constraints. These contextual factors are related to
micro-level rhetorical and discourse factors, but these factors are only alluded to in this
chapter and will be discussed more fully in the next two chapters. Of course, the optimal
configuration of both or either of contextual and/or rhetorical factors do not guarantee
successful uptake. However, my argument is that these factors make uptake more likely.
Through this analysis, I will also argue that our current thinking on genre
set/system/colony (see Chapter 2) can benefit from incorporating multiple rhetorical
expectations and mediation. Because these two concepts are central to my analysis that
follows, this chapter begins by introducing these concepts. Later, these concepts are used
to examine the Cory report and how academic research found its way into that report.
4.1. Intertextual Network and Competing Rhetorical Expectations
The idea of examining rhetorical expectation is not new. The concept has been
theorized by many scholars from Bitzer’s (1968) exigence, Burke’s (1945) motive,1
Bakhtin’s (1981) rejoinder and addressivity (1986), to Freadman’s (1987, 1994) tennis
metaphor of uptake. However, exigence and motive, while accounting for the rhetorical
action that is about to take place, do not link this rhetorical act with other rhetorical acts
that surround them; nor do they theorize the relationship among these rhetorical acts.
Bakhtin’s rejoinder and addressivity fare better in that they explicitly connect texts in the
intertextual chain and theorize the relationship among them, but these concepts are
limited to theorizing the text that immediately precedes or follows the analyzed text.
Freadman’s tennis metaphor and her theory of uptake (Freadman, 2002) can explain a
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long series of related semiotic texts, but her analysis is limited to a single intertextual
link.
In order to advance the theories of intertextuality, we can learn from theories on
genre collections (i.e., genre set, genre system, etc.) to imagine the types of intertextual
relationships that are possible among multiple texts. In other words, I want to take
Freadman’s tennis metaphor and multiply it so that at any given point there are multiple
tennis shots, each with possibly different (although not necessarily) competing
expectations.
Figure 4.1. Multiple Intertextual Links
As seen in Figure 4.1., any given text belongs to not only one but to many
intertextual chains, and the significance and the outcome of this discursive event is
influenced by the rhetorical expectations from other texts in all intertextual links. Let us
consider, for example, a job applicant who puts together a job packet that makes certain
textual links salient (e.g., his/her résumé, cover letter, past projects). From this applicant’s
perspective, s/he needs to populate this intertextual space with his/her texts, fill them with
Bakhtinian addressivity, which anticipates a particular response to the job packet. If
everything goes as this candidate hopes, the human resources personnel will let those
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texts cross the generic boundaries to be repeated in the subsequent text, which leads to a
favorable uptake for that candidate (i.e., a job offer).
However, this intertextual space is not just filled by one candidate. Other
candidates are also preparing their job packages to compete for the favorable uptake.
Thus, the text of a job offer becomes a node in the intertextual network with multiple
intertextual links with competing rhetorical expectations.
If the multiple candidates introduced the multiplicity of intertextual chains in the
diachronic plane, we can also multiply the intertextual chain in the synchronic plane
(following a similar argument by Orlikowski and Yates [1994] with their genre
repertoire). The uptake by the human resources department/manager may be complicated
by the budget, hiring policies, and many other factors.
Because each text projects a rhetorical expectation that favors the hiring of a
different individual, a decision to hire one person would simultaneously result in meeting
some rhetorical expectations and not meeting others. In the illustration in Figure 4.2., the
job packets of the three candidates textually project rhetorical expectations, each
expecting its writer to be hired. Furthermore, various texts, such as budget and equal
employment policy may textually project certain expectations on the hiring outcome.
Perhaps candidate A is a minority applicant that the equal employment policy prefers;
perhaps candidate C is more expensive to hire, thus, not preferable from the fiscal
standpoint. The outcome of a job offer, then, is a nexus of competing rhetorical
expectations, and regardless of which candidate is selected, only certain textual
expectations are realized, resulting in unfulfilled rhetorical expectations of others.
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Figure 4.2. Multiple Intertextual Chains with Multiple Rhetorical Expectations
The competing expectations from multiple intertextual chains are even more
pronounced in the legal, adversarial setting in which each side presents and emphasizes
one particular intertextual chain over others. As the later analysis section of this chapter
shows, these multiple expectations are important in understanding uptake because this
framework explains why certain rhetorical expectations are influential and others are not.
4.2. Intermediary Genre
Another important concept in this chapter is mediation. Mediation, in this
dissertation, is similar to the way Freadman (2002) uses the term when she writes “when
uptake crosses the boundary between ceremonies and a fortiori between jurisdictions, it
mediates between genres” (p. 44). In addition to uptake of sentences across genre
boundaries, mediation, in the context of this dissertation, includes uptake of any
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rhetorical and linguistic element (e.g., semantics, syntax, or social action) that crosses any
textual boundaries (genre boundary is one of many boundaries). Therefore, mediation
does not allude to activity theory in this study (see Chapter 2), in which mediation is a
tool to accomplish an objective in a human activity.
The concept of mediation in this sense is important for understanding the
relationship between academic research genres and policy relevant genres because the
literature in public policy provides ample evidence that academic research seldom
receives direct uptake (see Chapter 2), a point that is confirmed in this study as the later
analysis will show.
In order to theorize this mediational aspect of genre, I propose the concept,
intermediary genre. An intermediary genre is defined as a genre that facilitates an uptake
of another genre by yet another genre. To put it another way, genre A is an intermediary
genre if it contributes to an uptake of genre B by genre C. Of course most intermediary
genres have other primary functions that define themselves as genres. Therefore, I argue
that this intermediary function is not an internal property of a genre but a function that a
genre acquires through its generic position within the intergeneric network.
Furthermore, this intermediary status does not come from its absolute position in
the intergeneric network. Rather the status of an intermediary genre comes from its
position relative to what the researcher happens to be interested in. For example, in an
intergeneric chain that contains A, B, C, and D, if the analyst is interested in the uptake of
A by C, B is the intermediary genre (assuming that genre B facilitates the uptake of A by
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C). On the other hand, if we are interested in the uptake of B by D, then C becomes the
intermediary genre (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.3. Intermediary Genre
A  B  C  D
C is the intermediary genre.
A  B  C  D
B is the intermediary genre
Uptake of B by DUptake of A by C
Intertextual networks, multiple rhetorical expectations, and intermediary genres
are useful concepts because they allow us to study the circulation of discourse and
knowledge in the way that accounts for the complexity of the discursive relationship.
These are the concepts that I will use in the analysis section below to examine the
rhetorical context and intertextual relationship of the Cory report. The analysis section is
divided into three parts. The first part (“Intertextual Network and Competing
Expectations in the Cory Report”) uses primarily the intertextual network to map out the
rhetorical context of the Cory report and how knowledge and discourse circulate from one
text to another. The second section (“Mediation and Intermediary Genres”) uses
intermediary genre to focus on some of the key nodes in the intertextual network and their
role in the nature of uptake. The third section (“Accessibility and Time Constraints”) lists
two other relevant contextual factors that contributed to uptake of ideas but were not
mentioned in the first two sections.
4.3. Intertextual Network and Competing Expectations in the Cory Report
As described in Chapter 3, the Sophonow Inquiry was structured as a legal
proceeding, roughly following the same standard of a judge trial with direct examinations
and cross-examinations. Counsels and stakeholders are, at least formally, set up to
represent different sides of the adversarial system, and these counsels introduced different
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sets of texts, emphasizing certain intertextual chains. The analysis in this section begins
from defining the scope of the intertextual network, using theories of genre. Then the
section proceeds by describing the intertextual network of the Sophonow case. The
description of the intertextual network is used in the remainder of the section to discover
two ways in which the intertextual network facilitates the uptake of knowledge and
discourse.
4.3.1. Scope of the Intertextual Network
When one constructs an intertextual network to study the relationship among
different texts and uptake of ideas and language among them, the first challenge is
defining the scope of the intertextual network. This first subsection on intertextual
network discusses the issues of determining the scope of the network. In order to do so,
this section draws from theories of genre (see Chapter 2).
Some texts obviously belong to the intertextual network of the Sophonow Inquiry.
These are the texts that belong to the official intertextual thread of the Sophonow inquiry
(the newsletter, the order-in-council, the preliminary hearing, and the Cory report) as well
as the original Sophonow trials and the compensation trials that followed the Cory report.
Limiting the scope of the intertextual network to these texts would be almost equivalent
to Freadman’s (2002) analysis of uptake that focused on the official legal intertextual
thread when she studied the transformation of a death sentence into an execution in the
Ryan hanging (see Chapter 2).
However, as I have argued earlier in the chapter, the official legal intertextual link
is only one of many links that are related to the Sophonow inquiry. This is an argument
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that is similar to the one made by Spinuzzi and Zachry (2000), who noted the limitations
of Bazerman’s (1994) original genre system (see Chapter 2) and argued that we need to
find ways to incorporate unofficial genres into the scope of an analysis. In this
dissertation in particular, we need to incorporate at least research articles into the
intertextual network in order to examine their role in the Cory report.
Another obvious candidate is the genre of public inquiries because, by definition,
these other public inquiries are typified rhetorical actions that are similar to the
Sophonow case. Case studies in genre theories have repeatedly revealed that rhetors make
use of various rhetorical resources from the genre, such as topoi, organization, lexical and
syntactic choice, and composing process (e.g., Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Paré &
Smart, 1994). However, this seemingly unproblematic choice of including the genre of
public inquiries into the intertextual network is troublesome because Commissioner Cory,
during the research interview, denied the influence of other public inquiries in the
Sophonow Inquiry. In doing so, Cory invoked the legal ideals of objectivity, neutrality,
and independence to say that the process of the Sophonow Inquiry and his
recommendations were unrelated to other public inquiries no matter how similar they
may appear to be. However, it would be unwise to omit the genre of public inquiries from
the intertextual network for reasons that will become clear later in this chapter and in
Chapter 5, but this dilemma illustrates the theoretical limitations of Devitt’s (1991) genre
set.
As described in Chapter 2, genre set takes a particular vantage point in defining
what is included in a genre set. If we are to use genre set to define the scope of the
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intertextual network, then we are forced to choose a perspective, which is problematic in
this case because each participant is a stakeholder in this inquiry just like the three
hypothetical job candidates from the earlier example (see Figure 4.2). Like the
candidates, the participants in the Sophonow Inquiry occupied particular positions in the
intertextual network, thus, seeing only some relevant texts but not the others. If we were
still to select a vantage point among those of all the participants, the best vantage point is
probably that of Cory because he was in the best social and discursive position to see the
broad overview of the intertextual network. However, as the later analysis makes clear,
Cory’s vantage point is just as limited as others since he was (and still is) constrained by
what Foucault terms as discursive formations and its rules of exclusion. For these reasons,
Cory discounted the relevance of other public inquiries and downplayed the role of U.S.
government publications, which I will later argue as important and thus should be
included in the intertextual network.
In addition, we should incorporate texts that can be traced by citations and by
repetitions. As discussed in Chapter 2, textual repetition is what crosses the various
discursive boundaries (Freadman, 2002), and this circulation of discourse entails
circulation of knowledge and ideology (Bhatia, 2002; Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1972a;
Gee, 1990). While it is relatively easy to trace the texts that are cited by the texts in the
Sophonow Inquiry, it is methodologically more challenging to map all the texts that cite
the texts in the Sophonow Inquiry. Such textual mapping becomes more problematic for
cases in which the texts in the Sophonow case may textually repeat other texts, but this
textual repetition is not accompanied by formal citations, quotation marks, or other
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reporting expressions. The problem of tracing the source texts is compounded as the text
is further removed from the Sophonow case because any source texts in the middle
(intermediaries) may not document their sources, either. This means that we cannot
systematically construct an intertextual network of the Sophonow case, but to omit these
unreferenced texts from the intertextual network would seriously undermine the
usefulness of the intertextual network as an analytical tool. Therefore, I have concentrated
my efforts on identifying the relevant texts that contributed to the uptake of academic
research and justify their relevance in the analysis in this Chapter (e.g., the U.S.
government publications) while focusing less on the texts that have little to do with
academic research (e.g., Magna Carta). I will take the opposite approach in Chapter 5, in
which the systematicity is much more important to the issues that are addressed in that
chapter.
4.3.2. Intertextual Network of the Sophonow Case
With the selection criteria in the above section, Figure 4.4. describes the
intertextual network of the Sophonow Inquiry. This section describes how to read the
figure. This figure is used as the reference point for the analyses that follow.
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Figure 4.4. Intertextual Network of the Cory Report
In Figure 4.4 each box typically represents a number of texts (e.g., there are more
than one research article) with few exceptions (e.g., there is only one "Cory report") to
simplify the diagram. This simplification was done since listing individual text would be
too numerous and would not contribute much to answering the research questions.
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However, the complete listing of some boxes, which will become relevant in later
analysis, is available in Appendix A.
The left most column lists a number of sources that are cited by the texts in the
Sophonow Inquiry, and the arrows indicate the specific texts that cite these sources. For
example, U.S. government publications are cited by the preliminary hearing and the Cory
report. The right most column, on the other hand, lists some of the sources that cite the
texts in the Sophonow Inquiry. Some of the items in this column are repeated from the
left most column, indicating mutual citations. For example, research articles are cited by
the preliminary hearing and the Cory report, and the Cory report is cited by other research
articles that post-date the publication of the Cory report.
4.3.3. Strength of Rhetorical Expectations
This intertextual network of the Cory report (i.e., Figure 4.4) is meant to
emphasize the complexity of the network. The linear thread in the center column (boxed
and labeled as "Sophonow Case”) is the official legal thread of the Sophonow case. Using
this thread, one could tell the official version of the Sophonow case as a miscarriage of
justice that is righted through the public inquiry. But this is not the only intertextual
thread. One could also focus on the thread that links the Sophonow inquiry with other
inquiries to say that this inquiry is simply another rhetorical instantiation of the genre (of
public inquiries). The thread that links the Cory report to similar policy relevant
documents in the U.S. might even allow us to say that the Sophonow case illustrates what
policy analysts call a "policy transfer" (Stone, 2004), taking a public policy in one context
(usually one country) and applying it to another. On the other hand, the connection with
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international treaties/guidelines enables others to say that the recommendations in the
Cory report is simply a logical deduction of the existing principles outlined in those
international treaties.
What is not evident from the figure is that the strength of each link is not equal.
This is where Orlikowski and Yates’ (1994) genre repertoire and the related concepts
become useful. For example, Orlikowski and Yates introduced the idea that only certain
genres are most frequently invoked in any rhetorical situation (thus, constituting the
repertoire), while other genres remain dormant or rejected from the genre system. A
similar argument can be made in relation to the circulation of discourse. At any given
intertextual nodes with competing rhetorical expectations, uptake of the rhetorical
expectation of a given source or a genre can range from obligatory, expected, not
expected but not unusual, unusual, to forbidden.
For example, uptake of the Order-in-Council, its terms of reference, and the
preliminary hearing is legally required for Cory in his report; therefore, it is not surprising
to see various language and rhetorical elements cross the generic and textual boundaries
and enter the Cory report through repetitions of some sort. On the other hand, the direct
link between research articles and the Cory report is considerably weaker because citation
of the research article is neither required nor expected (Figure 4.5).
100
Figure 4.5: Rhetorical Expectations in the Cory Report
Reflecting this relative strength of the intertextual link, the Cory report cites the
preliminary hearing2 (109 out of 413) more often than academic research articles (9 out of
413). Furthermore, this framework allows us to imagine solutions for making research
more relevant to policy decision process.
One radical, if not obvious, solution is to reform the legal procedures to formally
make research more influential. In terms of the intertextual network, such a reform would
essentially change the configuration of the intertextual path, strengthening the uptake path
between research articles and the policy relevant document. However, such a proposal is
likely to incur the wrath of the legal community with little hope of succeeding. As
documented in Chapter 2, the current legal processes embody certain assumptions of
basic human rights and protection of these rights, and an attempt to privilege expert
discourse and knowledge is to disrupt and undermine some of the fundamental beliefs of
the legal system. For example, historical attempts to create a special science tribunal of
various legal status have encountered resistance and legal challenges (Golan, 2004).
However, this dissertation is not about whether such fundamental change is desirable or
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not (see Golan, 2004; Jasenoff, 1995; Waddell, 1996 for more discussions), so let us
focus on what may be possible without overhauling our current judicial system.
If such a change to the fundamental configuration of the intertextual network is
unlikely, then it means that uptake of academic research articles will always remain
optional. But given this constraint, we could find some ways of changing the level of
expectations to make the uptake more likely. The following section outlines two factors
that appear to increase this likelihood. 
4.3.4. Unexpected Uptake in the Context of Expected
While it is true that the level of expected uptake is partly determined by the
existing textual network (similar to the Foulcauldian discursive formation), it is still
possible for a rhetor to modify the relative strength of each rhetorical expectation. In
other words, a rhetor may weaken a strong rhetorical expectation or strengthen a weak
rhetorical expectation, potentially changing the outcome of a rhetorical event. In this
section, I will illustrate this process through the compensation payment issue in the Cory
report. While the compensation payment does not seem like an issue of research
knowledge, the compensation scheme was drafted by a an academic law professor who
testified at the preliminary hearing and introduced a variety of scholarly books and
journal articles (see Chapter 6 for how the compensation model by an expert won against
the competing argument.) Furthermore, I chose to use this case because the compensation
payment issue is particularly revealing about the process of reframing expectations.
Determining the compensation amount was one of the mandates by the
Order-in-Council, and Cory assigned specific amounts for the federal government, the
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provincial government, and the city of Winnipeg to pay Sophonow. Although Cory's
recommendations were legally non-binding, the configuration of the intertextual network
(the genre history of the public inquiries [see Chapter 3]; the government-initiated nature
of the inquiry3) placed a strong rhetorical expectation on these government bodies to
accept the recommendations. As seen in Figure 4.5 (see also Figure 4.3), the official
thread began with an apology by the Attorney General at the time, and the commission
was legislatively invoked with specific references to The Manitoba Evidence Act. Given
the legal nature of this intertextual threads and the government-initiated nature of the
inquiry, we would expect Cory's recommendations to be received without problems.
Figure 4.6: Formal Intertextual Thread
Law suits
against city
Law suits
against
province
Cory ReportPreliminary
Hearing
Order-in-
Council
Manitoba
Government
News
Release
AfterBefore
As anticipated by this intertextual thread, the federal government and the
provincial government complied with the recommendations. However, the city of
Winnipeg refused to pay on the ground that compensation payment is usually the
responsibility of a provincial government, not of a city; therefore, the city argued that the
provincial government should bear the amount that was assigned to the city. By saying so,
the city was invoking an entirely different intertextual thread (history of compensation
payment) whose expectation competed with that of the Cory report. The city's invocation
of this intertextual thread was motivated by the policy of the insurance company who
refused to pay the city for that reason.
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Figure 4.7: Competing Intertextual Threads on Compensation Payment
In response to this refusal (and after some failed negotiations), Sophonow
launched a lawsuit against the province to extract the amount that the city refused to pay.
In the end, the province agreed to pay the amount and reimburse itself from the city by
launching a lawsuit against the city. At surface this alternate events may look the same in
the end: Sophonow was paid $2.6 million; the Department of Justice Canada, the
province, and the city paid the amount recommended by Cory. However, this time the
city's insurance policy covered the compensation amount because there is a precedent of
payment as a result of a lawsuit as opposed to a recommendation from a public inquiry
report.
The struggle over the compensation payment illustrates several important
theoretical points. First the existing intertextual network and expected uptake do not
guarantee the results. In this case, the existing intertextual network and rhetorical
expectations were set up so that Cory’s recommendation was expected to cross the
generic boundary to be accepted by the city. But this uptake did not happen.
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Second, the intertextual network can be expanded (i.e. scaleable) like Latour’s
(2005) actor-network. The history of insurance policy was not part of the intertextual
network but was added (or “enlisted” to use Latour’s term) when the city refused the
payment and used it as a reason. But as one adds more texts to the intertextual network, it
is important to remember the nature of intertextuality described by Foucault (1972a),
Fairclough (1992), and Freadman (2002). As described in Chapter 2, the role of each text
is determined by its relative position in the intertextual network, so adding a text implies
a transformation of the entire network, changing the significance of each text that belongs
to the network. In short, adding a text to the intertextual network is not an additive but a
transformative process.
This transformative aspect of the intertextual network is more clearly seen in
Sophonow’s lawsuit against the province and the province’s lawsuit against the city. By
this time, the Cory report was no longer the direct force that prompted the city to pay.
Rather the shift in the entire network and the report’s relative position in the intertextual
network made it so that it now served as evidence for the claim (see Figure 4.7).
Similarly, the expert evidence for the Cory report may have become less salient or
perhaps dropped out of the discursive “memory” (Freadman, 2002). But even then, it
would be quite wrong to assume that the expert left no influence in the process. On the
contrary, the expert testimony was crucial in setting up the shape of the intertextual
network at one point in the process, so the influence would continue to live in the shape
of the following intertextual network no matter how unrecognizable that form may be.
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Figure 4.8. Shift in the Configuration of Intertextual Network
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Third, malleability of the intertextual network allows us to accommodate the
persistent problem in genre theory to account for Gidden’s (1984) duality: the social
constructionist force that constrains individual improvisations and the social
constructivist force that enables individual improvisations to change the structure. One
theoretical contribution of the intertextual network lies in its ability to explain how these
contradictory forces exert their power and how individuals may leverage the social
constructivist force in the network. The intertextual network analysis in this section
accounts for the social constructionist force in the form of the existing network and their
rhetorical expectations on the rhetor who might add another text to the network. The
social constructivist force, on the other hand, is accounted for by what Latour (2005) calls
scalability of the network, which allows the rhetor to add texts to the existing network. In
this case, it was the city’s enlisting of the insurance policy that afforded the city to resist
the rhetorical expectation and changed the configuration of the intertextual network, and
it was Sophonow and the province’s enlisting of the history of court that further changed
the configuration of the network to challenge the city’s rhetorical move.
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4.3.5. Optional but Not Unusual Uptake: Genre Expectations
The previous section discussed the role of rhetorical expectations and scalability of the
intertextual network in relation to the diachronic official “legal” intertextual link. This
section, by comparison, examines both the synchronic and diachronic intertextual links of
the public inquiry genre. Through this analysis, I will further develop the notion of
rhetorical expectation to include rhetorical resistance as well as its mediational capacity.
As described in Chapter 3, Canada has a long history of public inquiries, so all the
participants and the public had some sense of what to expect from a public inquiry and
how it works. In particular, the genre expectations from other similar public inquiries had
important impacts on the Sophonow inquiry with significant consequences.
For example, the rules of practice and procedure for the Sophonow Inquiry were
modeled after the one that had been approved for the Krever Inquiry and the one that had
been adopted for use in the Morin inquiry. That means the existing intertextual chain of
the genre exerted the social constructionist force on Cory for determining how the
evidence was gathered and what would count as evidence.
Equally important are the previous public inquiries that made it common for
experts to appear in the hearings. In particular, the Morin inquiry made use of expert
witnesses from several areas (e.g., jailhouse informants, contamination of forensic
evidence) that are relevant to wrongful convictions. Thus, although still optional, there
was nothing uncommon about inviting expert witnesses in the Sophonow Inquiry. Thus,
if the formal intertextual thread did nothing to require or expect the expert witnesses, it
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did not prevent or discourage their appearances. The intertextual link of the genre, on the
other hand, made such appearance a common occurrence.
Such observation points to the second valence of rhetorical expectation: rhetorical
resistance. Recall the Freadman’s (2002) study on uptake in Chapter 2, in which she
begins her story of the Ryan hanging by establishing the general trend in Australia at the
time for the state premier not to uptake death sentences as executions. I would call this
force to prevent uptake as rhetorical resistance, the force that compels a lapse in the
discursive memory. Presence or absence of this rhetorical resistance is important just as
much as that of rhetorical expectation because they both contribute to the likelihood of
uptake.
But the influence of the genre is not limited to its lack of rhetorical resistance
toward expert testimonies. At least in one case, the selection of experts was influenced by
other inquiries. This was the case with Sheila Martin, the expert on compensation, whose
expert opinion was also solicited in the Milgaard Inquiry, which was taking place
concurrently. Her status in the Milgaard Inquiry made her visible among commission
counsels, and one of the counsel members invited her to testify in the Sophonow Inquiry
as well.
The analysis so far illustrated the importance of conceptualizing uptake through
the intertextual network. In particular, I have argued that we need to pay attention to not
single but multiple rhetorical expectations and resistance and how these forces play out in
the intertextual network. I have also presented the genre’s capacity to mediate people and
text to facilitate uptake, and this idea is developed further in the next section.
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4.4. Mediation and Intermediary Genres
So far, I have pointed out several texts, such as the preliminary hearing and other
public inquiries, that projected certain expectations on the Cory report, and these
expectations were influential because of their intertextual positions in the overall
intertextual network. By virtue of these positions, these texts also functioned as
intermediaries that carry knowledge and discourse that were generated elsewhere and
increased the probability of uptake by the Cory report. This section examines the role of
intermediary genres, starting from the preliminary hearing, which was the most important
mediator. In particular the analysis will reveal the paradoxical nature of the preliminary
hearing that simultaneously excluded and validated academic knowledge in the legal
system. Then the analysis will turn to two other important intermediary genres, other
public inquiries and U.S. government publications that contributed much to introduce
academic research knowledge even though the contribution of these two genres appear
modest on paper.
4.4.1. Significance of the Preliminary Hearing
The preliminary hearing is important in understanding uptake for reasons that
have already been mentioned: Both the legal rules and the intertextual position of the
preliminary report expect the Cory report to use and respond to the preliminary hearing.
Furthermore, the preliminary hearing is the largest source of information for the Cory
report, constituting 26.4% (109 out of 413) of all explicit citations in the Cory report. The
preliminary hearing has additional significance in that the language of the preliminary
hearing (not simply ideas) is highly influential in the Cory report. But this point is
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addressed in Chapter 6. Given this importance, this section analyzes the roles of the
preliminary hearing in three parts. The first part examines its gatekeeping roles to filter,
exclude, and modify academic research knowledge. The second part discusses the ways in
which experts are invited into the legal system. The last part focuses on the preliminary
hearing’s ability to validate academic research knowledge, revealing its paradoxical role.
These three sections collectively reveal the capacity of the preliminary hearing to serve as
an intermediary genre.
4.4.1.1. Gatekeeping at the preliminary hearing.
The preliminary hearing first and foremost acts as a gatekeeper. As noted in
Chapter 2, the legal system has always taken an ambivalent stance toward scientific
expertise, and it has been particularly critical of social scientific knowledge (Golan,
2004). This well-documented attitude is articulated in the words of the lead counsel,
Richard Wolson who defined the role of expert in the courtroom in the following terms:
I think there's a role for experts, but I think we have to be careful that
experts don't dominate the courtroom. It ought not to be a battle of experts.
The ultimate decision ought to be left at the judge, but the law in Canada
on expert evidence is that beyond the expertise of the prospective juror,
then and it's not junk science, then the experts should be allowed to offer
opinions.
Cory also agreed with Wolson in that qualified experts should be able to offer
their opinions regardless of whether their opinions are eventually accepted. His
description of the expert testimony is slightly more positive but still heavily qualified.
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[The importance of expert testimony] always varies (by the nature) of the
particular inquiry and the nature of the questions raised in connection with
that inquiry as to its importance. If it offers a logical point of view, and if
it is well-qualified expert who is recognized in his field, and if there's
impeccable recommendations, then why not?
____________________________________________
(word): dubious hearing
____________________________________________
Cory's "why not?" may sound somewhat more enthusiastic than Wolson's view,
but Cory's "why not" is prefaced by a lengthy set of conditionals, suggesting that the court
should retain much power in determining which experts to invite and which opinions to
accept. In short, both Wolson and Cory see the experts as potentially useful in advising
the court, but their articulations still manifest their hesitation toward giving too much
control to the expert.
Their ambivalence is consistent with the literature in legal studies, suggesting that
their views are not idiosyncratic but representative of the legal profession, and this
collective ambivalence is articulated in the form of the rules and procedures in the
preliminary hearing as well as the discourse strategies of lawyers. As noted in Chapter 2,
both the U.S. and Canada have consistently emphasized the role of the trial judge in
interpreting the relevant admissibility rules since Daubert. By adopting the rules of
practice and procedure that emulate those of a court trial, the commission also reproduced
the power relationship that grants discretionary power to the commissioner in admitting
experts.
Similarly, the court-like procedure also reproduced the same lawyer-expert
relationship in the courtroom where the lawyers could exercise considerable power over
experts by virtue of their formal roles, rhetorical positions, and context-specific rhetorical
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expertise. Wolson reveals some of the preparations that lawyers undertake before
examining an expert.
If the expert is my witness, of course, I’ll spend time with the witness. If
the expert is counter to my position, I spend time, try to find together
evidence that I could cross-examine and ask favorable questions, hoping to
get favorable answers. You know, law, the standard rule in
cross-examination is that you only want to do something by way of
questioning that’s going to help your case.
Furthermore, Wolson's description of how he (and other good lawyers in general)
handle expert witnesses is consistent with the expert's position in the legal system as well
as the literature on expert witnesses. When he examines an expert witness, he prepares by
reading "whatever [he] can get [his] hands on" and always meeting with the expert in
advance to question him/her. Knowing the expert's answers in advance is critically
important for him because questioning any witness for a lawyer is about cost-benefit
analysis:
So you always, when you are going to ask a question of any witness,
particularly an expert, it’s sort of an analysis, a cost-benefit analysis.
What’s the up side? What’s the down side? If there’s any downside, you
should be very critical of yourself in terms of asking the question. So it’s
all about trying to achieve what you want in the case without getting a
negative. So if the negative outweighs the positive, or if there is a
negative, you then have to weigh that to determine whether you are going
to ask that question or not. It’s not science but it certainly requires a huge
amount of thoughts. You may take ten hours, preparing a ten-minute
cross-examination.
Specific discourse implementations of these strategies are examined in Chapter 6.
But for now, it should be sufficient to note that the existing legal rules, procedures, and
discourse processes are powerful gatekeepers of knowledge and discourse that originate
outside of law. Therefore, in order to gain admission into the preliminary hearing, experts
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must be able to meet the criteria, somehow noted by a stakeholder, and then manage to
introduce research knowledge in the contentious discourse arena. This capacity for the
preliminary hearing to introduce knowledge and discourse from one text to another is the
mediational capacity of a text, which is not yet visible by looking only at the gatekeeping
aspect. But as the analyses in the next two sections will show, this gatekeeping function,
combined with other aspects of the preliminary hearing, is important in understanding the
mediational capacity of the preliminary hearing.
4.4.1.2. Selection of the experts.
Similar to the gatekeeping aspect, the selection criteria are also relevant in
understanding the mediational capacity of the preliminary hearing. For that reason, this
section sets up for the analysis in the next section. But the analysis in this section is also
important in its own merit because the manner in which the experts are invited is crucial
to understanding how academic research knowledge enters public policy.
For academic experts to have an influence on policy recommendation, they must
be noted and invited to the forum in which their arguments can be heard. Therefore,
understanding of the selection process of the experts becomes important. In this inquiry
all stakeholders were allowed to recommend experts to the commission, and there were
five academic experts: Elizabeth Loftus, an expert on eye witness reliability; Peter
Neufeld, an expert on wrongful conviction; Roy O’Shaughnessy and Adrian Grounds,
experts on posttraumatic stress disorder; and Sheila Martin, an expert on victim
compensations. All but O’Shaughnessey were recommended by the commission counsels,
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and Wolson, as the lead commission counsel, explained the rationale for the selection in
the research interview:
Well, Elizabeth Loftus is world renowned, so I know when you are talking
about eyewitnesses, Elizabeth Loftus is one of the leaders in the world,
certainly in North America. Peter is well-known for his work with the
Innocence Project out of Yeshiva University in New York, and I had read
his book, Presumed Innocent [sic],4 I think it's Presumed Innocent. And
Sheila Martin, who is now a judge, has argued in the Supreme Court of
Canada many times, was a law professor, was the dean of law school in
Calgary. And Adrian Grounds, I was advised that through some other
sources that he was a, one of the world's renowned experts in
posttraumatic stress disorder of people who have been wrongfully
convicted, and he was involved in the Birmingham, falsely imprisoned,
and he group-counseled them. So through reading and also other sources
of the people who work in the wrongful conviction areas.
The above excerpt indicates that Wolson selected law-related experts (Peter
Neufeld and Sheila Martin) based their specific work but selected others for different
reasons. For example, it is true that traces of Loftus’ specific studies are visible in the
Cory report (e.g., Loftus, Schooler, Boone & Kline, 1987), but no specific study or
publication led to her invitation; rather it was her international reputation that she had
amassed through decades of publishing, testifying, and being recognized beyond her field
of psychology that prompted her invitation. Similarly, Wolson was not aware of Grounds’
specific study on wrongful convictions even though that is what qualified him as an
expert witness. Rather, Grounds was introduced to Wolson through James Lockyer of
Association in Defense of the Wrongfully Convicted (AIDWYC), an advocacy group.
Lack of direct connection between these non-legal researchers’ specific work and
invitations is explained by the reading practices of Wolson. His regular reading consists
of: law journals, law reports, and three newspapers in addition to a wide selection of
fictions and non-fictions. He is obviously a voracious reader, but his reading does not
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extend to scholarly journals outside of law. This means that in order for academic experts
to be noticed by lawyers like Wolson, they need to be known beyond their disciplines
through popular publications or through law-related publications.
This section illuminated the selection criteria of the experts. This information
itself is relevant to answering the research question. But the selection criteria, along with
the gatekeeping function, also reveal the paradoxical nature of the preliminary hearing
and how that paradox contributes to the intermediary capacity of the preliminary hearing.
4.4.1.3. Legal validation: Paradox of the preliminary hearing.
If the experts are selected and withstand the rigorous legal process (including
cross-examinations), then their research knowledge increases the likelihood of subsequent
uptake by the legal system. In short, the legal procedures in the preliminary hearing
simultaneously filters out and validates academic research knowledge.
One reason for this legal validation is the epistemological assumptions in law that
privileges cross-examination as a method of verification (Research Council, 2002).
Therefore, research knowledge that withstands a cross-examination in the preliminary
hearing is deemed acceptable for further uptake in law.
The second reason is that written texts that incorporate those research knowledge
often lose their epistemological origin (see Chapter 5 for detailed analysis). Thus, for
subsequent uptakers, the knowledge that originated in academic research is attributed to
the legal authority that published those texts. Even when the epistemological origin is
preserved, the subsequent uptake often emphasizes the legal authority that validated that
knowledge to argue for legitimacy and relevance in the legal context.
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An example of this process can be found in one of the recommendations section
of the Cory report in which Cory suggested ways to improve eyewitness handling and
police-lineup procedures. As I will analyze later in this chapter and in Chapter 5 and 6,
this section contains much research knowledge from psychology, but the recommendation
is devoid of attribution. Naturally, when this section of the report was cited in another
report by the heads of federal, provincial, and territorial prosecutors, they attributed to
Cory and framed this knowledge as arising out of Canadian legal context, losing any
indication that much of the knowledge was generated by research psychologists in the
U.S.
By contrast, the names of the experts who introduced the concepts were preserved
in the preliminary hearing of the Milgaard inquiry when an expert witness5 referred to the
works of Grounds and O’Shaughnessy. But the witness who introduced them emphasized
the facts that they were all cross-examined (i.e., legally validated) in the Sophonow
inquiry (The preliminary hearing transcript from the Milgaard Inquiry, p. 23192).
For these reasons, the preliminary hearing was an important node in the
intertextual network, in which research knowledge was simultaneously filtered and
validated. In this sense, we could argue that the preliminary hearing is like Galison’s
(1997) “trading zone,” which could resolve the major problem that was posed in Chapter
2 under various names, such as two communities (Caplan, 1979), cultural clash (Jasanoff,
1995), and incommensurability (Kuhn, 1962). In this case, the language of the experts
were pidgin-like in that the language of their testimonies were not their “native” academic
language. The representatives of the judicial systems used their “native” tongue, but they,
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too, had to negotiate the concepts and terminology that experts introduced. This
discursive negotiation is further elaborated in Chapter 6, which describes specific
rhetorical and discursive strategies and their consequences. But what makes the
preliminary hearing the most important intermediary genre is this process of filtering and
validation, along with the its position in the intertextual network with much consequence
for uptake. As I will show in the following sections, similar validation processes took
place in other legal and policy genres, also making them important intermediary genres.
4.4.2. Roles of Other Public Inquiries
I have already mentioned some of the ways in which other public inquiries
influenced the working of the Sophonow Inquiry. For example, the Sophonow inquiry
borrowed the procedural rules from the Marshall Inquiry, and it shared Martin as an
expert with the Milgaard inquiry. Furthermore, I have noted the influence of the
Sophonow inquiry on Milgaard inquiry, in introducing the work of Grounds and
O’Shaughnessy into the preliminary hearing of the Milgaard Inquiry.6
In addition to these influences, the Marshall inquiry probably contributed to the
prominence of Kaiser’s (1989) scholarly article in the Cory report. Unlike most scholarly
articles that contributed to the Cory report that received little to no citations,7 Kaiser’s
article was given the full formal citation, and he was given most direct quotes among all
scholarly articles. Furthermore, unlike many of the articles that are attributed to the
testifying experts, the Cory’s text leaves an impression that citation of Kaiser (1989) was
Cory’s own selection, rather than mediated by an expert witness even though Kaiser was
formally introduced by Martin.
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While we may not be able to solve Cory’s preferential treatment of Kaiser (1989),
we might find clues in the fact that Kaiser’s article played an important role in the
Marshall inquiry and Commissioner Kaufman accepted Kaiser’s argument in determining
the compensation amount. Although Cory denied the knowledge or influence from
Marshall inquiry (Cory, personal communication), the knowledge status of Kaiser was
known to the commission counsel Field-Marsham, who invited and direct-examined
Martin. Perhaps the uptake was a result of Field-Marsham’s skillful direct examination or
Martin’s skillful answers or some combinations of other factors (as I will suggest in
Chapter 6), but what is relevant to our current discussion is that Marshall inquiry
functioned as an intermediary text in facilitating the uptake of Kaiser, and the genre of
public inquiries collectively served as an intermediary genre.
4.4.3. U.S. Government Publications
Another important intermediary genre was U.S. government publications even
though these sources are almost textually invisible in the Cory report. This section
examines the ways in which this genre facilitated the uptake of research articles as well as
the ideological factors that obscured this uptake by erasing the textual traces. In order to
do so, the first part describes the uptake path in the intertextual network and some
evidence of the uptake. The remaining subsections address the manner in which the legal
community obscured this uptake path, using Foucault’s theory of discursive formation
and rules of exclusion as well as genre theory.
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4.4.3.1. Intertextual pathways.
The role of this genre is best illustrated by tracing psychological concepts that fare
prominently in Cory’s eight recommendations on live lineup, including the research
finding that eyewitness evidence is unreliable. This is an argument that psychologists
have been championing since the seventies (e.g., Loftus, 1979; Wells & Loftus, 1984),
but their research findings received lukewarm receptions from the legal community until
the nineties. A major breakthrough occurred when the National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
began reviewing the cases of wrongful convictions and began their initiatives to prevent
future miscarriages of justice under Attorney General Janet Reno. In 1996, the NIJ
published a research report Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science (Connors,
Lundregan, Miller, & McEwen, 1996) in collaboration with many experts, including Peter
Neufeld and Elizabeth Loftus. In particular, Convicted by Juries and Exonerated by
Science features Loftus’ commentary on malleability of memory and police pressure in
the policy implication section (pp. 24-25).
Furthermore, Convicted by Juries was followed by the publication of a practical
handbook for law enforcement, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement three
years later, which operationalized the findings and recommendations made in Convicted
by Juries, Exonerated by Science. The relationship between the two publications is
evidenced by the facts that Eyewitness Evidence explicitly cites Convicted by Juries as
the impetus for its publication and that both texts are forwarded by Janet Reno. This
practical guide was particularly influential in the Cory report even though, as I will
discuss below, the influence of this document is textually obscured.
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In the Sophonow Inquiry Eyewitness Evidence was first introduced by Counsel
Edwardh during her direct examination of Loftus (labeled as both “A” and “THE
WITNESS”):
(4-1)
MS. EDWARDH: You've got a book in front of you that is published 
by the Department of Justice in United States and 
it's guidelines for law enforcement?
A: Yes.
COMMISSIONER CORY: That's the U.S. Department of Justice?
THE WITNESS: The U.S. Department of Justice, A Guide For Law 
Enforcement. It's Eyewitness Evidence, A Guide 
For Law Enforcement. It was published in October 
of 1999.
MS. EDWARDH: We have taken the liberty of taking it off the 
website. I ask that it be filed as the next exhibit.
COMMISSIONER CORY: Yes, indeed. Exhibit 114.
MADAM REGISTRAR: Exhibit 114.
(EXHIBIT 114: BOOK RE EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, A GUIDE FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT PUBLISHED IN OCTOBER OF 1999)
(pp. 8980-8981)
From this moment, all participants during Loftus’ testimony carried copies of
Eyewitness Evidence, and they used it to collaborate on the phrasing of the
recommendations:
(4-2)
A Well, I think it would probably be worth getting some -- particularly that's
the proposal that's been made in a recent article by a number of experts in
this field, that you get some expression of confidence right at the time, so
that you can see if it changes later on.
Q And that issue is raised and dealt with in the U.S. Federal Department of
Justice Guidelines and they ask as well that there be a record of the
expression of confidence immediately after the procedures?
A I remember it from -- I remember it from the Wells' article on human
behaviour, and I just have to refresh my memory about exactly what their
wording is in the Federal Guidelines.
Q Let me just see if I can find this for you. This is the very last question, Mr.
Commissioner, that I wanted to deal with Dr. Loftus with, and if I could
just find that for her. Thank you, take a peek at page 32.6 and 35.6.
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A Okay, yeah there is -- ask the witness to state in his or her own words how
certain.
Q And I take it that is in accord with the general understanding of capturing
at this moment the confidence level to see whether it changes as time
passes?
A Correct. (pp. 9010-9011)
As a result, a significant proportion of the eight recommendations in the Cory
report regarding live lineup is directly traceable to the specific recommendations in
Eyewitness Evidence. The examples in (4-3) to (4-8) illustrate this connection.
(4-3a) [Eyewitness Evidence] Instruct the witness that the person who committed the
crime may or may not be present in the group of individuals (p. 32).
(4-3b) [Cory Report] The officer should emphasize to the witness that the suspect
may not be in the line-up (p. 31, emphasis in original).
This instruction can be traced back to Malpass and Devine (1981) who noted that
witnesses are less likely to force an identification when this instruction is present. This
implication from the study is included in Eyewitness Evidence and the transcript from
Loftus’ direct examination makes it clear that the direct examiner was working from
Eyewitness Evidence when she examined Loftus.
(4-4a) [Eye Witness Evidence] Select fillers who generally fit the witness' description
of the perpetrator. When there is a limited/inadequate description of the
perpetrator provided by the witness, or when the description of the perpetrator
differs significantly from the appearance of the suspect, fillers should resemble
the suspect in significant features (p. 30).
(4-4b) [The Cory report] The filler in the line-up should match as closely as possible
the descriptions given by the eyewitnesses at the time of the event. It is only if
that is impossible, that the fillers should resemble the suspect as closely as
possible (p. 31, emphasis in original.).
The recommendation to select fillers that resemble the eyewitness’ description
comes from Linsdsay and Wells (1985), who noted the changes in witness’ willingness to
identify a suspect and the confidence level of that identification based on the fillers’
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appearances. Again, the transcript from Loftus’ direct examination makes it clear that the
recommendation is based on Eyewitness Evidence.
(4-5a) [Eyewitness Evidence] Instruct the witness that the procedure requires the
investigator to ask the witness to state, in his/her own words, how certain he/she is
of any identification (p. 32) 
(4-5b) [Cory Report] At the conclusion of the line-up, if there has been any
identification, there should be a question posed to the witness as to the degree
of certainty of identification (p. 32, emphasis in original).
(4-6a) [Eyewitness Evidence] Record both identification and nonidentification results in
writing, including the witness' words regarding how sure he/she is. ... Ensure
results are signed and dated by the witness. (p. 38)
(4-6b) [Cory Report] The question and answer must be both noted and recorded
verbatim and signed by the witness (p. 32, emphasis in original).
Similarly, the verbatim recording of the witness’ expressions of confidence comes
from many studies that demonstrated that the witness’ expressions of confidence can be
easily manipulated by events after the identification8 (e.g., Hall, Loftus, & Tousignant,
1984; Wells, Ferguson, Lindsay, 1981). Therefore, the literature in psychology (e.g.,
Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, and Brimacombe, 1998) recommends that the
confidence level be recorded at the initial identification. This recommendation was
incorporated in Eyewitness Evidence, and Loftus explained during the direct examination
that the initial confidence level is used to detect inflated confidence when the witnesses
express higher confidence level at later times. Cory’s recommendation is, thus, based on
Eyewitness Evidence.
(4-7a) [Eyewitness Evidence] Include a minimum of four fillers (nonsuspect) per
identification procedure.
(4-7b) [Cory Report] The line-up should contain a minimum of 10 persons. The
greater the number of persons in the line-up, the less likelihood there is of a
wrong identification (p. 32).
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The last paired example is somewhat different from the previous four examples in
that the content of the recommendations is a slightly different, yet, Eyewitness Evidence
was still relevant. The size of a lineup is discussed in Wells, Leippe, and Ostrom (1979),
who tried to determine what they called a “functional size.” While psychologists argue
that the functional size is not simply a single number but is contingent on the quality of
the fillers, Eyewitness Evidence specifies the minimum number of fillers. The discussion
of the minimum size of a line up occurred because Edwardh was going through the
guidelines in Eyewitness Evidence, but the minimum number is higher in Cory’s
recommendation because the Winnipeg police, which would have to comply to this
recommendation, already had a more rigorous standard by the time of the hearing:
(4-8)
BY MS. EDWARDH:
Q I just want to highlight if I could some of the features that I think 
are very very positive about this. And you'll forgive my smugness, 
but I see in the Federal Department of Justice U.S. proposals, they 
talk about photo packs having a minimum number I think of five 
and live line-ups having a minimum number of four. And I see 
that the Winnipeg proposal -- or the guidelines in place talk about 
for a live line-up ten. And can you just confirm for us, Dr. Loftus,
that in fact the larger the number of members of the line-up, the 
less likely it is that there will be a false identification or mistaken 
identification? So that if you just have five, you increase the 
probability of a mistake?
A Right. ...
In short Eyewitness Evidence was still relevant in incorporating the minimum
lineup size in Cory’s recommendation even though this particular recommendation was
not the cause for the change in the Winnipeg police guideline. However, this
recommendation itself is still influential since other jurisdictions have later appealed to
the Cory report in adjusting their guidelines.
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4.4.3.2. Obscuring the influence.
The transcript and textual juxtapositions in the previous section seem to make it
obvious that Cory’s recommendations on eyewitness owe much to Eyewitness Evidence.
However, the Cory report never mentions Eyewitness Evidence in his report. He cites
Convicted by Juries once but it was outside of the recommendation section, and it was
used in a way to appear unrelated to Cory’s argument. Furthermore, he denied the
significance of Eyewitness Evidence during the research interview, insisting that no single
source was particularly important in his recommendations (Cory, May, 10, 2007, personal
communication). Furthermore, he denied that he consulted this source when writing his
report (Cory, May, 10, 2007, personal communication). The following interview excerpt
illustrates his unwillingness to discuss sources of influence:
Researcher: Quite a few of the recommendations in this section ((pointing to pp. 31-34 in
the Cory report, recommendation section on eyewitnesses)) seem to come from
Eyewitness Testimony ((showing him the cover of the document and presenting it
to him)). My first question is: How important is this document?
Cory: No! This is just part of the background! Part of the background! Part of the
(matrix) You gather your recommendations from all the evidence that you have
considered and accepted, and to say that dominates? No. You have to all sort the
evidence of Elizabeth Loftus, evidence of the other chap that has an international
reputation on eyewitness ( )
Researcher: Yes
Cory: And, generally, it’s always the sum total of the evidence that leads you to the
conclusion. ( ) and the sum is always greater than the parts.
___________________________________________
Notes transcription conventions
(( )): transcriber’s description
( ): inaudible
(word): dubious hearing
____________________________________________
The audible raising of his voice (indicated in the transcript with an exclamation
mark) suggests that direct questions about his sources are unlikely to be fruitful.
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Furthermore, his willingness to frame his sources as “just part of the background”
suggests that his recommendations should not be traced back to the sources despite the
compelling textual evidence. This apparent contradiction between the two sources of data
points to the limitations of interviewing as a method to elicit certain types of information;
similarly, the same contradiction could be interpreted as a limitation of textual analysis
that fails to account for the rhetorical motives for the citation (or lack thereof). However,
as the next section demonstrates, the resolution of this contradiction should not result in a
complete rejection of the interview data or the textual data. Rather, the contradiction
reveals the process in which influence of academic sources superficially disappears and
become "just part of the background." The superficial disappearance of these academic
sources, I will argue, is motivated by the legal version of Foucault’s will to truth and
accomplished by what Latour (1987) calls “blackboxing,” which consists of rhetorical
manipulation of textual elements to obscure the source and to manufacture (“scientific” in
Latour but “legal” in this case) facts. To this end, the next section examines the rhetorical
contexts that situate the Cory report and the interview data so that we can better
understand the function of each from Cory's perspective.
4.4.3.3. Will to truth and public performance.
It is not difficult to imagine the failure to elicit insightful information about the
influence of academic sources as limitations of interviewing as a research method. After
all, the inquiry took place some seven years ago, and Cory may have simply forgotten
details of his own writing process and the extent to which he relied on other sources. This
and other limitations of interviewing as a research method is pronounced by
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methodologists like Yin (2003) who cautions that interview data, as verbal reports, suffer
from “bias, poor recall and poor or inaccurate articulation” (p. 92). Dean and White
(1970) go further to say that any account from a given informant should be viewed as one
that has been "filtered and modified by his cognitive and emotional reactions and
reported through his personal verbal usage" (p. 120, emphasis in original).
However, these problems are only limitations if we want to pretend that the
accounts obtained through the interviews are factual descriptions of some external reality;
these "problems" are not limitations if we intend to use interview data as the interviewee's
perception and interpretation of a given event at the time of the interview.
This more cautious interpretation of interview data is consistent with Foucault’s
(1972a, 1972b) discursive approach because a phenomenon or an event does not depend
on its internal property but on the discursive relationship that forms around it. As
described in Chapter 2, we need to treat Cory’s description not against some inaccessible
historical events that may or may not have taken place at the time of his writing but
against other discourses on the topic at the time of the interview.
A similar view is expressed by the social constructionist force in the genre theory,
which also theorizes reality based on discourse. One such example is illustrated in Paré
(1993), who noted the genre’s social constructionist force (or Foucault’s rules of
exclusion) to impose a particular construction of reality by describing the struggle of a
social worker. This social worker wanted to provide a fair description for one of his
young offenders, but the genre of predisposition report was constructed to frame each
young offender as “a rotten little kid” (p. 117). So the social worker was torn between
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conforming to the genre (thus, providing what he thought as an unfair description) and
breaking free of the genre and risking his credibility in the report.
A similar illustration is found in the work of Segal (1993), who studied medical
doctors and medical genres. Her finding illustrates that medical genres compel doctors to
see patients as atomized objectified bodies for the purpose of their treatment, not as
whole humans with feelings and emotions who seek philosophical significance of their
illnesses within their social and cultural context.
The same phenomenon occurs in the legal community, as peculiarities of legal
reasoning and knowledge schemata are well-noted by observers of the legal system and
language (Gibbons, 2002; Golan, 2004; Jasenoff, 1995; Tiersma, 1999; Vandevelde,
1996). For example, Vandevelde (1996) observes that unlike non-lawyers who typically
see laws as fixed prescribed decorum, lawyers are trained see the political nature of law,
giving much weight to political and moral values as well as neutral logic in predicting the
likely outcome of the court. These observers have also noted the legal community’s
ability to construct and perpetuate their legal reality through law even though such legal
discursive construction may be best perceived by non-lawyers as descriptive nonsense
(Tiersma, 1999). 
There is no doubt that the discursive formation (along with rules of exclusion) and
the social constructionist force in genre are necessary and useful at least some of the
times. Like the social workers in Paré (1993) and doctors in Segal (1993), these forces
enable the participants to carry out their jobs, justify their actions, and assign meanings to
what they do. However, the discursive formation becomes an impediment to researchers
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who try to unmask “the truth” that has been masked by the will to truth. In other words,
interviewing is particularly suited in eliciting how the professional community
rhetorically imagines itself but not necessarily useful in how that community really works
whether or not the participant tentatively or actually believe in that projected image.
Additional difficulties occur when situational and motivational factors may
compel the informants to modify their propositional contents, leaving the researcher with
the task of separating useful research data and public performance. Such cases are
abundant in the history of social science research. For example Dean and Whyte's (1970)
South African informant volunteered for a research interview, praised the management
throughout, and subsequently asked the researcher for a good recommendation to the
management. These factors are particularly problematic when interviewing public figures
who have vested interests in preserving and propagating their discursive constructions of
reality (Imagine a U.S. President, discussing democracy). In these cases, informants may
perceive a research interview as another opportunity for public performance, rather than
an occasion to reveal what is obscured by the will to truth.
Acknowledging the role and the nature of discursive formations requires us to
examine the stakes of the legal community as well as the functions of the Cory report and
the research interview from his perspective. Examination of these social, situational, and
motivational factors allows us to better understand Cory’s response and reframe the
apparent contradiction described earlier.
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4.4.3.4. Reframing Cory’s account.
This shift in perspective allows us to see Cory’s denial in light of the legal context
and the discursive formations that surround Cory. Such an approach situates Cory as
socially and discursively occupying the role of a judge partly because he was a judge but
also because the ritual of the public inquiry emulates a court proceeding, thus equating a
commissioner and a judge. As a result, the commissioner role comes with the
responsibilities that are ordinarily associated with a judge, such as neutrality, objectivity,
and independence. It is through this formally assigned role that the commissioner's
recommendations are received and accepted as valid.
Many of us, who subscribe to some versions of postmodernism, may object to the
very possibility of such idealized neutrality, objectivity, and independence. For example,
it is unlikely, contrary to what Cory implied in the earlier excerpt, that all testimonies
were given equal weight as they disappeared in the background. Furthermore, this
explanation does not reveal the process of his recommendation-making, which this
dissertation seeks to uncover.
However, it misses the point if we dismiss those idealized qualities of a judge on
the ground that these qualities are literally impossible in our framework, our own
disciplinary discursive formations and forbidden by our rules of exclusion. Rather, we
need to examine how the legal discursive formations enable the possibility of these
qualities, and how Cory rhetorically possesses those qualities. In doing so, we must
separate Cory's role from the individual who occupies this position: The flesh-and-blood
Cory may not be immune to biases and prior knowledge, like every other human being,
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but these human qualities are masked by the legal will to truth, and
Cory-the-Commissioner must be and is construed as neutral, objective, and independent.
This assumption is crucial to the working of the legal system because admitting
the lack of these idealized qualities would invalidate his recommendations, just as much
as the lack neutrality of a trial judge is a ground for overturning the verdict. Under this
condition Cory cannot afford to speak outside this discursive formation; as a
representative of this system, he must propagate the validity of this will to truth.
This explanation is supported by several other segments of the interview, in which
Cory consistently rejected the idea of any prior knowledge or opinions ("You wouldn’t be
a useful commissioner if you had made up your mind.") Similarly his description of his
decision making process de-emphasized any specific connections and uptakes from
individual sources but emphasized the prescribed method of how the legal community
approaches a problem:
First of all, you hear all witnesses that are called by all parties. You
determine what evidence you particularly think as relevant, credible, and
you put all this into various headings: What happened? What went wrong
with eyewitness identification? What could be done to see that doesn’t
happen again?
(Cory, May, 10, 2007, personal communication)
Analysis of these interview segments suggests the importance of contextual and
motivational factors in interpreting interview data. The analysis also suggests that
interviewing is particularly fruitful in eliciting the socially constructed reality of that
profession, which is the framework through which the participant operates. Regardless of
whether the participant truly or only tentatively believes in that framework, our role as
researchers is to accept it as such and do not buy into that discursive formation ourselves.
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This is not to say that discursive representations are never useful or interview data can
never elicit information that is obscured by that representation. Rather we need to account
for the will to truth and find a way to see beyond it before drawing conclusions.
4.4.3.5. Further blackboxing.
If Cory’s de-emphasis of the U.S. government publications in his report
contributed to obscuring the origin and the process of his knowledge making, he was not
the only one to make this rhetorical move. This process, which was labeled earlier as
“blackboxing” (Latour, 1987), occurred at many nodes in the intertextual network. 
During the preliminary hearing, for example, the direct examiner Edwardh kept a
greater focus on Eyewitness Evidence rather than the original academic articles with
utterances like (4-9).
(4-9)
Q I want to start with some that emerges from the psychological 
literature, and you can feel free to use the U.S. Department of 
Justice.
(p. 8982)
As I suggested earlier in this chapter, Edwardh’s rhetorical move to use
Eyewitness Evidence makes sense because it belongs to a policy genre that has already
processed the scholarly articles, but this shift amounts to blackboxing because it obscures
the origin of the knowledge.
Similarly, Eyewitness Evidence also contributed to the blackboxing process.
Eyewitness Evidence contains references to scholarly articles in an appendix, but they are
presented as further reading, not as sources from which Eyewitness Evidence derived its
knowledge. In addition, the body of Eyewitness Evidence obviously does not contain any
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citations because it is meant to be a practical guide, thus erasing any traces to the source
of its information.
Examination of the U.S. publications as an intermediary genre has led us to see its
capacity to serve as intermediary genres, increasing the likelihood that academic research
is used in the Cory report. However, the uptake process is such that the textual traces are
removed from these documents, making it more difficult to see that the ideas originated
from academic research. This observation is further validated in Chapter 5 where a
quantitative citation analysis shows a systematic removal of these textual attributions.
The section on intermediary genres has illustrated genres’ capacities to serve as
intermediary genres. But as I stated in the beginning of this chapter, most genres that can
serve as intermediary genres have other primary functions that define them as genres. For
example, the U.S. government publications (Convicted by Juries and Eyewitness
Evidence) sought to reduce wrongful convictions in the U.S.; their primary role was not
to facilitate the uptake of academic research into a Canadian public inquiry. However, in
the intertextual network of the Sophonow report, the discursive relationship assigned this
intermediary role to this genre.
4.5. Accessibility and Time Constraints
This chapter so far has focused on the intertextual network and intermediary
genres, and how they contribute to our understanding of uptake of academic research by a
policy relevant document. However, there are two other macro-level contextual factors
that contributed significantly to the uptake but did not fall under either category.
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Therefore, this last section will examine accessibility and time constraints and how these
elements played a role in the uptake of academic research.
Accessibility refers to the fact that certain scholarly texts were more readily
available for Cory than others. For example, Kaiser’s (1989) article, which is highly
visible in the Cory report, was probably far more accessible to Cory than other scholarly
sources because Kaiser (1989) was published in a Canadian law journal, and the
bibliographic information was clearly listed in the written report, prepared by Martin. By
comparison, Wells (1984) was mentioned by Loftus and Neufeld, but neither of them
provided Cory with the bibliographic information. The source is locatable only by
searching through Wells’ publication list (or his website) to find the first use of the term
“relative judgment.” Similarly, Loftus, Schooler, Boone, & Kline (1987) was also an
influential scholarly article in the Cory report (see Chapter 6 for Cory’s uptake), but
Loftus never provided the bibliographic information for her study even though she spent
considerable amount of time in her testimony, describing the study. The source is
technically easier to locate than Wells (1984), but it still requires one to review her
curriculum vitae (attached as an appendix to the Cory report), locate the likely title among
403 of her publications, and confirm it by comparing the descriptions of the study design
in the article and her testimony. Cory was generally unable to say which specific scholarly
article he read seven years ago except to say he read everything that was introduced to
him in the preliminary hearing and nothing else. But he was reasonably confident that he
read neither Wells (1984) nor Loftus et al. (1987). As a result, these two articles are less
visible in the Cory report, with consequences on linguistic uptake (see Chapter 6).
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The second constraint is that Cory had only approximately three and half months
to write a 218-page report (single-spaced) only with an occasional help of a stenographer.
This time constraint is evidenced by moderate grammatical, typographical, and formatting
errors in the report. As a result, his choice of uptake seems to be influenced by
expediency to a certain extent. Salient texts are more likely to receive uptake (like
Kaiser), and labor-intensive citations (like Wells [1984] and Loftus [1987]) are omitted.
This point and the linguistic consequences of the time constraint are further discussed in
Chapter 6.
4.6. Conclusion
This chapter has provided a macro-analysis of the Sophonow case, focusing on the
intertextual network and intermediary genres. By doing so, I have attempted to reveal
some of the factors that are relevant in uptake of academic research by a policy relevant
document. At the same time, I have proposed intertextual network and intermediary
genres as two theoretical contributions that can extend the theoretical usefulness of genre
theory to analyze multiple genres and uptake across genre boundaries.
To summarize the main arguments in this chapter:
1. Uptake is influenced by the configuration of the intertextual network. In particular
we need to examine the discursive relationship among the members of the
network as well as the social constructionist and the social constructivist forces
that govern the network. I have argued in this chapter that the social
constructionist force is exerted by the existing configuration of the intertextual
network and the relative strength of the intertextual links. The social constructivist
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force, on the other hand, comes from the scalability of the network. It is the
question of where to attach the new text and what additional textual links it brings
with it. The theory of intertextual network, in sum, specifies the manner in which
Gidden’s (1981) duality of structuration is carried out and the places in which
individual rhetors may leverage the social constructivist force, which are all
relevant to uptake.
2. Uptake is influenced by the mediational capacity of genres and texts. While this
perspective does not deny the possibility and importance of direct uptake, this
approach complicates and complements the above description of the intertextual
network. First, while the discussions on intertextual network focused on the
multiplicity of the intertextual links, the concept of intermediary genres and texts
leads us to examine the history of each intertextual link to see which texts and
genres mediate the source and the outcome. I have argued that the uptake pathway
and the mediating texts and genres are all relevant to uptake. Second, this
mediation may leave a number of consequences, such as validating and filtering of
knowledge and discourse as well as obscuring the source through Foucault’s rules
of exclusion. Finally, I have argued that this mediational function of the genre is
secondary, and this function is acquired through its discursive position in the
intertextual network and the analyst’s research framework.
3. Uptake is also influenced by other macro-level contextual factors. In this chapter,
I have identified accessibility and time constraints as relevant in understanding the
nature of uptake.
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The next two chapters continue this line of inquiry to identify uptake factors, but
the units of analyses in these chapters are considerably narrower. The analysis in Chapter
5 focuses on citation in the Cory report to trace its sources more systematically, describe
their representations, and discuss the consequences of those representations. While the
analytical tool in Chapter 5 is different from those of this chapter, some of the same
theoretical concepts will recur in Chapter 5, accommodating a different kind of evidence
and articulating different details of the uptake process. Similarly, Chapter 6 still addresses
uptake factors, but the analysis in Chapter 6 focuses on uptake of specific language and
rhetorical elements.
NOTES
1. Bitzer (1968), for example, locates the source of rhetorical expectation in the
rhetorical situation. Others, like Burke (1945) and Vatz (1973) locate it in the rhetor.
2. As noted in Chapter 5, some of the additional 183 items are oral testimonies from the
preliminary hearing, so the actual number of items from the preliminary hearing is
somewhere between 109 (26.4%) and 292 (70.7%). The wide range makes it difficult
to estimate the actual proportion of cited materials from the preliminary hearing, but
the point is that the even the most conservative estimate (26.4%) makes it clear that
this is an important source.
3. Court, Hovland, and Young (2005) note that research is more likely to be
incorporated into policy if the research was commissioned by policy makers. As
described in Chapter 3, the Sophonow Inquiry was initiated by the Justice Minister of
Manitoba. Therefore, the recommendations from the Cory report are likely to be
incorporated into policy by that criterion by Court et al.
4. Wolson is referring to Actual Innocence by Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld.
Presumed Innocent is a movie title from the 1990s.
5. This witness in the Milgaard inquiry is Joel Grymaloski, who testified as the
counselor of David Milgaard, another wrongfully accused. It is noteworthy that
Grymaloski was also the counselor for Thomas Sophonow and testified as an expert
in the Sophonow inquiry. Grymaloski’s standing in the Milgaard Inquiry also supports
my point that the public inquiries are an important intermediary genre.
6. To clarify the chronological confusion, the timelines for the Sophonow Inquiry and
the Milgaard Inquiry overlapped. When Martin was selected an expert for the
Sophonow inquiry, her appointment as an expert to the Milgaard inquiry was already
confirmed. However, the preliminary hearing for the Milgaard inquiry postdated the
preliminary hearing of the Sophonow Inquiry and the publication of the Cory report.
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7. General lack of attribution to scholarly articles is not entirely Cory’s fault. Many
expert witnesses who introduced research articles provided insufficient (if at all)
bibliographical information.
8. In Chapter 6 we will trace the circulation of the word “postevent” from the
preliminary hearing to the Cory report.
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Chapter 5: Tracing Academic Influences
In Chapter 4, we have examined the intertextual network of the Sophonow case to
trace the pathway of influence from academic research articles to the Cory report. The
analysis in that chapter revealed the complexity of the intertextual network and pointed
out some social constructionist and social constructivist factors that contributed to uptake.
The chapter also introduced the concept of intermediary genre to emphasize the
mediational aspect of some important genres. This chapter, by comparison, focuses on
one crucial uptake point in the intertextual network: uptake of research knowledge from
the preliminary hearing to the Cory report. The analysis in this chapter supplements
Chapter 4 in providing a systematic and quantitative analysis of the citation in the Cory
report.
Consistent with the research questions, the major goal for this chapter is to
understand the representation of academic research in this policy relevant document, but
this chapter also raises a methodological argument on citation analysis. The first section
describes some of the challenges of applying the citation analysis to a non-academic
document by uncovering some of the assumptions behind the method. The second section
describes the modifications to the method so that the method can be used to analyze the
Cory report. The third section presents the results from the citation analysis and discusses
the results in relation to the research questions and the findings from Chapter 4.
The major findings and arguments in this chapter are as follows:
1. Academic sources do play a role in influencing policy relevant documents. These
sources exert influence through the textual context of citation that favor these sources.
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2. Tracing of these ideas from academic sources is, however, made difficult by the
Foucauldian will to truth, lack of systematic documentation, and different (from
academic genres) functions of citation. As a result, academic sources appear to be less
influential than they really are.
3. Methods in citation studies, which were developed for analyzing academic genres,
can be used to analyze non-academic texts even though modifications are necessary to
accommodate generic differences.
5.1. Challenges to Citation Analysis
As discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 3, there are many approaches to citation
analysis. Some analyses, like that of Garfield, Pudovkin, and Istomin (2003), are
decidedly algorithmic, making use of the existing databases and developing computer
programs for their citation analysis. On the other hand, researchers like Winsor (1993)
use a more sociological view of citation and takes a more rhetorical approach to her
citation analysis.
The citation analysis conducted in this chapter takes the middle ground. Certain
algorithmic approaches that presupposes the existence of a database is clearly not
applicable in this case because the Cory report is not part of any known index, such as the
ISI citation index. Furthermore, these approaches would typically miss what Small (1982)
calls the context of citation. On the other hand, purely qualitative approaches would not
provide the overall picture of how academic sources are used in the Cory report.
Therefore, the analytic method used in this chapter is based on quantitative methods, such
as Small (1982) and Swales (1986), that are sensitive to the context of citation. A more
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in-depth qualitative approach is taken in Chapter 6 to complement the quantitative
analysis in this chapter.
This section of the chapter begins with challenges to citation analysis that emerge
from the differences between academic and non-academic genres and ways of
overcoming these challenges. This involves reconstructing a list of sources and changing
the unit of analysis from a source to an instance of citation to accommodate the
differences between academic and non-academic genres. The methodological discussion
is followed by a quantitative analysis of citations in search for meaningful patterns that
reveal the nature of academic sources in the Cory report.
5.1.1. Generic Considerations
Challenges of applying citation analysis to non-academic writing come from the
fundamental differences in ways in which academic and non-academic writing
conceptualize and value citation. As noted in Giltrow (2002), academics use citations to
accomplish a number of important functions, such as making claims about the state of
knowledge, locating knowledge deficit, constructing knowledge, and affirming
membership to the disciplinary community. Furthermore, academics have additional
financial and moral incentives for rigorous citations, evidenced by the existence of
citation indices and continued debates on values, such as academic integrity. On the other
hand, non-academics do not necessarily hold the same view on citations (nor do their
professional communities support such a view).
Some of the consequences of this difference is that many non-academic texts,
including the Cory report lack references pages, and in-text citations are not as rigorous
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as those in academic writing. This difference makes it difficult for us to simply apply
many of the citation analysis methods that have been developed for academic writing.
5.1.2. Applicability of the Coding Categories
In Chapter 3, we discussed in detail the coding categories that include the
following five categories: (1) positive/neutral/negative to indicate the level of factnsess,
(2) evolutionary/zero/juxtapositional to indicate the source’s relation to the writer’s
argument, (3) extended/short to indicate the length of the discussion on the cited source,
(4) formal citation to indicate the presence or absence of formal citations, (5) direct quote
to indicate whether the cited material appear as a direct quote.
However, application of these categories is not straight forward because Cory uses
his sources multiple times throughout his report, and his framing of the same sources
differ from one place to another. This poses a problem for conducting a citation analysis
because in Swales (1986) each source, not each instance, can assume only one modality,
such as positive ("confirmational" in Swale), negative ("negational"), or neutral ("zero").
This problem is illustrated in (5-1) in which a single source (Sergeant Biener) has both
positive and negative modalities.
(5-1a) [The Cory report] Sergeant Biener appeared to me to be very conscientious, fair
minded and for the most part a competent police officer. He frankly conceded that
problems existed in the police department in 1982 (p. 36).
(5-1b) [The Cory report] Sergeant Biener's recollection of the event is somewhat
different from that of Inspector Smith. On this issue, where there is difference, I
accept the evidence of Inspector Smith. ... (p. 25).
The introductory sentence in (4-8a), the adverb frankly, and the lexical choice of
the reporting verb concede all indicate Cory's positive stance on Sergeant Biener's
reported speech, thus making a tacit (although fairly obvious) argument that the
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propositional content of the reported speech should be accepted as fact. On the other
hand, Cory explicitly rejects the statement of Sergeant Biener in (4-8b), preferring the
version by Inspector Smith. On basis of this contradiction, it is not easy to label this
source as positive or negative.
The same problem occurs in other sources and other classifications as well. The
Crown received two positive, one neutral, and three negative modals; the Canadian
Charter received one evolutionary, one zero, and one juxtapositional uses. The existence
of these cases suggests that a source may not be an appropriate unit of analysis.
The Swales' category of short/extended is not without problems, either. His
definition of short as "one sentence" was useful to Swales when he was analyzing
research articles in social science (applied linguistics to be exact), a genre known to have
many cursory citations. As if to confirm this known characteristic, Swales' analysis of 47
essays that cite Munby resulted in 27 (57%) shorts and 20 (43%) extendeds. However, the
Cory report does not seem to share the same characteristic, regarding cursory citations.
Only 31 (21%) out of 148 sources are treated in one sentence or less, unable to
distinguish the remaining 79%. This different characteristic on cursory citations suggests
that the category of short/extended may serve us better if we could tweak this category to
indicate the length of the sources.
These challenges can be remedied by changing the unit of analysis from a source
to an instance of a citation. This shift is consistent with one of the theories of citation
analysis to emphasize the language that frames each citation because it is the act of citing
(uptake) that creates meaning to the cited work (Small, 1978). A recent invention of the
142
term citance to refer to the sentence(s) that contain citation (Nakov, Schwartz, & Hearst,
2004) is also an indication that much can be gained by focusing on each instance of
citation and the language in that sentence(s).
This means that each instance of citation can be now coded with
positive/neutral/negative, evolutionary/zero/juxtapositional with other bibliographical
information such as the source, presence of formal citation, and inclusion of direct
speech. If the same source appears pages later, it is treated as another instance, but of the
same source of citation. When each instance of citation is used as the basis for the citation
analysis, there are total of 413 instances of citation from the 148 sources.
Again, a list of all instances of citation provides some indications of the extent to
which academic sources are used in the Cory report. Out of 413 instances, academic
sources take up 62 instances (15.0%). In academic genres, this number may be used as a
rough indication of relative importance since studies in citation analysis (especially Small
[1982]) established that citations in academic writing are largely positive. However, as
the later analysis in the chapter will show, this assumption does not hold true for the Cory
report, and we cannot use this 15% weighting of academic sources as an indicator of
academic influence.
To summarize, there are some differences in the nature of citation between
academic writing and the Cory report, and these differences make it so that the citation
categories are better applied to each instance of citation than to each source.
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5.2. Overcoming Methodological Challenges
The previous section pointed out some of the difficulties in applying citation
analysis to non-academic writing. The two purposes for this section are: (1) to describe
the necessary modifications to the method so that the method is applicable and (2) to
make a methodological argument that citation analysis methods that have been developed
for academic writing are not adequate in analyzing non-academic writing.
5.2.1. Reconstructing References Page
The first major obstacle to applying citation analysis to the Cory report is the lack
of references page. This seemingly simple task of constructing a references page is
complicated by the fact that what counts as citation is not immediately obvious. Unlike
academic writing in which formal parenthetical references are a fairly reliable indicator of
textual and ideational dependence, formal citations represent only a fraction of total
textual and ideational dependence in the Cory report. In total, there are five types of
textual representations in the Cory report (including no textual clues at all) where the
content and/or language appear to be influenced by other sources.
(A)Formal parenthetical citation (FORM)
(B) Quotation marks (QT)
(C) Blockquotes that indicate citation (BLQT)
(D)Expressions of attribution (reporting verbs, such as state, testify, express; preposition
phrases, such as in his opinion, by her). (ATTR)
(E) No textual clues in the Cory report. Reliance on sources can only be inferred by
similarity in Cory's ideas and/or language to those of the transcript from the
preliminary hearing. (NO)
Perhaps the most obvious and tempting approach is to consider (A) FORM, (B)
QT, and (C) BLQT as instances of citation since these are relatively easy to locate in the
report, yielding 52 items in the constructed references page (see Appendix A).1 However,
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there are no obvious differences between (D) ATTR and (A) FORM - (C) BLQT in many
cases, making it difficult to justify the omission of (D) ATTR. The pair in (4-4) clearly
illustrates the problems of omitting (D) ATTR since attributing expressions in (4-4a)
make it clear that Cory is citing Ground's testimony. Yet, there is no formal textual cues,
and as a result, Grounds does not make it to the list in Appendix A. By comparison,
Siverthorne's testimony in (5-2b) is similar in function and presentation: it is another
expert testimony, presented as a paraphrase, using expressions of attribution. Yet, (5-2b)
is formally attributed to the transcript, so it would count as a citation and appear in
Appendix A.
(5-2a) [The Cory report] Dr. Grounds further stated that he believed that the core
symptoms of enduring personality change would not be alleviated as a result of
counseling. In his opinion, those symptoms of mistrust, anger, fits of temper,
withdrawal and paranoid ideation concerning police and lawyers will not change
(p. 120).
(5-2b) [The Cory report] Dr. Silverthorne expressed the view that Thomas Sophonow's
depression was an underlying condition that has existed from the time that he
came out of prison. (Inquiry, Vol. 10, page 986) (p. 115).
Passages like (4-4a) occurred in enough frequency so that omitting them from the
citation analysis would seriously undermine the validity of such analysis. Therefore,
construction of the references page must contain (D) ATTR, in addition to (A) FORM -
(C) BLQT. The newly constructed references page now contains 148 sources, and it is
available in Appendix B.
While we can easily list sources that are textually mentioned through (A) FORM -
(D) ATTR, sources with no textual clues are much more difficult to recover. (E) NO
represents cases in which ideas and/or language in the Cory report have a similar
corresponding section in the transcript from the preliminary hearing. Yet, the report
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contains no overt indication of textual dependence. Such examples were already
presented in Chapter 4, in which Cory made recommendations about handling
eyewitnesses and conducting lineups. In that case the original source is recoverable
because the corresponding section of the transcript explicitly mentions the original
source, Eyewitness Evidence (1999).
(5-3) [Preliminary Transcript]
Q: You've got a book in front of you that is published by the Department of Justice in
United States and it's guidelines for law enforcement?
A: Yes.
COMMISSIONER CORY: That's the U.S. Department of Justice?
THE WITNESS: The U.S. Department of Justice, A Guide For Law Enforcement. It's
Eyewitness Evidence, A Guide For Law Enforcement. It was published in October
of 1999.
(p. 8980)
However, not all sources are easily recoverable. At one point, Cory describes the
tendency of eyewitnesses to overestimate the duration of the witnessed event (5-4a). This
section of the report, like many others, has a corresponding section in the transcript, and
the transcript makes it clear that this piece of knowledge originates in an academic study
(5-4b). However, Loftus, the expert, does not provide sufficient bibliographical
information so that one needs to rummage through her curriculum vitae to find that "one
study that we did" refers to Loftus et al. (1987).
(5-4a) [The Cory report] Interestingly, witnesses almost always think that an event took
place over a longer period of time than it actually did (p. 27).
(5-4b) [Preliminary Transcript] So in one study that we did, people looked at a bank
robbery, a simulated bank robbery that lasted for 30 seconds and later on they
were estimating some of them that it was 5 minutes, 7 minutes, occasionally even
longer (p. 8925).
While sources that fall under this type are somewhat traceable, albeit with
difficulty, other sources are given even less bibliographical information. (5-5) illustrates a
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case in which the expert witness is clearly citing "every study everywhere," but we are not
given any bibliographical information to retrieve the sources of this information.
(5-5) [Preliminary Transcript] I'm saying that they can -- I wouldn't even say
minimized. I probably would take issue. I would say that the inherent
suggestiveness can be reduced somewhat but every study, every study everywhere
has shown conclusively that a one on one in identification procedure is inherently
suggestive. It has to be. I mean it's a matter of common sense is it not? I mean
intuition that if you're only shown one person and asked is this the individual that
did this to you, that that's inherently suggestive as opposed to a person given a
number of choices. So all you could ever do in that situation and that's why you
only do it when it's absolutely essential, given the example that I presented to the
Commissioner before, that you take every possible measure to reduce the
suggestiveness of it, but minimize, I don't think that's possible.
(p. 9965)
Given the variations in the amount of available bibliographical information, as
illustrated through (5-3) to (5-5), it is not possible to systematically list citations that
contain no textual clues (E) NO. Furthermore, attempts to list those hidden citations
would artificially inflate the number of academic sources since hidden citations are likely
to exist in other sections of the transcript (testimonies by non-experts), which were not
carefully examined in this study. For these reasons, citation type of (E) NO is only used in
qualitative analyses in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 but omitted from the quantitative analysis
in this chapter.
The two constructed references provide some impressions of the extent to which
academic sources are used. If we take the first list (Appendix A), the academic sources
constitute seven out of 52 items (13.5%) plus some of the sources that are attributed to
the preliminary transcript. If we take the second list (Appendix B), the proportion of
academic sources is 14 (or 15 if we take the transcript) out of 148 (9.5%). However, such
147
an impression is obviously not a reliable indicator of the academic influence because a
simple list does not take into account the frequency of each item in the Cory report.
To summarize, the first problem in applying the citation analysis to the
non-academic text is the lack of references page and the different treatment of the
sources, making it difficult to observe what sources have influenced the Cory report. This
problem can be remedied by defining citation to include all sources that can be
systematically recovered and construct a references page from them. However, such a list
alone obviously does not solve the problem of understanding the influence of academic
sources.
5.2.2. Notes on Categories
In order to infer meaningful results relative to the research questions, the 413
sources are grouped into different categories. For example, if we are to trace the influence
of academic sources, we need to isolate academic sources from non-academic sources.
Furthermore, I wanted to isolate research genres, such as academic books and articles
because these are the most prized media of communicating research knowledge among
academics. This effort to isolate research genres led to the creation of "CV," another
genre by academics but with a very different purpose.
Another important distinction is speech vs. writing. From the literature in our field
that examines speech and writing (Chafe, 1982, 2002; Kress, 1994), the difference
between the two media is expected. In addition, the literature in linguistics that examined
legal discourses (O'Barr, 1982; Gibbons, 2003) also noted the importance of the
speech-writing distinctions.
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Where possible, efforts were made to distinguish texts from different professions.
For example, Cory, during the personal interview, indicated the importance of separating
policy and legal communities, so government publications are separated from legal
documents.
In the end, 413 sources are settled into the following 14 categories:
(A)Academic Texts (A-TXT): Academic books and articles
(B) Testimonies by Academics (A-TEST)
(C) Transcript by Academics (A-TRANS): Testimonies by academics when formally
attributed to the transcript of the hearing.
(D)CV (CV): Curriculum vitae
(E) Law (LAW): Laws and regulation, including Canadian Charter and legal guidelines
(F) Legal Texts, including court cases (LEG)
(G)Government publication (GOV)
(H)Popular media (POP)
(I) Speech (by non-academics), including testimonies (SP)
(J) Transcripts (TRANS): Testimonies by non-academic witnesses
(K)Public inquiries (INQ)
(L) Technical texts (TECH), including police reports, doctor's notes, telephone record.
(M)Informal written texts (INF)
(N)Unknown (UNK): Unrecoverable source.
Most categories are self-evident (A-TXT, CV, LAW, LEG, GOV, POP, INQ,
TECH, INF), but some categories require additional explanations. The source of both (B)
A-TEST and (C) A-TRANS is the oral testimony of the academic experts, but Cory chose
to attribute some instances of this to the written transcript from the preliminary hearing
(A-TRANS) and other instances to the academics themselves (A-TEST). This distinction
is made because the difference shows Cory's rhetorical choice, albeit unconscious,2 in
attributing the same source differently.
The same distinction is made between (I) SP and (J) TRANS. Some of the
speeches are non-academic witnesses' testimonies but these testimonies are sometimes
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attributed to the speaker (SP) but other times to the transcript (TRANS). (I) SP also
contains casual speeches outside the preliminary hearing, often going back to things
various participants have said while Sophonow case was originally investigated in the
80s. Efforts were made initially to separate these casual speeches from sworn testimonies
to respect the distinction between primary and secondary realities,3 but the Cory report
did not provide sufficient textual cues to allow consistent distinctions between the two.
(N) UNK consists of sources that are not clearly identified. Lack of identification
mostly came from the use of expletives and passive voice, as in "It was said that Thomas
Sophonow brought upon himself many of the problems that led to his being charged and
convicted of murder" (p. 18).
To answer the research questions, the 14 categories are sometimes combined to
make supercategories. The supercategories used in the analysis are:
 Academic sources: (A) A-TXT, (B) A-TEST, and (C) A-TRANS.
 Non-academic sources: (D) CV, (E) LAW, (F) LEG, (G) GOV, (H) POP, (I) SP, (J)
TRANS, (K) INQ, (L) TECH, (M) INF, (N) UNK.
 Non-academic writing: (D) CV, (E) LAW, (F) LEG, (G) GOV, (H) POP, (J) TRANS,
(K) INQ, (L) TECH, (M) INF.
(D) CV is classified as non-academic rather than academic in this analysis because
the research question focuses on the influence of academic research. For that purpose, (D)
CV should not be categorized as "academic" in that sense.
In addition, efforts are made to categorize all instances of citation into “Evidence”
and “Non-evidence” to see if this distinction may be helpful along with other categories.
However, I was unable to make distinction between them among non-academic sources
because the text did not provide sufficient clue to make this judgment on many cases.
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This distinction, however, was possible among academic sources, but the category was
not useful in dividing the citation data. All but one instance of citation was clearly
evidence in the legal sense, and the only item that is arguably “non-evidence” does not
appear problematic. This item occurs when Cory writes “However, the psychiatrists were
unanimous in their opinion that the stress caused by a single act, such as an accident, has
much less impact than does the constantly repeated stress occasioned by wrongful
conviction and imprisonment.” This point was raised by an expert (a law professor, who
is invited as an expert on compensation), and she submitted a written report to the
commission, which makes this report a piece of evidence. The sentence in the Cory
report, however, attributes this knowledge, not to the expert’s report (= evidence) but to
the psychiatrists that are not part of the commission hearing (thus, non evidence).
Therefore, the following analyses in this chapter do not use Evidence vs. Non-evidence
distinction, but the attempt to categorize the citation into evidence and non-evidence
indicates the obvious: the academic research must be classified as evidence in a legal
setting. However, as we will see in Chapter 6, being evidence does not guarantee that the
source will be used in the final deliberation.
To summarize the points so far, we need to modify the method for citation
analysis when we apply the method for non-academic genres. In this study, the following
modifications have been made:
 Defining the citation to include all instances in which sources are (1) formally cited,
(2) given quotation marks, (3) given blockquotes that indicate citation, (4) mentioned
with expressions of attribution.
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 Constructing the references page based on the above criteria.
 Categorizing sources for statistical analyses.
 Applying the coding scheme to each instance of citation rather than to each source.
 Noting the presence or absence of direct quotes and formal parenthetical citation for
each instance of citation.
5.2.3. Null Hypotheses and Statistical Tests
The first research question for this dissertation is to examine the role of academic
research in policy and legal documents, so the first set of statistical tests are designed to
see whether or not Cory used academic sources differently compared to non-academic
sources. In accordance with the standard approach in statistical analysis, the null
hypotheses are formulated as follows:
The distinction between academic and non-academic sources is unrelated to:
1. How Cory distributed modalities (positive, neutral, negative)
2. How Cory used his sources (evolutionary, zero, juxtapositional)
3. The extend to which Cory used his sources (short, extended)
4. Whether or not Cory used formal citation
5. Whether or not Cory included direct quotes.
Since the categories in this study are all nominal,4 the chi-square test of
independence is used to determine if Cory used some categories more or less beyond
what is expected by chance compared to the expected frequency for each. The alpha level
is set to .05 so that the null hypotheses are only rejected when the statistical tests reject
the null hypotheses with 95% confidence or higher. However, the alpha level is
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complicated by the fact that there are 16 separate independent hypotheses, causing what is
known in statistics as the Bonferroni effect.5 In order to protect the results from type I
errors, the protected alpha level is set to .003. In the results section of this chapter, I will
report all significant results with the p value of .05 or lower, but I will caution the reader
of the interpretations when any specific results do not meet the protected alpha level of
.003.
5.3. Results
This section reports the results of the chi-square tests of independence. The
section is grouped into three subsections. The first section discusses the differences
between academic and non-academic sources on the above five null hypotheses. The
second section examines the significance of the oral academic sources compared to the
written academic sources. The last subsection discusses the role of formal citation and
direct quotes in the Cory report.
5.3.1. Role of Academic vs. Non-Academic Sources
The results of the chi-square tests of independence reveal that academic sources
are more likely than non-academic sources to be used more extensively, more positively,
and in more evolutionary manner. But academic sources are no more likely to be given
formal citation or direct quotes.
Table 4.1 indicates that if the first null hypothesis is true, it is expected that the
academic sources should have 16 positives, 37 neutrals, and 9 negatives. However, in
reality, Cory used 30 positives, 32 neutrals and 0 negatives for academic sources.
Similarly the null hypothesis predicts that non-academic sources should have 90
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positives, 209 neutrals, and 51 negatives when, in fact, they received 76 positives, 216
neutrals, and 60 negatives. This discrepancy between the expected and actual frequency is
represented by adjusted residuals, which indicate the extent to which the discrepancy in a
particular cell contributed to the overall discrepancy. The larger the adjusted residual in a
particular cell in absolute value, the greater the influence of this particular discrepancy in
contributing to the overall discrepancy. This means that the biggest source of discrepancy
came from the distribution of positives between academic and non-academic sources,
indicating that the academic sources received unusually high number of positive modals
and non-academic sources received unusually low number of positive modals. The
second biggest source of discrepancy came from the distribution of negatives; the
adjusted residuals tell us that academic sources received unusually low number of
negatives and non-academic sources received unusually high number of negatives.
Complete statistical figures are available in Appendix C.
Table 5.1. Academic vs. Non Academic X Modality Crosstabulation
412610624660Total
3.51.4-4.4Adjusted Residual
3505120990Expected
3506021676FrequencyNon-academic
-3.5-1.44.4Adjusted Residual
6293716Expected
6203230FrequencyAcademic
TotalNegativeNeutralPositive
< .001225.99Pearson Chi-Square
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
dfValue
The test of significance in Table 4.1 indicates the chi-square of 25.99 with the p
value of less than .001. This means that the overall discrepancy in Cory's distribution of
modalities could not have occurred by chance with higher than 99.9% confidence level.
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This confidence level meets the protected confidence level of .003, which incorporates
the Bonferroni correction.
Incidentally 106 negatives (25.73%) is considerably higher than the proportion of
negative citations in academic writing. While variations in methods prevent us from
making a direct comparison, there is a general consensus among citation scholars that
most citations are confirmative (White, 2005). In particular, Small's (1982) review of
seven citation studies in multiple disciplines (ranging from high energy physics to
German literature) revealed that the proportion of negatives in academic writing ranged
from 1% to 14%, far below the 25.73% in the Cory report. The notable difference in the
proportion of negative citations reinforces the idea that non-academic writing uses
citations differently, requiring us to consider how that difference might affect citation
analyses.
The distribution of evolutionary, zero, and juxtapositional was somewhat similar
to the distribution of modalities (Table 5.2). Academic sources had considerably higher
frequency of evolutionary use and considerably lower frequency of zero and
juxtapositional uses than what was expected by the null hypothesis. Non-academic
sources, as a result, had considerably lower frequency of evolutionary use and
considerably higher zero and juxtapositional uses. This finding is also statistically
significant at 2(2, N = 413) = 31.28, p < .001, the confidence level higher than 99.9%,
meeting the protected confidence level.
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Table 5.2. Academic vs. Non Academic X Use
4136783263Total
3.43.6-5.6Adjusted Residual
35156.970.5223.5Expected
3516681204FrequencyNon-academic
-3.4-3.65.6Adjusted Residual
6210.112.539.5Expected
621259FrequencyAcademic
TotalJuxtapositionalZeroEvolutionary
The difference between academic and non-academic writing was also significant
when the length of their citations were compared. However, this result is not significant
after the Bonferroni correction. This means academic sources may have been more likely
to be extended and less likely to be short than expected by the null hypothesis;
conversely, non-academic sources may have been less likely to be extended and more
likely to short. The result is significant at 2(1, N = 413) = 7.31, p = .007, the confidence
level of 99.3%, not meeting the protected confidence level of .003.
Table 5.3. Academic vs. Non Academic X Length
413178235Total
2.7-2.7Adjusted Residual
351151.3199.7Expected
351161190FrequencyNon-academic
-2.72.7Adjusted Residual
6226.735.3Expected
621745FrequencyAcademic
TotalShortExtended
The comparison did not yield significance for formal citation at 2(1, N = 413) =
1.171, p = .56; nor was it significant for direct quotes at 2(1, N = 413) = .003, p = .955.
This means that Cory did not use formal citation or direct quotes more often in academic
sources or in non-academic sources.
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The results from these chi-square tests of independence revealed some interesting
roles of academic sources in the Cory report. Academic sources, which take up about
15% of all citations, are given a greater weight compared to non-academic sources in that
Cory is more likely to frame them in a positive manner, more likely to use them to build
an argument, and perhaps more likely to spend more space to discuss them. While it is
unclear whether the same finding holds true beyond this inquiry, the statistical data
suggest that academic experts, when cited, are respected and their points taken seriously
in a document that has policy implications. This finding is contrary to some skeptics who
argue that academic research contributes little to policy decisions and affirms those who
acknowledge the role of academic research. However, consistent with the literature, the
influence of academic research is not overt. As the next set of tests reveal, this subtlety
and indirectness are the product of Cory's rhetorical choices in framing academic sources.
5.3.2. Role of Oral Academic Sources
As a complement to the first set of tests, the same tests of independence were
conducted with the 14 categories without collapsing them into two supercategories of
academic and non-academic sources. Similar to the earlier null hypotheses, the null
hypotheses of these tests predict that Cory's use of modalities, uses, lengths, formal
citations, and direct quotes are the same across all 14 categories. The same chi-square test
is used with the alpha level of .05 and .003 after the Bonferroni correction. One caution
for this set of tests is that as a result of using 14 categories, some of the cells in the tests
had the expected frequency of less than five. In those cases, the expected value is likely to
be overestimated so that caution is needed for interpreting the results. However, the
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resulting chi-squares of all of the tests (where the significance is observed) is sufficiently
high to assume that the results are still significant even if we discount the overestimation
caused by the small numbers.
The biggest surprise came from the first three tests, which compared the 14
categories in terms of modality, use, and length. Consistent with the earlier tests, these
three tests came with the significant results although the two of the three results are not
significant after the Bonferroni correction: 2(26, N = 412) = 45.56, p = 0.1 for
modalities; 2(26, N = 4127) = 61.72, p < .001 for use; 2(13, N = 413) = 28.72, p = .011
for length. The examination of the adjusted residuals reveals that it is the academic
speech that contributed most significantly to the overall discrepancy, and not the
academic writing or the academic testimony that are attributed to the transcript (see
Tables 5.4-5.6). To spare the reader from many long tables, the remaining tables in these
chapters are partial tables, listing all rows for academic sources but listing other rows
only when there is an adjusted residual of 2.0 or higher. The complete statistical tables are
available in Appendix D.
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Table 5.4. Partial Statistical Table of Category X Modality Crosstabulation
412610624660Total
2.7-.9-1.1Adjusted Residual
18226.5108.746.8Expected
1823610442FrequencySpeech
(Non-academic)
-1.7.9.4Adjusted Residual
172.510.24.4Expected
170125FrequencyAcademic
Transcript
-2.6-2.34.7Adjusted Residual
365.221.59.3Expected
3601521FrequencyAcademic
Speech
-1.3-.31.3Adjusted Residual
91.35.42.3Expected
9054FrequencyAcademic Text
TotalNegativeNeutralPositive
The adjusted residual of 5.4 for the row Academic Speech and the column
Positive (Academic Speech X Positive) is the biggest in the entire table, followed by 2.7
in Speech X Negative, -2.6 in Academic Speech X Negative, and -2.3 in Academic
Speech X Neutral. This means that the unusually high number of positive modalities in
academic speech contributed the most to the overall discrepancy between the expected
and actual frequencies, followed by unusually high frequency of negatives in speech as
well as unusually low frequency of neutrals and negatives in academic speech. The
interpretation of this result, however, requires caution because the p value for this test did
not meet the protected significance level.
This distribution of modalities is counterintuitive for us, academics, who privilege
writing over speech in our writing and use formal citations to privilege certain voices
over others. Equally puzzling is the fact that the same testimonies are given less positive
modalities when they are textually attributed to writing (i.e., transcript rather than the
speech itself). These peculiarities (1) reinforce the earlier claim that the rhetorical
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function of citation in the Cory report is, indeed, different from that of academic writing,
(2) suggest that the citations rhetorically downplay the influence of academic writing
even if they promote ideas that originate from these sources, thus ultimately obscuring the
source of its influence, (3) suggest the importance of oral speech at the preliminary
hearing in this quasi-legal system, a point which was discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
A similar trend holds true for the category comparison of use. As seen in Table
4.6, the biggest residual in the entire table was 4.0 for Academic Speech X Evolutionary
and CV X Zero, followed by 3.2 for Academic Transcript X Evolutionary. Then the
adjusted residual of -2.7 was observed for Academic Speech X Zero and CV X
Evolutionary, followed by 2.5 for Speech X Juxtapositional, -2.3 for Academic Speech X
Juxtapositional, -2.1 for Academic Transcript X Zero, and -2.0 for Speech X
Evolutionary. Again, this result requires caution since the p value for this test did not
meet the protected significance level.
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Table 5.5. Partial Statistical Table of Category X Use
4136783263Total
2.50.1-2Adjusted Residual
18329.736.8116.5Expected
1833937107FrequencySpeech
(Non-academic)
-0.94-2.7Adjusted Residual
40.60.82.5Expected
4040FrequencyCV
-1.9-2.13.2Adjusted Residual
172.83.410.8Expected
170017FrequencyAcademic
Transcript
-2.3-2.74Adjusted Residual
365.87.222.9Expected
361134FrequencyAcademic
Speech
-1.3-0.71.6Adjusted Residual
91.51.85.7Expected
9018FrequencyAcademic Text
TotalJuxtapositionalZeroEvolutionary
The high residuals for CV are not surprising. The point of citing and attaching the
CVs is to establish the experts' credentials, not to build arguments in the CVs. What is
noteworthy, however, is the distribution of high residuals among academic speech and
academic transcript but not in academic writing. Curiously the same cannot be said true
for speeches by non-academics. As the adjusted residuals reveal, speeches by non
academics are much less likely to be incorporated into Cory's argument (evolutionary)
and much more likely to be used only to be refuted later (juxtapositional). In fact, if we
only compare academic writing (A-TXT) and non-academic writing (CV, LAW, LEG,
GOV, POP, TRANS, INQ, TECH, INF) in terms of use, the difference in distribution
disappears.7
These results, again, reinforce the notion that Cory's use of citations differs from
that of academic writing, rhetorically privileging academic speech. By contrast, academic
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writing, by its low frequency and the rhetorical framing is less visible as a source of
influence. The less privileged use of non-academic speech does not mean that oral
testimony is only important when testified by academics. Such a claim is not quite
substantiated because non-academic speech contains both testimony and other casual
speeches by non-academics while academic speech only consists of testimony.
The finding supports the analysis in Chapter 4 that identified the preliminary
hearing as an important intermediary text that filters and validates knowledge that is
generated outside the legal system. However, the textual privileging of oral testimony in
the Cory report maintains the appearance that the Cory report is a legal genre, and its
findings primarily derives from the knowledge generated in the legal process (and not the
academic one). This appearance is the textual manifestation of the Foucauldian will to
truth in Chapter 4, which maintains neutrality, objectivity, and independence of the
commission.
The interpretation from this test requires caution in some parts because the
expected frequency is less than five in some cells. However, when this result is combined
with other tests, this test paints a consistent picture that emphasizes the importance of
academic speech over academic writing.
Finally, the results from Category X Length reinforce this general trend in which
discrepancy between the expected and actual frequencies in academic speech contributes
most to the overall discrepancy. The highest adjusted residuals in this test were +/- 2.6 for
Academic Speech, followed by +/- 2.3 for CV and +/- 2.0 for Transcript (Table 5.6).
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Table 5.6. Partial Statistical Table of Category X Length Crosstabulation
413178235Total
2-2Adjusted Residual
5624.131.9Expected
563125FrequencyTranscript
(Non-academic)
2.3-2.3Adjusted Residual
41.72.3Expected
440FrequencyCV
-1.21.2Adjusted Residual
177.39.7Expected
17512FrequencyAcademic
Transcript
2.62.6Adjusted Residual
3615.520.5Expected
36828FrequencyAcademic
Speech
0.1-0.1Adjusted Residual
93.95.1Expected
945FrequencyAcademic Text
TotalShortExtended
Again, the high residuals of CV are not particularly interesting since CVs are
always mentioned in one sentence and never discussed. It is the high adjusted residuals of
academic speech and low residuals of academic writing that reinforce the significance of
academic speech over academic writing. It is also curious to note that testimony, when
attributed to the transcript, is given less space for discussion than when attributed to the
speaker. This pattern seems to hold true for both academic and non-academic sources.
The results of these three tests reveal a curious tendency by Cory to privilege
academic speech over academic writing. This tendency may well be a result of the
contradiction between Cory's willingness to recognize the value of academic research and
the demand of the legal will to truth, which asserts its independence. Therefore, the ideas
from academic sources are rhetorically framed in a favorable manner, but at the same
time, these ideas are attributed to the oral testimony, a legal genre in which legal counsels
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and academic experts co-construct the text. This systematic rhetorical move to emphasize
legal discourses and to de-emphasize academic writing may well contribute to the
impression that academic research may have little to contribute. While we cannot be sure
whether the same tendency persists in other policy relevant events and documents, we
may want to be more careful when analyzing events such as Congressional hearings, in
which oral genres play a prominent role. The resulting documents and recommendations
from these policy events may contain few references to academic research, but that does
not necessarily mean that academic testimonies were delivered in vain. A close textual
analysis might reveal that the influence of academic research may be there, but the traces
of these influences may have been erased from the final deliberation to assert
independence and power of the policy makers.
5.3.3. Function of Formal Citation and Direct Quotes
If the textual patterns in the Cory report are systematically reducing the visibility
of academic sources, one might expect the distribution of formal citations and direct
quotes to play a role since these two textual clues are the most obvious sign of textual
dependence. For example, if we find that the distribution of formal citations and direct
quotes is significantly lower in academic sources compared to non-academic sources, it
would reinforce the argument that the textual features in the Cory report obscure the
influence of academic sources. However, the earlier tests indicate that neither formal
citations nor direct quotes is related to academic sources or to non-academic sources (see
Appendix C). This failure to find the relationship might lead us to suspect that perhaps
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the formal citations and direct quotes are associated with other categories and roles, such
as rhetorical effects (inferred through modality and use).
The statistical tests failed to reject most of the null hypotheses except the
following four (see Appendix D and E for full statistics):
1. Cory’s use of formal citation is not related to the source categories. This hypothesis is
rejected at 2(13, N = 413) = 202.85, p < .001, significant after the Bonferroni
correction.
2. Cory’s use of direct quotes is not related to the source categories. This hypothesis is
rejected at 2(13, N = 413) = 31.49, p = .003, significant after the Bonferroni
correction.
3. Cory’s use of direct quotes is not related to his use as evolutionary, zero, or
juxtapositional. This hypothesis is rejected at 2(2, N = 413) = 9.56, p = .008 but not
significant after the Bonferroni correction.
4. Cory’s use of direct quotes is not related to the length of his citation. This hypothesis
is rejected at 2(1, N = 413) = 7.17, p = .005 but not significant after the Bonferroni
correction.
Most of the rejected null hypotheses are rather unremarkable. Examination of the
adjusted residuals tells us that formal citations and direct quotes tend to occur more often
than expected when they are attributed to the transcripts but occur less often when they
are attributed to speech regardless of the academic/non-academic distinction. This finding
is not very meaningful because categories of “transcript” was created on the basis of the
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presence of formal citation, and it is not surprising that direct quotes and formal citations
tend to occur with these categories.
Nor is it surprising to find that instances of citation that contain direct quotes tend
to be longer and more likely to be used to build an argument (evolutionary) and less likely
to be used to be refuted later (juxtapositional). This finding simply shows that Cory used
these formal textual attributions for some rhetorical effects. However, this interpretation
requires caution because these results did not meet protected significance level.
On the other hand, formal citation is not associated with modality, use, or length.
Similarly no significance is found between direct quotes and modality. Again, the lack of
these relationships is surprising to academic writers because we carefully use citations
and direct quotes to manage our nuanced positions, declare allegiance, and affirm
membership (Giltrow, 2001, 2002). However, this does not seem to be the case in the
Cory report, reinforcing the idea that the function of citations here is not quite the same.
The only meaningful significance finding from this set of tests is that the higher
than expected instances of legal texts received formal citation. This is shown in Table 4.8
where the adjusted residuals of +/- 2.0 are the highest after the not-so-meaningful high
residuals in transcripts and speech.
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Table 5.7. Partial Statistical Table of Category X Formal Citation
41390323Total
-11.111.1Adjusted Residual
5643.812.2Expected
561244FrequencyTranscript
(Non-academic)
8.6-8.6Adjusted Residual
183143.139.9Expected
1831794FrequencySpeech
-22Adjusted Residual
3416.67.4Expected
342212FrequencyLegal Texts
-5.65.6Adjusted Residual
1713.33.7Expected
17413FrequencyAcademic
Transcript
3.3-3.3Adjusted Residual
3628.27.8Expected
36360FrequencyAcademic
Speech
TotalNot FormalFormal
The higher than expected formalization of legal citation does not mean that they
are more important; rather over-representation in this category increases the saliency of
this category, creating an impression that legal texts contributed to a greater proportion of
the sources. Similarly, a close inspection of the cited academic sources reveals that
academic law articles are the only ones that are directly cited while non-law academic
articles are de-attributed and/or re-attributed to other (often legal) sources. Again, as
examples in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 amply demonstrate, non-law academic sources are
quite influential in the Cory report. But the citation practices in the Cory report makes it
appear that citation of academic law articles are Cory’s own rhetorical choices even
though all academic sources (both law and non-law) were introduced by expert witnesses
with similar uptake history.
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5.4. Conclusion
Through the analyses of the interview and discourse data, this chapter has
revealed that:
1. Academic sources are framed more positively, perhaps used more extensively and
used more often to build an argument compared to non-academic sources. This
finding answers the first research question (how does academic research enter public
policy) in that academic sources do enter the policy documents, and they enter
through the rhetorical frames that favorably position the ideas from academic sources.
2. These ideas from academic sources, however, often lose indications of textual and
ideational dependence. As a result, fewer sources are visibly linked to academic
sources and even fewer sources are directly attributed to academic writing. Therefore,
academic sources appear to have much less impact on policy documents than they
actually do, explaining the contradictory sentiment raised in the third research
question.
3. Methods in citation studies, which were developed for analyzing academic genres,
can be used to analyze non-academic texts. However, we must first examine the
nature of the genre and adopt the method so that the results from such citation studies
are meaningful.
Some aspects of these findings are further analyzed in the next chapter that
focuses on the micro-level discourse and rhetorical features of the academic articles, the
preliminary hearing transcript, and the Cory report. In particular the circulation of
knowledge and discourse and their rhetorical transformation, which was examined
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through citations in this chapter), will be analyzed in terms of specific rhetorical and
linguistic elements.
NOTES
1. The items in the constructed references pages in Appendices A and B list and describe
the sources rather than follow any specific citation format. This approach is taken
partly because many sources do not contain full bibliographical information but partly
because descriptive lists are more useful to the readers given the purpose of this
dissertation.
2. When the differences between (B) A-TEST and (C) A-TRANS are pointed out to
Cory, he explained that (C) A-TRANS signifies that the source came from a specific
segment of the transcript while (B) A-TEST came from the overall testimony even
though the distinction was not applied systematically throughout the report (Cory,
May, 10, 2007, personal communication). However, this explanation does not seem to
hold since many instances of (B) A-TEST clearly refer to specific segments of the
transcript.
3. Hale and Gibbons (1999) note the distinction between primary and secondary realities
that occur in the courtroom discourse. The primary reality refers to the reality of the
courtroom, while the secondary reality refers to the content of the litigation.
4. Some categories, such as modality and use, are arguably ordinal. But the chi-square
test of independence applies to ordinal categories.
5. The assumption behind the p value and statistical significance is to calculate the
probability that a particular result could occur by chance or not. Therefore, testing two
independent hypotheses increases the probability of false positive. This increased
probability of type I error as a result of multiple independent hypotheses is known as
the Bonferroni effect, and the remedy for the Bonferroni effect is to divide the alpha
value by the number of independent hypotheses. In this case the protected alpha value
is .05/13 = .003.
6. The total number is less in this test because the coding of modality produced one item
in which a single instance of citation is simultaneously positive and negative. In order
to prevent another category with only one item, this item was removed from the
sample, reducing the total number from 413 to 412.
7. The null hypothesis is formulated as: The distribution of use is unrelated to whether
the source is academic or non-academic writing. The null hypothesis is not rejected at
2(2, N = 413) = 8.53, p = .074. The result is not significant even though the
chi-square is inflated by the two cells with the expected frequency of less than 5.
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Chapter 6: Rhetorical and Discourse Factors for Uptake
The last two analysis chapters described the uptake of academic research by the
preliminary hearing and the Cory report and how that knowledge is re-represented
through uptake. In Chapter 4, the focus was on the larger context and the intertextual
network, as the chapter documented the pathways through which academic research
entered the Cory report. It also identified contextual factors that seemed to have
facilitated the uptake. On the other hand, the quantitative analysis in Chapter 5 focused on
the citation patterns to describe the representation of that knowledge in the Cory report.
This chapter approaches the research questions through the perspective of the
micro-level discourse processes to elaborate and extend the findings in Chapter 4 and 5.
This approach, as I justified in Chapter 2, is useful to our overall understanding because
language not only represent knowledge but constitutes it (e.g., Bazerman, 1988; Foucault,
1972a; Latour, 1987; Law, 1986). Furthermore, critical theories of language postulate that
language is a generator, shaper, maintainer, and carrier of knowledge and ideology
(Bhatia, 2004; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Dijk, 2001; Fairclough, 1992; Huckin,
2002; Scollon & Scollon, 2001). For these reasons, uptake of a linguistic unit (e.g., word,
phrase, clause) is not simply uptake of an idea, but it constitutes what Bhatia calls
colonization, involving uptake of values and viewpoints that are associated with that
linguistic unit.
This chapter begins by providing the discursive context of the preliminary
hearing, which is linked to the literature on expert testimony from Chapter 2. This
discursive context is used as a background that constrains what experts can do in the
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preliminary hearing. The middle section of this chapter provides textual evidence of the
experts’ ideational and linguistic uptake despite the efforts to limit the uptake. The
middle section also describes the consequences of the uptake in terms of Bhatia’s
colonization and stasis theory. The final section identifies specific factors that seem to
have influenced Cory's decision on uptake and discusses some of the specific instances of
Bhatia’s colonization.
The arguments in this chapter are as follows:
1. Linguistic and rhetorical items, in addition to ideas, receive uptake, potentially
colonizing the legal genres, effecting an ideological change in the judicial and policy
communities through language.
2. The testifying expert's rhetorical performance affects the likelihood of uptake even
though the likelihood is also influenced by factors that are beyond the expert's control.
The factors that are within the control of the experts (at least to a certain extent) are:
untranslatability, presupposition, conceptual tool, conceptual salience, emphasis,
narrative mode, discursive position, and ideology.
3. Research on effective delivery from the jury trial may be instructive to expert
witnesses in quasi-legal proceedings, but the findings from these studies may not be
applicable.
4. Neither witnesses nor lawyers are likely to succeed in changing the ideology of the
legal system through direct confrontations.
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6.1. Regulating Expert Discourse
Before examining the rhetorical and discourse uptake of academic sources by the
Cory report, we need to be reminded of the rhetorical context of the report. As described
in Chapter 4 and in the literature review, policy and legal communities take an ambivalent
stance toward academic experts, and this ambivalence creates a series of processes that
limit the expert's influence. For example, both policy and judicial contexts are set up so
that the experts are placed in the periphery, not in the center of the decision making
process. Furthermore, the influence from this peripheral role is further constrained by the
complex negotiations on discourses that take place. Additional complexity is discussed in
Chapter 4 in terms of Foucauldian will to truth, which manifested itself textually in the
Cory report. While understanding of these discourse processes in both policy and legal
contexts is relevant to discussing the influence of academic research into policy, this
section focuses only on the discourse processes in the legal context because discourse
processes of the Sophonow inquiry are largely based more on the legal discourse
processes rather than on other types of policy discourse processes.
The discourse strategies to control the expert’s discourse have been already
discussed in Chapter 2 (see 2.2.5). For example, lawyers use questions of various types,
such as tag questions and embedded questions, to control the likely answers. This section
describes these discourse strategies used by counsels to control the experts’ utterances in
the preliminary hearing: interruption rules for turn taking, discursive role, types of
questions, and the average length per turn. The descriptions in this section are used to
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provide the discursive background against which the experts needed to assert their
arguments.
Like the court proceedings, the commissioner, acting as a judge, is the only
person, authorized to speak without his turns. In the following interchange, the
commissioner interrupts the counsel in the middle of a cross-examination and, perhaps
inadvertently, reveals one of the cross-examining techniques that purposefully
mis-paraphrases the witness’s testimony and solicits agreement.
(6-1)
Q All right. So is it your opinion then, sir, that it wasn't at any time prolonging any
disability that he was having from the motor vehicle accident?
COMMISSIONER CORY: Well, that's not what he said, Mr. Olson.
MR. OLSON: No, that's why I asked him.
COMMISSIONER CORY: All right, yes.
(p. 1037)
Next to the commissioner, counsels occupy a more powerful discursive position,
relative to the testifying experts because they are formally given their turns, and they
occupy the discursive role of questioners. This role is easily inferred through grammatical
modes, as most interrogatives in the transcripts are used by counsels. Furthermore, each
turn by a counsel is labeled as "Q" in the transcript to signify his or her de jure and de
facto role, as illustrated in the following interchange.
(6-2)
Q      Just to follow up on what you said in answer to Mr. Commissioner's question, Dr.
O'Shaughnessy, Dr. Sheilah Martin, a Compensation Expert, gave evidence to the
Commission yesterday and the day before about the distinction in her mind
between a single event trauma, a single intrusive experience on the one hand, and
a process of harm that is continually inflicted on a daily basis, on the other hand. I
take it that is what you have just been talking about?
A Yeah, basically. I mean, not from a compensation perspective, obviously, but,
yeah, there are significant psychiatric differences.
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Q Yes. Yes. Now, you describe some of the symptoms that he has exhibited over the
years as quite disturbing. Those words appear at the last complete paragraph at the
first sentence of the last paragraph on page six.
A Yes
(pp. 1600-1601)
In addition to their position as questioners, counsels carefully chose their
questions to exert a significant amount of control over the content and scope of the
answers given by the experts. As (6-2) shows, many questions were posed in declaratives
rather than interrogatives to solicit agreement. The counsels also used other strategies
outlined in Chapter 2, such as tag questions, rephrasing, hypothetical questions, and
formulaic expression, among others. The examples in (6-3) are a small sample of such
discursive strategies.
(6-3a) All right. Because that case doesn't really stand for the proposition that wrongful
incarceration would necessarily breach Section 7 of the Charter all by itself, does
it? (p. 1441)
(6-3b) Is it fair to categorize these together as fear of re-victimization? (p. 1783)
(6-3c) In your view, if a trial judge alerted a jury to some of the failings of the type of
evidence that you have commented on here, the photo pack and some of the
eyewitnesses as to potential, I use the word tainting, or exposure to things that
might adversely affect their recollection; if a trial judge is relatively careful in
alerting the jury to the potential of that recollection not being accurate because of
those facts, do you say that that is sufficient education of the jury? (p. 9046)
(6-3d) You also have commented through your evidence, sir, on the fallibility of
eyewitness identification witnesses. And we've heard Dr. Loftus on that as well.
I'm sure you've been advised of that. All those same factors that apply with respect
to eyewitness identification witnesses also apply to alibi eyewitnesses don't they?
(p. 9966)
(6-3a) is an example of a tag question, and (6-3b) is an example of a formulaic
expression ("Is it fair...?") that paraphrases the expert testimony in a particular manner,
(although this example is not as malicious as the purposeful misrepresentation in [6-1]).
(6-3c) is an example of a hypothetical question. Like many hypothetical questions in the
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courtroom, this question is not hypothetical at all but is presented hypothetically to elicit
particular answers from the witness. When the expert answered this question by rejecting
some of the premises in the question, it was quickly revealed that the question was not
hypothetical at all, and the expert could not reject the premises because they had already
happened in the Sophonow case. (6-3d) works by playing one expert against another; by
suggesting that another expert already took a particular position puts pressure on the
witness to take the same stance (although the witness disagreed in this case).
Perhaps as a result of these discursive strategies, there was systematic imbalance
in the average length per turn between counsels and testifying experts. Overall the
average length per turn was approximately the same between counsels and experts, but
experts' turns were a mix of very short and very long answers whereas counsels’ turns
typically fell between these two extremes. Experts' long turns were easily explained by
their expert knowledge, which sometimes required long turns to present their complex
analyses, but it is their short turns and the counsels' relatively lengthy questions that
reveal the counsels' discursive strategies.
In fact, a significant number of expert turns were short responses, containing one
or few words (e.g., "Yes." "That's correct." "He did." "That's right." "Indeed.") with
optional restatements of the questions. These short turns constituted 1227 of 2368 expert
turns (51.8%), indicating the prevalence of interchanges like (6-2), consistent with the
literature on legal discourses (e.g., Gibbons, 2003; Shuy, 2006) as well as manuals for
lawyers, which teach them to control and domesticate expert responses.
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As mentioned Chapter 4, these discursive moves, along with the discursive
context, are what make the preliminary hearing a discursive gatekeeper of the legal
community. These discursive moves also make it possible for the legal community to
impose its own will onto other discourses, or to use Bakhtin’s (1981) term, to appropriate
academic discourses and fill them with their own intentions. As the analysis in the
remaining chapter shows, this appropriation of academic discourses paradoxically
increases the likelihood of the appropriated academic discourse to be repeated.
6.2. Discursive Profile of Cory Report: To Uptake or not to Uptake
The previous section presented various strategies by the counsels to control the
expert testimony. But as argued in Chapter 4, these mechanisms of control do not simply
reject the expert testimony; rather, they simultaneously filter and validate academic
knowledge. This section argues that these mechanisms of control do the same for the
uptake of linguistic and rhetorical elements as they did for the uptake of knowledge in
Chapter 4.
In one sense, counsels’ discursive moves, outlined in the previous section, clearly
make it difficult for the experts to take control over the language in the hearing, which
has an obvious impact, such as the nature and scope of the content, on the subsequent
uptake in the Cory report. But at the same time, once the legal system extracts these
expert utterances through the legal discovery process, frames them in legal questions, and
appropriates them to serve their own interests, these utterances are now ripe for direct
linguistic uptake. This paradoxical discursive environment creates a curious situation in
which discursive uptake is not obvious when directly comparing the academic articles
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and the Cory report (with some exceptions to be discussed below) but obvious when
comparing the preliminary hearing and the Cory report.
Thus, Cory's linguistic uptake is illustrated in two parts. The first part describes
the Cory report's discursive profile to illustrate the difference between the Cory report and
academic research genres, and how this generic difference naturally imposes additional
barriers to linguistic uptake. The discursive profile of the Cory report is followed by the
discourse data that demonstrates frequent linguistic uptake despite the generic differences
and the mechanisms of control in the previous section. But the focus of this section is
what and how the linguistic uptake occurs. The reason that these discourse uptake occurs
is only hinted in this section, to be discussed later in the final part of this chapter.
6.2.1. Linguistic/Rhetorical Uptake from Academic Articles to Cory Report
It is not difficult to imagine why academic research articles and the Cory report
should differ linguistically and rhetorically. As explained in Chapter 4, the function as
well as exigence and audience of each genre is different. For example, Cory's
understanding of multiple audiences, particularly the lay audience, forced him to
reconcile what Heffer (2005) terms as the narrative mode and the paradigmatic mode:
The narrative mode focuses of human actions, and it is characterized by lifelikeness,
time-bound particulars, personal, and evaluative among other things; on the other hand,
the paradigmatic mode focuses on categorization and conceptualizations, and it is
characterized by logic, timeless universals, impersonal prose, and non-evaluative stance
(p. 232). As a result, compared to the paradigmatic academic research articles, the Cory
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report is best described as a mixed mode, that uses both narrative and paradigmatic
modes.
To illustrate this mix, Cory used a narrative mode in the section titled "The Facts
Giving Rise to the Inquiry, the Authorizing Order in Council, in Nature and Scope.”
Despite the paradigmatic sounding heading, Cory's narrative focuses on character
development to achieve lifelikeness with full of evaluation, a kind of discourse
uncommon in the traditional academic research articles:
(6-4) Barbara Stoppel was a beautiful, vivacious and friendly 16-year-old. She was well
liked by school friends and beloved by her family. In a season of joy and hope she
was brutally killed. Murder, the most grievous of crimes, had been committed. On
the 23rd of December, 1981, she was working at the Ideal Donut Shop. Sometime
around 8:30 in the evening, twine was placed around her neck and she was
strangled. She died a few days later at the St. Boniface Hospital. A life so full of
promise was extinguished. Barbara Stoppel was the ultimate victim. Her family
suffered a grievous loss and have continued to relive the tragedy through three
trials and two appeals and this Inquiry (p. 1).
Consistent with the linguistic characteristics of the narrative mode, which is more
often used in the oral discourse, sentences in (6-4) are short (11.8 words per sentence),
and all but one of the sentences are simple. Passive voice in the passage is used
purposefully to place a rhetorical emphasis on the victim status of Barbara Stoppel, who
is the grammatical recipient of verbs such as strangle and extinguish.
But elsewhere in his report, Cory used a more paradigmatic mode, focusing on
conceptualizations and timeless universals as in (6-7).
(6-5) With regard to hypnosis, she pointed out that the experience within the United
States was such that many jurisdictions either restrict or bar the use of witnesses
who have been hypnotized. This is done because people under hypnosis are
suggestible and often assume that what they retrieve under hypnosis must be
accurate. (p. 29)
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The difference between (6-4) and (6-5) is striking in several different ways. First,
the number of words per sentence has increased from 11.8 words per sentence to 26, and
the syntax in (6-7) is considerably more complex, with four clauses, each with multiple
embedding, including a left-branching clause in the second sentence. Furthermore, Cory
seems much more careful in committing himself to the claim through the use of a
reporting expression ("she pointed out"), a striking contrast from (6-4) in which he was
unequivocal in claiming many subjective statements as facts (e.g., "beautiful, vivacious
and friendly...," "joy and hope," "brutally killed," "so full of promise"). These linguistic
and rhetorical features make some sections much closer to academic writing than others.
But even when we take a paradigmatic section of the Cory report, many
differences from academic discourse still persist. For example, the Cory report contains
considerably fewer formal citations than a typical academic article (see the analysis in
Chapter 5), and it uses solidarity markers differently. For example, one of the main
solidarity markers in academic writing is the inclusive pronoun we to refer to the
members of the disciplinary community (Hyland, 2001). In contrast, the Cory report
contains very few inclusive first person plurals, and when they do appear, we refers to
people in general as in (6-6).
(6-6) All of us see many people in many places but we have only one memory.
Even when the content of the passage in the Cory report is the same as that of an
academic article, the rhetorical and linguistic profiles of academic articles and the Cory
report differ, as illustrated in the following pair:
(6-7a) [Academic Article] The average estimate of duration across 66 subjects was
147.3 s, which confirms earlier findings of time overestimation for complex
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events. Only two (3 per cent) subjects estimated a duration that was equal to or
less than the true value of 30 s (p. 5)
(6-7b) [Cory Report] Interestingly, witnesses almost always think that an event took
place over a longer period of time than it actually did. (p. 27)
While all three sentences in (6-7a) and (6-7b) are syntactically identical in that
each sentence is complex with one subordinate clause, (6-7a) morphologically contains
greater nominalizations (e.g., estimate, duration, overestimation). Rhetorically (6-7a)
emphasizes precision through presentation of quantitative data, and it maintains a more
hesitant stance toward generalization by preserving the source of knowledge.
By comparison (6-7b), which could be nominalized as "witness' overestimation of
an event," does not resort to nominalization, and the sentence is rhetorically constructed
to present the information as a generalizable fact. This rhetorical generalization is partly
achieved by obscuring the source and the process of the knowledge, which makes it more
difficult for the reader to contest it.
Another way in which this sentence achieves generalization is through a shift in
what classical rhetoricians call stasis. Stasis, which is generally thought to originate in the
lost work of Hermagoras and is later developed by Cicero and Quintilian (Fahnestock,
1986; Ochs, 2003), is a theoretical tool to arrive at the crux of the matter through a series
of questions that are applied in discrete stages. These stages, known as stases, are (1)
conjectural stasis (“Did anything happen?”), (2) definitional stasis (“What name should
be applied to what happened?”), (3) qualitative stasis (“What sort of action was it?”), and
(4) translative stasis1 (“What action is called for?”). What is relevant for us is that the
process of stasis theory requires the user to pose questions sequentially, asking later
questions if and only if the earlier questions have been satisfactorily answered. For
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example, in the context of a forensic debate, it makes no sense to ask the second stasis
question (“What name should be applied to what happened?”) if the first stasis is not
established. However, in reality, questions about later stases are asked without
establishing earlier stases with or without intention (e.g., Fahnestock, 1986). But because
the stasis theory requires this sequential application, to ask questions about later stases is
to assume that the earlier stasis questions have been answered. To put the stasis theory
into context, we note that (6-7a) stays with the first and second stases. In particular,
Loftus, et al. (1987) is rhetorically working toward establishing the first stasis by
attempting to generalize (“confirms earlier findings of time overestimation for complex
events”) but is careful not to assume generalization. By comparison, Cory in (6-7b)
moves to the third stasis by commenting on the nature of this phenomenon
(“interestingly”). This move to the third stasis implies that the first two stases have been
resolved and assumes the factuality (conjectural stasis) of the time overestimation for a
complex event (definitional stasis).
The stasis analysis shows a subtle, albeit important, difference between academic
writing and the Cory report. By shifting the stasis levels, Cory, like the journalists in
Fahnestock's (1986) analysis, unwittingly transformed into a fact a statement that the
expert was unwilling to codify as a fact. The above stasis analysis complements the
analyses in the previous two chapters that also noted the rhetorical transformation in the
knowledge status. In Chapter 4, the Foucauldian will to truth, which masked the
ontological origin of the knowledge contributed to an increase in “truthfulness” of the
academic knowledge in the legal domain. Similarly, the citation analysis in Chapter 5 also
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documented the systematic de-attribution of academic knowledge and re-attribution of it
to legal sources, which also contributed to an increase in “factness,” using Latour’s
(1987) term.
While exceptions exist (to be discussed later in the chapter), the general trend is
that the direct rhetorical and linguistic uptake from academic articles to the Cory report is
rather scarce and difficult to observe, confirming the literature in public policy, which has
found little direct influence of academic research on public policy. However, the lack of
direct rhetorical and linguistic uptakes does not mean that the actual influence is small or
scarce as the following section demonstrates. As argued in Chapter 4, the influence is
more visible if we look at the intermediary genre, namely the preliminary hearing.
6.2.2. Linguistic/Rhetorical Uptake from Preliminary Hearing to Cory Report
As the previous section has shown, a direct comparison between academic articles
and the Cory report yielded little linguistic uptake. However, as argued in Chapter 4 and
5, most research knowledge, including the pair in (6-7), is mediated by other discourses,
most notably by the preliminary hearing. If we identify this intermediary genre and
juxtapose the transcripts from the preliminary hearing and the final report, the instances
of linguistic, along with ideational, uptake become much more frequent and more
prominent.
The paired excerpt in (6-8) comes from sections in the preliminary hearing and the
Cory report that explain the basic model of how memory functions.
(6-8a) [Transcript] So the first stage is the acquisition stage. This is a period of time
where an event occurs and some information is laid down in the memory system.
And then when the event is over, time passes. We call this stage the retention
stage. And finally there's a period of time, another stage that we call the retrieval
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stage. This is when a person tries to retrieve information from memory to answer
questions about what happened, to look at photographs and try to make an
identification. These are all different acts of retrieval. Our job then as researchers
in this area is to identify the factors that come into play at each of these stages that
affect the accuracy of somebody's memory (pp. 8922-8923).
(6-8b) [Cory Report] The acquisition phase represents the time when an event occurs
and some information is stored in the memory system. After the event is over,
time passes and this period is referred to as the retention stage. Finally, there is the
retrieval stage. This occurs when a person attempts to retrieve information from
the memory in response to questions as to what happened. For example, retrieval
takes place when a witness is asked to look at photographs in order to try to make
an identification (p. 27).
In addition to the obvious ideational uptake, one can readily see the linguistic
uptake at the levels of lexical, phrasal, and even clausal. Just in the first few lines, we see
the reiteration of: the acquisition stage (noun phrase), time (lexical item), an event occurs
and some information is ... in the memory system (two clauses). Furthermore, the
morphology of the original sentences, such as the grammatical subject, tense, aspect,
mode, and voice, perseveres in the Cory report. In both texts, the grammatical subject
slots are occupied by non-human phenomenal nouns (such as the first stage, retrieval)
and demonstratives that refer to them (e.g., this). Similarly, all verbs are in present tense,
neither continuous nor perfective in aspect, and all the main clauses are in indicative
mode and use active voice.
While both the preliminary hearing and the Cory report are both legal genres, thus
falling under the same Bhatia’s (2004) professional genre, these two genres are clearly
different genres with their own general communicative purposes. Thus, the linguistic
uptake in (6-10) constitutes Bhatia’s colonization that invades and compromises the
generic integrity of one genre by another.
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This point is important because the above transcript segment is the utterance of an
academic expert; therefore, the linguistic repetitions of these utterances in the Cory report
(i.e., Freadman’s [2002] uptake) represent an opportunity for academic experts to
potentially colonize the legal genres with academic ones. This means that the worldviews
and values of academic genres can potentially have an influence on the legal genres,
perhaps allowing the legal professionals to see the world from the academic point of
view. Of course, such colonization effort is neither simple nor easy. As I explained
earlier, the expert’s testimony is carefully controlled by the legal system and the counsel’s
questions, thus limiting the expert’s potential to colonize legal genres. However, as I will
show later in the chapter, there are a few opportunities to populate the legal genres with
academic language.
What does not receive an uptake is the sentence structure. However, this is easily
explained by differences in media. The expert testimonies are given in oral speech rather
than in writing, and oral speech tends to be shorter, less complex, and less left-branching.
So it is not surprising to find syntactic differences between the testimony and the report.
What is interesting and surprising is the extent of the lexical, phrasal, clausal, and
morphological uptake despite the differences in media.
In addition to the linguistic uptake, the Cory report also contains uptake of
rhetorical elements, such as emphasis and qualification. The following example comes
from a section in the preliminary hearing transcript, in which a law expert testifies about
the goals of tort laws, followed by Cory’s uptake in his report.
(6-9a) [Transcript] And while the goals of tort are many, it's often said that the primary
function of tort law is to provide first all for compensation for an injured party. It
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is a function of loss distribution. A second goal of tort would be in the deterrence
of conduct seen to be problematic or below a certain standard of expected
performance. (pp. 1266-1267)
(6-9b)[Cory Report] The primary goal of tort law is to compensate the injured party and,
secondly, to act as a deterrent to misconduct (p. 93).
Ideationally, the uptake of (6-9a) in (6-9b) is that of a summary. Linguistically,
there are obvious uptake of lexemes (e.g., goal, primary) and morphemes (e.g.,
compensation vs. compensate, deterrence vs. deterrent) as well as other morphological
elements, such as the grammatical subject, mode and voice. In addition, what receives
uptake in (6-9b) is the parts in (6-9a) that are given rhetorical emphasis. The first
sentence of (6-9a) rhetorically emphasizes "the primary function of tort law is to
provide..." through its syntactic position (lower clause in the right branch) as well as its
rhetorical position ("new" slot in the given-new contract). So, this segment of the
sentence receives uptake and the other segment does not. Because what is included is
given a greater emphasis than what is left out, one could argue that this pair represents
uptake in rhetorical emphasis in addition to the linguistic and ideational uptake.
The two examples provided above ([6-8] and [6-9]) may appear remarkable and
exceptional in the extent to which the expert testimony received uptake in ideational,
linguistic, and rhetorical senses, but these examples are, in fact, typical of how the Cory
report used expert testimony. Indeed, a similar analysis of the entire expert sections in the
Cory report reveals that almost every sentence is directly traceable to a specific segment
in the transcript with abundant linguistic uptakes. Only 16 out of 226 sentences or
approximately 7% of all the sentences did not have an obvious corresponding section in
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the transcript. In addition, these sentences without corresponding parts were typically
short, expressing assent or other evaluative comments, as illustrated in (6-10).
(6-10a) The Winnipeg Police Service is to be commended for the great strides that it has
taken in the procedures that it has adopted for dealing with identification
evidence.
(6-10b) He is a very conscientious and caring family practitioner.
(6-10c) I accept this opinion.
In addition to the linguistic and rhetorical uptake, Cory’s use of the transcript is
also obvious at the level of organization. Ideas in the expert sections of the Cory report
are clearly organized in the order they appear in the transcript. To demonstrate this
organizational influence, the table below lists the first ten sentences from the Loftus and
O’Shaughnessy sections of the Cory report. The number(s) next to each sentence is (are)
the page numbers in the transcript where the corresponding section can be found. A
question mark in the transcript page indicates that the sentence is one of 16 sentences
with no corresponding section in the transcript.
Table 6.1. Cross-referencing Cory Report and Transcript
1593He has an obsessional ...8923Finally, there is ...
1592He has experienced ...8923After the event is...
1592He is totally preoccupied ..8923The acquisition phase...
1591He testified that ...8923Research has been...
1590In Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s ...8922She testified that memory...
?As I started earlier ...8921Since that report ...
?Dr. O’Shaughnessy was ...8921Her 1996 report, ...
1574-1579Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s ...8916-8917She has conducted ...
1576-1577He is presently the ...8914Her curriculum vitae is filled ..
1574Dr. O’Shaughnessy is...8915Dr. Loftus is a full professor ..
Transcript p.Cory ReportTranscript p.Cory Report
O’ShaughnessyLoftus
The table clearly shows a corresponding progression between the Cory report and
the transcript, indicating that the organization in the preliminary hearing contributed to
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the organization of the Cory report. But this prevalence of the linguistic and rhetorical
uptake does not lead us to the conclusion that academic researchers have direct influence
on policy recommendations. These expert utterances are already partially shaped by the
explicit and implicit rules of the legal community, the form and content of the question,
and the mediation by the oral genre of the preliminary hearing. Furthermore, not all
expert utterances received uptake, and it was at the commissioner's discretion to decide
which utterances by the experts ultimately received uptake and how these utterances were
framed, sequenced, and judged in the final report.
This section of the chapter provided evidence that the Cory report contains many
linguistic and rhetorical uptake in addition to the ideational uptake. The uptake occurred
despite the ambivalence within the legal community toward academic experts and the
discourse mechanisms in the legal community to control the expert testimony. In Chapter
4, I suggested that the uptake occurs, ironically, because the legal mechanism, which
filters the expert knowledge and discourse, simultaneously validates them. The next
section offers other reasons for the uptake.
6.3. Understanding the Mechanism of Uptake
The discourse data in the previous section demonstrated the existence of linguistic
uptake but only hinted the reasons of the uptake. Nor did the data explain why certain
segments, expressions, and linguistic units received uptakes but not the others. This
section lists and discusses linguistic and rhetorical features and strategies that were likely
to have resulted in uptake. One should note that many of these factors that resulted in
linguistic uptake constitute Bhatia’s colonization, potentially influencing the legal genres
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with academic values and worldviews. These factors are: untranslatability,
presupposition, conceptual tool, conceptual salience, emphasis, narrative mode,
discursive position, and ideology.
6.3.1. Untranslatability
One reason that expert discourse perseveres is that some words and phrases in the
expert testimony cannot be easily translated. This is most obvious at the lexical level with
technical jargon, but untranslatability can extend to phrases and clauses. Recall the paired
example in (6-8) in which the linguistic uptake is most prominent (reproduced below as
[6-8a’] and [6-8b’]). In this section of the transcript (i.e., [6-8a]), Loftus, the memory
expert, explains the basics of how memory works by using diagrams and introducing
terminology that describes the stages of memory, such as acquisition, retention, and
retrieval. The explanation is accompanied by examples, and the counsel member in her
direct examination compared the theory and research with the perception by a lay person
to point out what is and what is not common knowledge.
(6-8a’)[Transcript] So the first stage is the acquisition stage. This is a period of time
where an event occurs and some information is laid down in the memory system.
And then when the event is over, time passes. We call this stage the retention
stage. And finally there's a period of time, another stage that we call the retrieval
stage. This is when a person tries to retrieve information from memory to answer
questions about what happened, to look at photographs and try to make an
identification. These are all different acts of retrieval. Our job then as researchers
in this area is to identify the factors that come into play at each of these stages that
affect the accuracy of somebody's memory (pp. 8922-8923).
(6-8b’)[Cory Report] The acquisition phase represents the time when an event occurs
and some information is stored in the memory system. After the event is over,
time passes and this period is referred to as the retention stage. Finally, there is the
retrieval stage. This occurs when a person attempts to retrieve information from
the memory in response to questions as to what happened. For example, retrieval
takes place when a witness is asked to look at photographs in order to try to make
an identification (p. 27).
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In the context of this inquiry, the basic memory terms were too useful to avoid but
too specific and technical to find counterparts in general or legal vocabulary. Therefore,
mirroring what the expert had done in the preliminary hearing, Cory adopted a teaching
role in this section of his report to define and explain what these terms meant (6-8b). In
doing so, his description closely resembled the actual utterances by the expert in (6-8a),
and Cory acknowledged that this linguistic uptake is a result of his awareness that one
cannot readily change the phrasing of a technical definition without altering the meaning
(Cory, May, 10, 2007, personal communication). Just as much as academics typically
prefer direct quotation over paraphrasing to preserve the accuracy of the technical
definition, Cory was doing the same through a heavy uptake of the expert's linguistic
items. The result is that the academic vocabulary, which originated in academic genres, is
introduced to the preliminary hearing (a legal genre), and that vocabulary gains its
legitimacy in the legal genres through Cory’s uptake of that term, resulting in Bhatia’s
colonization.
6.3.2. Presupposition
Presupposition occurs when the academic terms are presupposed in discussing
something else. In the Cory report, the basic memory terms in the previous section
recurred throughout the hearing, not only in Loftus’ testimony but in testimonies of other
experts, to describe other phenomena that presuppose the validity and knowledge of the
expert's view of memory. The excerpt in (6-11) comes from a testimony in which the
expert introduced another concept called postevent. Her description of postevent
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presupposes the basic memory terms, and it is framed in the context of what is and what
is not common knowledge.
(6-11) [Transcript] The longer the period of time, the weaker the memory. That's
something of a matter of common sense. But what's not so much a matter of
common sense is that as time is passing and the memory is fading, that memory
becomes more and more vulnerable to the factor of post event information. And
by this I mean new information that becomes available to a person after the event
is over, during the retention interval. If that post event information is misleading
or erroneous in some way, it's going to have more of an impact after a delay than
it will have shortly after the event. (pp. 8930-8931).
Similarly Cory also presupposed the knowledge of these basic memory terms later
in his report to describe Loftus’ analysis of the Sophonow case, using the concept of
postevent, as seen in (6-12).
(6-12) [Cory Report] She emphasized that, if memory has been contaminated by an
unfair test, the damage cannot be repaired. If an effort is made to correct it by
giving an unbiased test later on, she likened it to trying to squeeze toothpaste back
into a tube. The later test acts in the same manner as a post-event experience
where the person is called upon to make subsequent acts of retrieval (p. 28).
While (6-14) also characterizes untranslatability of postevent, what is important
here is that the acquisition, retention, and retrieval are presupposed in the process of
defining postevent. Presupposition of these terms (note that presupposition itself is taken
up in the report) provides an additional motive for Cory to retain these terms.
6.3.3. Usefulness
Sometimes, the counsels have found terms and concepts from academic research
so useful that they voluntarily used them to make sense of expert testimony and formulate
questions. What is important to remember is that these terms and concepts are not value
neutral; they embody the values and ideology of the discipline that engendered them.
Therefore, when the counsels appropriate these technical terms and use them as their own
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conceptual tools, they have been persuaded (or colonized) to step outside of the legal
perspective and look at the world from the disciplinary lens.
The previous sections already mentioned some compelling reasons
(untranslatability and presupposition) for retaining the basic memory terms like
acquisition, retention, retrieval, postevent. But in addition to these reasons, Cory and the
counsels found the concept of postevent so useful in understanding the Sophonow case
that they voluntarily used it to make sense of ideas that were introduced by other experts.
One such example is (6-13), in which Olson (represented in Q), the counsel for the
province of Manitoba, cross-examined Neufeld. In doing so, Olson voluntarily brought up
the Loftus' term postevent to make sense of Neufeld's testimony.
(6-13)
Q I appreciate that but my point was simply any identification process results
in some reinforcement.
A Some.
Q Yes, thank you. And the identification process utilized at any point in time
is one of those I think Dr. Loftus calls it a post event factor that can shape
one's memory that has been acquired and retained?
A Certainly. (pp. 9959-9960)
Obviously, conceptual usefulness is likely to have played a role in other cases
presented so far: (6-8), (6-11), and (6-12). An untranslatable term is unlikely to be used or
presupposed if it does not offer a useful conceptual tool through which one can illuminate
a particular issue at hand.
6.3.4. Conceptual Salience
However, the usefulness of the concept does not always seem to predict the
uptake path as the following pair illustrates. In this example, two technical terms, weapon
focus and unconscious transference, are introduced in the preliminary hearing; however,
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only the first term was taken up by Cory even though both terms were somewhat
peripheral to his argument, and if anything, the latter was more useful to Cory than the
former.
(6-14a)[Cory Report] There is as well a weapon focus. As a result of this focus,
witnesses may remember a weapon to the exclusion of other details. This means
that they will often be able to describe a gun or a knife accurately, to the detriment
of their ability to describe the person holding the weapon (p. 27).
(6-14b)[Cory Report] She explained that, if a witness is shown a photo pack and then
views a live line-up and only one person is carried over in both, the suspect may
look familiar because of the photos (p. 28).
In (6-16a) Cory introduces weapon focus and provides a definition and a relevant
illustration even though neither the concept nor the term is ever used again in the rest of
the report. However, the same is not done for unconscious transference in (6-14b) despite
the recurring nature of this concept. Instead, the concept is only described through an
example without a label or a definition. Several explanations are likely in this case. First,
compared to other technical terms, such as acquisition, retention, retrieval, and weapon
focus (all of the words, except weapon and focus are at least trisyllabic),2 the meaning of
the term unconscious transference (both trisyllabic) seems less readily obvious.
Furthermore, the concept has already been described without the use of technical terms in
legal and policy writing as well as in the preliminary hearing. Finally, the term was
initially described without the technical label in the beginning of the preliminary hearing,3
and the term was introduced later in the session, referring back to what had been already
discussed.
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6.3.5. Emphasis
Earlier in the chapter, (6-9) (reproduced below as [6-9a’] and [6-9b’]) was used to
argue that rhetorical elements, such as emphasis and qualification received uptake from
the expert testimony to the Cory report. In this case, it is the emphasis through syntactic
and rhetorical position of the clause “the primary function of...” that seems to explain the
successful uptake of that clause and the failed uptake of other clauses.
(6-9a’)[Transcript] And while the goals of tort are many, it's often said that the primary
function of tort law is to provide first all for compensation for an injured party. It
is a function of loss distribution. A second goal of tort would be in the deterrence
of conduct seen to be problematic or below a certain standard of expected
performance. (pp. 1266-1267)
(6-9b’)[Cory Report] The primary goal of tort law is to compensate the injured party
and, secondly, to act as a deterrent to misconduct.
Similarly, ideas in the following two excerpts (6-15) and (6-16) are potentially
relevant and useful to understanding the case, but they receive qualifications and
de-emphasis in the hearing, and they do not ultimately receive uptakes.
(6-15)
Q And by way of example again, if there is a hatred of someone or a hatred of an
institution and you then have an encounter with that institution, that can adversely
affect your acquisition of the memory of that encounter?
A It could, yes.
(p. 9032-9033)
In (6-15) a counsel introduced the idea that one’s prior experience and
expectations have an impact on acquisition of memory, an idea that was consistent with
the expert’s testimony so far. However, the expert offered a less than enthusiastic reply by
hedging her response.
A similar tactic was used by another expert to disapprove of an idea that the
judicial system seemed to already favor. In more than one expert testimony, both counsel
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members and the commissioner suggested that unreliability of eyewitnesses can be
partially remedied through stronger judicial instructions. However, the suggestion was
de-emphasized by one expert in the following exchange:
(6-16)
Q Okay, I appreciate that. And I take it, then, that one of the things that can be seen
from that piece of research is that that narrative, those verbal instructions or
information given to the subject at that point in time clearly had an impact upon
recollection?
A That happens in these kinds of studies, yes.
(pp. 9055-9056)
In an attempt to lead to viability of stronger judicial instructions, the counsel
referred to one of the studies by the expert and packaged the inference from the study in
his question as a generalizable fact. However, noticing this move to elevate the status of
this knowledge, the expert shifted the focus of the question to the generalizability of
knowledge, or lack thereof, by calling attention to the circumstances from which the
research finding had been extracted.
These findings so far reveal the importance of the expert's rhetorical performance
in the preliminary hearing. Untranslatability, presupposition, conceptual tools, conceptual
salience, and emphasis are all something that the expert witnesses can somewhat plan and
control. While this degree of control depends on many factors (e.g., the context, the
ability and stance of the lawyers), successful expert testimonies can bring, not only ideas
but also language into the policy relevant document. This means that the values and
ideology of the academic disciplines that shaped the creation of these words can
potentially enter the policy relevant realm.
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6.3.6. Narrative Mode vs. Paradigmatic Mode
Heffer's (2005) distinction between the narrative and paradigmatic modes, which
was described earlier in this chapter, seems useful in explaining an anomaly in the
linguistic uptakes among the experts. As argued earlier in the section, the Cory report
frequently made use of the expert's linguistic items in addition to their ideas, but this rule
does not seem to apply to one of the experts, namely Neufeld. He is listed as an expert
and is given his own section in two separate content areas (eyewitness testimony and
compensation), but his sections are considerably shorter, compared to the sections given
to other experts. But more importantly, Cory's language in these sections does not seem to
owe much to the actual utterances by Neufeld in his testimony, except one direct quote.
A close reading of Neufeld's transcript reveals several interesting traits about his
testimony. As a trained lawyer, Neufeld seemed, more than the other experts, to fight for
his turns and to get bigger turns. In fact, 65.0% of his turns in the testimonies were long
turns compared to the 49.2% of all the experts (including Neufeld), and his long turns
persisted, albeit decreased, even during the cross-examinations during which the counsels
typically intensified their efforts to control the expert testimony. It is, then, ironic to find
that Neufeld, who successfully wrested control of the turn taking, is the expert whose
linguistic items were least likely to be used by Cory.
The answer to this irony may lie in the ways in which Neufeld chose to present his
data. Unlike other experts, Neufeld often narrativized his argument, focusing on and
developing characters, like the example in (6-17)
(6-17) I couldn't agree with you more. I would -- let me just point out something because
I think it illustrates the point. We give an example in the book of a fellow named
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Vernon White in California, who was a very busy jailhouse informant. And he
was challenged by his bragging -- about his bragging that he could basically
inform on anybody he wanted to even if he had never met the man and do it
convincingly and compellingly. (p. 9899)
In this example, Neufeld named this "fellow" and started to develop this character
to give him a face and individuality. This is the strategy Neufeld consistently used in his
testimony as well as in his book Actual Innocence, which documented his and his
colleague's study into the causes of wrongful convictions.
As a result of his narratives, his study is framed in the Cory report as a personal
experience as demonstrated in (6-18).
(6-18) Mr. Neufeld spoke from his experience with men who had been wrongfully
convicted, spent time in prison and then had been exonerated and released (p.
120).
Cory's framing of Neufeld's study is in stark contrast with his framing of Ground's
study, which is somewhat similar. Like Neufeld, Ground studied those who were
wrongfully convicted and later exonerated, and his study, like that of Neufeld, took a
qualitative approach with an even smaller sample. However, Grounds did not narrativize
his study. His description of the study was delivered in the paradigmatic mode, and none
of his participants was named, and none of them was developed into a character. In
contrast to Cory's framing of Neufeld's study, Cory did not indicate that the Ground's
study was anything other than a formal study.
(6-19) He studied eight individuals who had been incarcerated for periods from eight
years and upwards. These people were wrongfully convicted and imprisoned. Five
of the individuals studied had been involved in the Birmingham and Guildford
pub bombings. All the individuals studied exhibited profound long-term effects.
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The comparison of these two experts in terms of linguistic uptake suggests that
the narrative mode had a negative impact on linguistic uptake. In one sense, this finding
makes sense because the expert sections of the Cory report are generally written in the
paradigmatic mode, so the testimony delivered in the paradigmatic mode are easier to use
in writing these sections. However, this finding contradicts findings from research in the
jury trial that narrativization is the key to persuading the jury (Schuetz, 1999). As an
experienced lawyer, Neufeld may have been using strategies that are effective in the jury
trial, but in this case, his use of the narrative mode seemed to have prevented the
linguistic uptake of his testimony. We can only speculate on the reasons behind these
findings. It is possible that Cory's privileging of the paradigmatic mode among the expert
witnesses was a product of the genre he was going to write; it is also possible that Cory,
who was more educated than a typical juror, responded better to the paradigmatic mode in
general. Either way, this finding suggests that the research findings from the jury trial do
not necessarily apply to a (quasi-)legal proceeding of a similar kind.
6.3.7. Position in the Transcript
An earlier section presented a table that documented the influence of the transcript
in the sequence of ideas in the Cory report. This sequencing happens to have another
important function in the uptake. Ideas that were presented near the beginning of the
transcript seem to have had a much greater chance of receiving uptake compared to ideas
that were presented later in the transcript. Cross-referencing of the Cory report and the
transcript reveals that corresponding pages typically begin at the beginning of the
transcript, and it is from the beginning of the transcript where a sentence by sentence
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correspondence, like (6-8) typically occurs. As the report and the transcript progress, the
correspondence between the two becomes less exact; many later sections of the transcript
have no corresponding parts in the Cory report, and if these parts receive uptake, they are
typically summarized, with many sentences and sometimes pages condensed into one
sentence.
Cory’s preference for the earlier segment of the transcript can be explained by a
number of means. For example, it makes sense that Cory’s prior experience has a greater
influence in structuring his experience because later experience is made sense in light of
prior experience. This framework fits rather nicely with the formal tradition of the legal
proceedings, in which direct examination precedes cross examination, and cross
examination may only deal with issues that have been raised in the direct examination.
This means that if direct examiners did well in eliciting much useful information, cross
examination would yield only marginally useful information, thus, discouraging Cory
from using information near the end of the transcript.
But this explanation alone is not sufficient because cross examination is an
important process in the legal proceedings, and to claim their relative insignificance based
on its discursive position seems absurd. But the preliminary hearing differs from an
ordinary trial in several important ways.
Unlike a jury trial, in which the jury is not allowed to take notes or consult written
records in delivering verdicts, Cory had access to the transcript and consulted with it
during his writing process. This written documentation arguably reduced the relative
importance of memory and salience of what was last heard, shifting the relative
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importance of the information. Furthermore, the written transcript gave semiotic
emphasis to the information in the beginning of the text as well as perceptual salience,
compared to the information buried in the middle or the end.
Secondly, although the hearing was formally constructed as an adversarial
process, the expert testimony in the hearing4 were not subject to much contestation with
no overt hostilities directed to the experts. This moderate milieu during the expert
testimony may have reduced the significance of cross examinations compared to
witnesses in other hearings, in which opposing counsels are less amiable.
These findings are not completely applicable to other settings, but it’s not entirely
unique to this inquiry, either. For example, in most trials expert witnesses are less
rigorously cross-examined compared to fact witnesses (Matson, 1999), and many policy
relevant hearings make use of similar oral proceedings and use transcripts in the
deliberation process. Therefore, the positioning of the information is likely to be relevant
more or less in other contexts.
6.3.8. Accessibility
In Chapter 4, we examined accessibility as a contextual factor that facilitated
uptake of Kaiser (1989), compared to Lofus et al. (1987). This section revisits this
comparison to examine consequences in linguistic uptake.
The comparison between Loftus et al. (1987) and the Cory report was already made in
(6-7), pointing out many of the differences between the two. The pair is reproduced below
as (6-7a’) and (6-7b’):
(6-7a’) [Academic Article] The average estimate of duration across 66 subjects was
147.3 s, which confirms earlier findings of time overestimation for complex
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events. Only two (3 per cent) subjects estimated a duration that was equal to or
less than the true value of 30 s (p. 5).
(6-7b’) [Cory Report] Interestingly, witnesses almost always think that an event took
place over a longer period of time than it actually did (p. 27).
By comparison, Cory’s uptake of Kaiser (1989) is considerably different:
(6-20a)[Academic Article] Firstly, the law of torts, while it may have slowly evolved in
line with changes in society in other areas has not developed a recovery
mechanism which would effectively compensate a person who has been
wrongfully convicted and imprisoned (p. 112).
(6-20b)[Cory Report] Professor Kaiser strongly contends in his writing that the law of
torts has not developed an effective recovery mechanism for the wrongfully
convicted. (A. Kaiser, Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment Towards an End to
the Compensatory Obstacle Course (1989), 9 Windsor Y.B. Access Justice 96 at
112) (p. 94).
In addition to the use formal citation and the reporting verb, (6-20b) contains
many lexical and phrasal reiterations, such as the law of torts, has not developed,
effective, and recovery mechanism. To understand the different treatment of the two
scholarly sources, we need to understand how the source was introduced to Cory.
Kaiser’s essay was brought to Cory’s attention by one of the experts' written
reports to the commission. During her direct examination, she explained that Justice
Evans in Marshall Inquiry, another public inquiry that resulted from a wrongful murder
conviction, had used headings from the Kaiser report, and these headings had been
endorsed by Federal-Provincial task force of 1985 as well as New Zealand’s Law Reform
Commission. Although Cory claimed that he had not read Kaiser’s essay prior to the
inquiry, he did read the essay when it was explicitly brought to him by the expert (Cory,
May, 10, 2007, personal communication).
As described in Chapter 4, Loftus et al. (1987) was described by one of the
experts in the testimony but it was never given sufficient retrieval information in the
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transcript. The source is mentioned in Loftus's curriculum vitae, but it was listed among
403 of her publications, so it was unlikely that Cory ever read this essay, and he agreed to
this assessment in the interview (Cory, May, 10, 2007, personal communication).
If Cory's recollection is correct in that he only read the texts that were explicitly
brought to him and if Cory's behavior is typical of a commissioner in preserving discourse
elements, perhaps a greater amount of academic discourses may be preserved by
introducing more written discourses rather than oral discourses. Of course, such an
attempt will be difficult because, as described throughout this dissertation, the judicial
system is established to privilege the oral account through hearings, as in the Sophonow
case. However, the experts could be more explicit in articulating their written sources and
incorporate these source in their deliberations, particularly with their written reports.
6.3.9. Argument and Ideology
Another important factor is whether or not the anyone's argument in the hearing
violated the ideology of the judicial system. This point was already raised in Chapter 4,
when it discussed the Foucauldian legal will to truth and the rules of exclusion. Since
Cory was either unable or unwilling to disrupt the Foucauldian will to truth in the
research interview (in which the stake was much lower), we should expect the force to
fare prominently in Cory's handling of arguments in his report if the ideology of the legal
system was at stake.
This force seems to be at play in Cory's decision to favor Martin's
"innocence-based" model over another model, introduced by the cross-examining
counsel, Olson, who represented the interest of the province of Manitoba. Cory's choice
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of the compensation model was particularly important for Olson because this choice
would largely determine how much the province would have to pay for Sophonow's
compensation. Not so surprisingly, Olson argued hard. He put forward what he termed as
the "social insurance" model and provided extensive evidence to argue that his model was
superior to Martin's. In doing so, he cited almost an endless number of sources: four
academic articles (three of which had been cited by Martin in her written report to the
commission), precedents, tort laws, the Canadian Charter, provincial laws, the
International Covenant of the Civil and Political Rights, the Supreme Court decisions, the
Manitoba Guidelines, the Injury Compensation board, the Manitoba Act, the Criminal
Injury Act, the Thomas Commission, the Statistics Canada, AIDWYC (an advocate group
for the wrongfully convicted), the International Commission of Jurists, an unnamed US
Study, the Canadian Criminal Justice Association, the Globe & Mail (newspaper),
advocates for the wrongfully accused, the 1985 Task force report, and even Cory himself
as a judge in a libel case. As Olson's evidence mounted, he submitted an increasing
number of exhibits to the commission that prompted a joke from direct examiner Harris
on Olson’s growing exhibits:
Mr. Harris: I notice the size of Mr. Olson's exhibits seem to be growing
exponentially.
Mr. Olson: The good thing is that I don't have to take them back with 
me, Mr. Harris.
(p. 1507)
However, Olson's argument and his compensation model were dismissed in the
Cory report because his argument rested on a premise that the judicial system was full of
errors. Olson used statistics from the Statistics Canada, an academic article, and various
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advocates groups and individuals to estimate the number of wrongful conviction in
Canada to be 570 per year! As a representative of the judicial system who was appointed
to restore the faith in the system, this premise was not something that Cory could afford
to endorse. Olson's argument and evidence that filled 71 pages of the transcript from the
preliminary hearing had been paraphrased and reduced to one small paragraph in the Cory
report, and the argument was dismissed without much argument or evidence. But perhaps
the manner in which this argument was dismissed is indicative of the ideological
violation.
(6-21) The argument of Mr. Olson suggests that the criminal justice system is replete
with instances of wrongfully convicted accused [sic]. I pray God that this is not
correct. If Crown Counsel, Defence Counsel and the Judiciary fulfil their
demanding roles our system should work effectively (p. 101).
Of course, neither praying to God nor an obligatory modal should constitutes an
argument or evidence, but Cory is not making an argument in this excerpt because faith in
the judicial system is a fundamental premise and is not open to discussion. As suggested
in Chapter 4, Cory’s faith in the judicial system partly comes from his stake in the system,
and a fundamental criticism of the system, like the one raised by Olson, is something that
must be silenced/blinded by the rules of exclusion.
This interpretation of the Cory report is supported by numerous examples. Cory
made many statements like (6-22) and (6-23) that affirmed the robustness of the judicial
system with confidence (without any qualifiers or evidence) despite numerous claims to
the contrary in the preliminary hearing. 
(6-22) By their careful investigations and fair enforcement of the law, the police serve
and protect society (p. 10).
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(6-23) When Trial Judges, Crown Counsel and Defence Counsel all fulfil their difficult
roles, our system of criminal justice works extremely well. Fortunately, this is true
in the vast majority of cases (p. 85).
Similarly, he emphasized the competence and integrity of the members of the
legal system who clearly contributed to the wrongful conviction of Sophonow by their
own admissions. In those cases, Cory had an option of interpreting these testimonies as a
sign that these individuals are reprehensible. Instead, Cory interpreted their admissions as
acts of courage and integrity, and their specific acts that led to Sophonow’s wrongful
conviction as unfortunate exceptions to their general competence. In (6-24) for example,
Cory mentions the fact that Mr. Whitley contributed to a handbook for the Code of
Conduct for Crown Counsel in order to argue for Mr. Whitley’s good moral standing. He
could have interpreted the same evidence to argue that the Crown misconduct was so
common that even the ones who set the ethical standards were implicated in misconduct.
But as argued in Chapter 4, such a move would not respond to the rhetorical exigence of
the Order-in-Council, which instructed Cory to avoid criminally implicating anyone, and
it would have violated the legal ideology. 
(6-26) At the outset, I should say that I have no doubt that Mr. Whitley is an able and
conscientious Crown Counsel. I am sure that he is dedicated to the administration
of justice, to the education of Crown Counsel and to establishing and maintaining
a high standard for Crown Counsel. He has written on issues of criminal law. He
has taken part in conferences and been instrumental in the preparation of a
handbook for the Code of Conduct for Crown Counsel. Anything that I may say
with regard to his conduct, or his actions in the third trial of Thomas Sophonow,
should not take away from his record of dedication to the administration of justice
(p. 49).
These examples, along with the arguments in the previous two chapters, amply
demonstrate that the direct confrontation with the judicial ideology within the judicial
204
system is unlikely to succeed even if the confrontation occurs in the premise (rather than
the conclusion) of the argument. Studies in other arenas reported somewhat similar
findings. For example, Peterson (1988), who studied the discourse of a Senate
subcommittee, found that the activists who endorsed the power and ideology of the
commission had a better chance of being heard compared to the ones who did not even
though their positions were the same. In other words, unless one seeks to change the
fundamental change in the ideology of the system in which the deliberation takes place, it
is better to frame one's argument so that it does not clash with the ideology of that system.
The analysis in this section identified a number of factors that seem to have
facilitated the linguistic and rhetorical uptake of various testimonies in the Cory report.
These factors are: untranslatability, presupposition, conceptual tool, conceptual salience,
emphasis, narrative mode, discursive position, and ideology. It is worth repeating that the
uptake of linguistic and rhetorical items allow academic researchers to bring some
ideological influences to a system that would otherwise vigorously reject such a change.
While any of the factors in this chapter are, to a certain extent, dependent on other factors
like context, nature of the debate, competence of the lawyers, and others, identification of
these factors may be useful to expert witnesses who would like their research to have a
greater impact on policy relevant debates.
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6.4. Conclusion
This chapter used discourse analysis to reveal rhetorical and linguistic processes
that contributed to the uptake of academic discourses into policy recommendation. The
analysis found the following results:
1. Linguistic and rhetorical items, in addition to ideas, receive uptake, potentially
colonizing the legal genres, effecting an ideological change in the judicial and policy
communities through language.
2. The testifying expert's rhetorical performance affects the likelihood of uptake even
though the likelihood is also influenced by factors that are beyond the expert's control.
The factors that are within the control of the experts (at least to a certain extent) are:
untranslatability, presupposition, conceptual tool, conceptual salience, emphasis,
narrative mode, discursive position, and ideology.
3. Research on effective delivery from the jury trial may be instructive to expert
witnesses in quasi-legal proceedings, but the findings from these studies may not be
applicable.
4. Neither witnesses nor lawyers is likely to succeed in changing the ideology of the
legal system through direct confrontations.
Through the three analysis Chapters, I have examined the policy uptake of
academic research knowledge through different levels of analysis. The final chapter
summarizes the findings from these analysis chapters in relation to the six research
questions in Chapter 1.
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NOTES
1. The existence and the role of the fourth stasis are disputed among scholars of Roman
rhetoric. Dearin (1976) traces the pre-Hermagorean origin of the fourth stasis to argue
that the translative matter was a claim of substance in the judicial system of the
ancient Greece, but it became a mere procedural issue under the Roman judicial
system. This change in the judicial environment explains why many Roman
rhetoricians like mature Cicero and Quintilian dismissed the translative question from
their stasis theory.
2. The number of syllables does not explain the difference between items that receive
uptake and those that do not. Both items are equally polysyllabic.
3. The position of the transcript seems to be an uptake factor as discussed later in the
chapter.
4. Unlike fact witnesses, expert witnesses typically enjoy less hostile cross-examination
processes in the trial. This is partly due to the prescribed status of the expert witnesses
as neutral observers even if they are hired by one side. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
This dissertation began with the question of the role of language and rhetoric in
the uptake of academic research in public policy. The analyses in Chapters 4, 5, and 6
generally supported the literature in political science that the relationship between the two
is indirect and complex, but this dissertation uncovered the nature of this indirectness and
complexity, using theories and methods that are available in writing studies.
To begin this concluding chapter, it is perhaps appropriate to revisit the six
research questions that I set out in the beginning.
1. How does academic research influence public policy?
2. What is the role of language and rhetoric in this process?
3. What is the nature of the relationship between research and policy that seems to leave
the contradictory impression that public policy both uses and ignores academic
research?
4. What rhetorical factors are relevant in understanding why only some research results
in policy uptake?
5. What rhetorical transformations occur to the research knowledge as it enters into the
policy domain?
6. How can genre theory be expanded to elaborate Freadman’s uptake, accounting for
the circulation of discourse and knowledge?
The first section of this chapter reiterates the answers to these questions that were
discussed throughout the dissertation to clarify the contribution of this dissertation. The
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answer section is followed by a section on limitations to qualify the findings from the
study, which leads to the last section that discusses the directions for future studies.
7.1. Research Questions Answered
In relation to the first two research questions, the intermediary genre analysis in
Chapter 4 revealed that the influence of academic research is often mediated by other
policy and legal genres, and the rhetorical and discourse analyses in Chapter 6 showed
that this process of uptake is highly selective. In addition, the intermediary genre analysis
in Chapter 4, the citation analysis in Chapter 5, and the stasis analysis in Chapter 6 have
shown that the selectively chosen knowledge from academic research undergoes various
transformations. For example, the intermediary genre analysis in Chapter 4 discussed the
gatekeeping mechanism of the legal genres, which validates as well as filters the research
knowledge. Therefore, the uptake changes the status of that knowledge in the legal
domain. In addition to this transformation through the legal system, the citation analysis
in Chapter 5 illustrated that language and rhetoric also play a part in this transformation.
The results from the citation analysis have documented a systematic use of positive
modality to accompany academic sources, and these sources are now incorporated as a
part of Cory’s argument. Similarly, the stasis analysis in Chapter 6 also documented the
role of rhetoric in framing the research knowledge. This point is discussed further below
in response to the fifth research question.
The third research question refers to the seeming contradiction that policy makers
simultaneously consider and disregard academic research. In this study, all three analysis
chapters made it clear that academic research was influential in the Cory report, but these
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chapters also identified numerous factors that obscured this influence. In particular, the
analysis in Chapter 4 uncovered the Foucauldian will to truth that obscured the
epistemological origin of the research knowledge, and the citation analysis in Chapter 5
documented the textual consequences of this phenomenon. But as I reiterated throughout
this dissertation, this obscuring of the epistemological origin should not be equated with
lack of influence from academic research because the Cory report still “remembers” these
sources in terms of Freadman’s (2002) “memory”: The Cory report is filled with textual
repetitions from other sources that originate in academic sources. In fact, the
de-attribution of the knowledge and re-attribution of it to legal sources increased the
“truthfulness” (in Foucauldian framework) or “factness” (in Latour’s modality) of the
knowledge in the legal system.
For reasons I listed in response to the first research question, I concur with
political scientists who suggest that it is naïve for researchers to expect their research
findings to be directly incorporated into policy. But for reasons that I listed in response to
this third research question, I would also argue the opposite: Ostensive absence of
research in policy does not necessarily mean that the policy was not influenced by
research in some ways. This finding should be encouraging for many researchers who
would like to see their research utilized in public policy in some meaningful manner. It is
possible that their research has indirect contribution to some public policy somewhere
after a series of uptakes by intermediary texts.
In response to the fourth research question, this dissertation documented various
factors to increase the likelihood of research uptake. The intertextual network analysis in
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Chapter 4 noted the existing network as the social constructionist force that constrains the
likely uptake, but the analysis also noted scalability of the network as the social
construtivist force that enables one to change the odds of uptake. This means that the
rhetor who has vested interest in having some research incorporated into policy should
enlist other texts (perhaps not unlike what the city of Winnipeg did when it enlisted the
insurance company policy) and change the overall configuration of the intertextual
network. A related argument comes from the intermediary genre analysis in Chapter 4,
which revealed that research is often mediated by other legal and policy genres. This
finding suggests that the social construtivist force in the intertextual network may be best
leveraged when the rhetor enlists policy and legal genres. The finding is also instructive
for researchers who would like to see their work influence public policies. As I argued in
Chapter 4, a study must be first recognized by someone who is in the position to
introduce the study to legal or policy genres that are intertextually linked to a policy
document. Since lawyers and policy makers do not necessarily read scholarly journals
beyond their professions, academic publications in the researchers own disciplines may
not be sufficient to draw the attention of the policy and legal professions. Furthermore,
the findings from this study suggest that researchers should make effort to have their
studies incorporated into any legal or policy document. It may be difficult to influence a
national policy immediately, but the uptake by any legal or policy document changes the
status of that knowledge in the legal and policy domains. This shift in the knowledge
status increases the chance that the knowledge will have a greater influence in the future.
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If the scalability of the network and intermediary genres are the macro-contextual
factors that influence the likelihood of uptake, the rhetorical and discourse factors are the
micro-textual factors that also contribute to uptake. Like the existing intertextual network
in macro-contextual factors, some elements are beyond the rhetor’s control (such as
accessibility, mistakes by the opposing party), but many other rhetorical and discourse
factors, such as lexico-grammatical choice, rhetorical moves, and discourse styles, are at
the rhetor’s disposal.
The answer to the sixth research question comes from the introduction of the two
concepts: intertextual network and intermediary genre. Intertextual network contributes to
our understanding that rhetorical expectations are multiple and that the multiple rhetorical
expectations, which vary in strength, compete for uptake. Intermediary genre adds to the
current thinking of genre by making us consider the secondary function of a genre when
put into the context of an intertextual network. I have argued that a genre or a text that
occupies a particular place in the intertextual network facilitates uptake of other genres or
texts.
In addition to the six research questions, I have also raised a methodological
argument that a language-based analysis is a viable method in studying policy and
research. For example, the analysis in Chapter 4 revealed some of the problems of solely
relying on interview data because such data reflect the participant’s perspective,
interpretation, memory, and re-articulation. But more importantly, interview data alone
cannot unmask the Foucauldian will to truth, which is collectively maintained in the
profession to ensure the normal functioning of that profession. Another reason to include
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language analysis is that language data are manifestations of processes that participants
themselves may not be able to articulate. Similar to the ways in which linguists try to map
competence (i.e., the inaccessible mind) from performance (i.e., the linguistic output), the
language data present an opportunity to understand unarticulated processes and functions
that are performed when people write policy-relevant documents. But my call to
incorporate language-based analysis does not mean that we should limit our observation
to language data alone. As the contemporary development in our discipline shows, we
need to analyze and incorporate context in our analyses, but this incorporation of context
should not result in forgoing a language-based analysis.
At the same time, the methodological discussion in Chapter 5 indicates that some
methods contain problematic assumptions when applied to legal and policy documents; in
this case the citation analysis assumed rigorous documentation of all the sources. This
incident shows that we need to adjust the existing methods in language studies and
accommodate them to the particular needs of the policy and legal contexts, as I have done
so in Chapter 5.
7.2. Limitations
In Chapter 3, I provided the rationale for using a case study approach and listed its
strengths such as its ability to study a phenomenon in which the researcher has little to no
control and its ability to capture nuanced elements. However, the approach has its
limitations as well. First and foremost, the Sophonow case is only one case, and we
cannot simply generalize findings from the case alone no matter how cogent some of the
findings may be.
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Similarly because the Sophonow case is a case of one, there are many variables
that may be unique to the case. To address this problem, I have attempted to describe the
phenomenon in depth with multiple methods to attribute reasons for the observed
phenomena so that we can separate what is unique to the case and what may be more
applicable to other cases. For example, I pointed to the physical availability of the
transcript to explain Cory’s tendency to use language from the beginning of each
transcript more than the end as well as his tendency to preserve the organization of the
preliminary hearing. This phenomenon is unique to this inquiry in one sense because the
transcript is not always available to the decision makers (e.g., a jury trial), but the finding
is still useful because some policy making fora make available the transcripts of the
expert witnesses (e.g., Congressional hearing). But of course, such descriptive
explanation does not attain the neatness of an experimental study that can control and
manipulate these variables to test the explanation.
As I mentioned in the methods section, I was unable to secure interviews from one
additional counsel member and four other expert witnesses. However, the use of the
interview data is quite limited in this dissertation so that it is doubtful that additional
interviews would have substantially changed the nature of the findings and the overall
argument.
7.3. Future Directions
This dissertation has answered a number of questions regarding the relationship
between public policy and academic research as well as the role of language and rhetoric
in this relationship. But it has also introduced a number of new questions.
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The first new question is the extent to which the findings from this case study are
applicable in other contexts. It would be interesting to see if similar case studies in other
public inquiries would yield similar findings. Similar studies on other policy contexts
would show which findings are more widely applicable and which findings are more
constrained to the Sophonow Inquiry or the genre of public inquiries.
As mentioned in the limitations section above, some of the findings from this
study are linked to the specifics of the process of public inquiry. However, it should be
worthwhile to see if other policy processes that contain these specifics would yield
similar results. For example, is the beginning of a transcript more important than the end
when a policy process produces a transcript and when the decision maker uses that
transcript to make a policy decision? Are the specific rhetorical and discourse processes
in Chapter 6 still relevant in another case that uses a hearing as an invention device?
The theoretical contributions in this dissertation emerged from this specific case,
but they are meant to have wider applications beyond the context of the this policy
process or the research questions on policy uptake of research. In particular, intertextual
network and intermediary genre should be useful in studying other issues that involve
multiple genres and uptake across genre boundaries. Future studies can test the usefulness
of these concepts in various settings.
The methods for studying citation and circulation of discourse have much room to
develop. As mentioned in Chapter 3, citation analysis consists of many methods that were
developed independently in separate disciplines, and the literature that uses citation
analysis suggests that scholars have not yet made a concerted interdisciplinary effort to
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address the methodological issues. In particular, this dissertation revealed the usefulness
of the method in analyzing a policy relevant document, but it also revealed problematic
assumptions that needed to be modified. For example, lack of references pages and lack
of consistent formal citation made it difficult to apply existing citation analysis methods.
But this problem is not unique to the Sophonow case because non-academic texts do not
follow the citation convention in academic writing. Future researchers may increase their
efforts to establish some methodological guidelines that enable the use of citation analysis
in non-academic writing.
Similarly, the methods for tracing circulation of knowledge and discourse seem
underdeveloped. In this dissertation, I have relied on Foucault’s (1972a) discursive
“method,” Freadman’s (2002) “uptake,” as well as various rhetorical and linguistic
concepts that could be expanded to theorize circulation of knowledge and discourse.
However, Freadman’s (2002) uptake as a method is limited to tracing the repetition
across discourse boundaries, and Foucault’s (1972a) discursive “method” lacks
specificity. Perhaps future researchers may find inspirations in this dissertation to propose
specific methods that allow us to systematically trace circulation of knowledge and
discourse across a wide variety of genres.
Finally, this dissertation eschewed the prescriptive question of whether or not
academic research should influence public policy. As a language “expert,” who is about
to complete his dissertation, I am somewhat partial to the idea that research on language
should inform public policy on language, but this issue is beyond the scope of this
dissertation. Such discussions can be found elsewhere (e.g., Brint, 1990; Cozzens &
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Woodhouse, 2002; Waddell, 1996), and the language-based analyses in this dissertation
have little to contribute to this debate. However, language-based analysis can be relevant
to the prescriptive question. Feminist language scholars (e.g., Keller, 2000) and critical
discourse analysts (e.g., Fairclough, 1992; Wodak & Reisigl, 2001) have already applied
language-based analyses on many issues, such as science, technology, and race. Future
researchers may wish to use a language-based analysis to study issues of power in policy
making.
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Appendix A: Constructed References Pages without Expressions of Attribution
1. Andrews v. Grand & Toy [1978] 
2. Arnold v. Teno [1978]
3. Battlecry of French revolutionaries ("Liberté, Egalité, "Fraternité")
4. Bruce Henley (custodian at Remand Centre)
5. Chief Justice Hewak
6. Cooper-Stephenson's Charter Damages Claims (1990)
7. Curriculum vitae of Mr. Grymaloski
8. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Grounds
9. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Loftus
10. Curriculum vitae of Mr. Neufeld
11. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Silverthorne
12. Detective Bernard's note
13. Document brief
14. Dr. Loftus
15. Dr. O'Shaughnessy
16. Dr. Silverthorne
17. Former Chief of Winnipeg Police
18. Federal-Provincial Guideline of 1988
19. Hill v. Church of Scientology [1995]
20. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
21. The John Howard and Elizabeth Fry Society report
22. Justice Dickson
23. Justice Evans (from Marshall Inquiry)
24. Justice Twaddle
25. Kaiser's "Wrongful conviction and imprisonment: Toward an end to the compensatory
obstacle course"
26. Luczenczyn report
27. Mr. Doerkson (eye witness)
28. Mr. Finlayson (Assistant Deputy Attorney General)
29. Mr. Whitley
30. Mr. Whitley's memo
31. Muir v. Alberta [1996]
32. Neighbor (of Sophonow)
33. Newspaper
34. Neufeld's Actual Innocence (2001)
35. Order in Council
36. Photos (from the photo lineups)
37. Pilkington's "Damages as a remedy for infringement of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms" (1984)
38. Police & Crown
39. Police supplemental report
40. R. v. Brooks [2000]
218
41. R. v. Dyment [1988]
42. Rachel Devine (niece of Sophonow)
43. Rules of practice and procedure
44. Sergeant Biener & Detective Bernard
45. Sergeant Paulishyn
46. Sergeant Paulishyn's note
47. Sergeant Wawryk's note
48. Shphonow
49. Thornton v. School District no. 57 [1978]
50. Transcript from the preliminary hearing (testimonies of Mr. Brodsky, Mr. Cheng,
Crown, Mr. Dangerfield, Inspector McCorrister, Inspector Smith, Mr. Doerksen, Mr.
Janower, Mr. Lawlor, Dr. Loftus, Mr. Whitley, Mrs. Janower, Mrs. King, Mr.
Neufeld, Dr. O'Shaughnessy, Sgt Paulishyn, Sgt. Biener, Sgt Wawryk, Dr.
Silverthorne, Mr. Whitley, and some unknown testifiers).
51. Trial transcript
52. Winnipeg Police
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Appendix B: Constructed References Pages with Expressions of Attribution
1. Andrews v. Grand & Toy [1978]
2. Arnold v. Teno [1978]
3. Attorney General
4. Battlecry of French revolutionaries ("Liberté, Egalité, "Fraternité")
5. Berkley Company
6. Beth Olsen (Sophonow's friend)
7. Bruce Henley (custodian at Remand Centre)
8. Canadian Charter
9. Chief Justice Hewak
10. Church of Scientology
11. Cindy Coe (character witness)
12. Code of Conduct for Crown Counsels
13. Constable Bell
14. Constable Foster
15. Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science (NIJ publication)
16. Cooper-Stephenson's Charter Damages Claims (1990)
17. Correspondence (between police and Mr. Williamson?)
18. Counsel's submissions
19. Criminal record
20. Crown
21. Crown counsel
22. Crown file
23. Curriculum vitae of Mr. Grymaloski
24. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Grounds
25. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Loftus
26. Curriculum vitae of Mr. Neufeld
27. Curriculum vitae of Dr. Silverthorne
28. Detective Bernard
29. Detective Bernard's note
30. Document brief
31. Dr. Grounds
32. Dr. Loftus
33. Dr. Martin
34. Dr. Martin's paper
35. Dr. O'Shaughnessy
36. Dr. Silverthorne
37. Dr. Silverthorne's record
38. Former chief of Winnipeg Police
39. Former mayor of Winnipeg
40. Federal-Provincial Guideline of 1988
41. Friend of Terry Arnold
42. Hill v. Church of Scientology [1995]
220
43. Inspector McCorrister
44. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
45. The John Howard and Elizabeth Fry Soceity report
46. Jackie Henke (character witness)
47. Janet Jonesw (character witness)
48. Justice Dickson
49. Justice Evans (from Marshall Inquiry)
50. Justice Kaufman (from Marshall Inquiry)
51. Justice Twaddle
52. Kaiser's "Wrongful conviction and imprisonment: Toward an end to the compensatory
obstacle course"
53. Law
54. Luczenczyn report
55. Magna Carta
56. Manitoba Court of Appeals
57. Manitoba Government
58. Manitoba Guideline of 1986
59. Marian McLean (eye witness)
60. Marquis of Queensbury Rules
61. Millon Clinical Multi Axaial Personality Inventory
62. Morin Inquiry
63. Mr. Brodsky (defense counsel from Sophonow's second and third trial)
64. Mr. Brodsky's memo
65. Mr. Buzahora (of Safeway)
66. Mr. Cheng (jailhouse informant)
67. Mr. Collette (eye witness)
68. Mr. Dangerfield (Crown)
69. Mr. Doerkson (eye witness)
70. Mr. Finlayson (Assistant Deputy Attorney General)
71. Mr. Grymaloski (clinical counselor of Sophonow)
72. Mr. Janower (eye witness)
73. Mr. Lawlor (Crown)
74. Mr. McQuade (jailhouse informant)
75. Mr. Neufeld (expert on wrongful conviction)
76. Mr. Neufeld's Actual Innocence (2001)
77. Mr. Olson (Counsel for Manitoba)
78. Mr. Pollock (defense counsel from Sophonow's first trial)
79. Mr. Ududec (donut shop owner)
Mr. Whitley (Crown)
80. Mr. Whitley's memo
81. Mr. Williamson
82. Mrs. Janower (eye witness)
83. Mrs. King (eye witness)
84. Mrs. Peasgood (eye witness)
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85. Ms. Barrett (eye witness)
86. Muir v. Alberta [1996]
87. Myshokowsky's memo
88. Nadine (Sophonow's ex-wife)
89. Neighbor (of Sophonow)
90. Nelles v. Ontario [1989]
91. Newspaper
92. Nurse Navoa (fact witness)
93. One memo
94. Order in Council
95. Philip Sophonow (Sophonow's brother)
96. Photos (from the photo lineups)
97. Pilkington's "Damages as a remedy for infringement of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms" (1984)
98. Police
99. Police & Crown
100.Police officers
101.Police report
102.Police supplemental report
103.Police transcript
104.Preliminary hearing
105.Prominent persons
106.Province of Manitoba
107.Psychiatrists
108.Public comments
109.R. v. Brooks [2000]
110.R. v. Dyment [1988]
111.R. Stinchcombe [1991]
112.Rachel Devine (niece of Sophonow)
113.Raymond Johnson (Sophonow's brother-in-law)
114.Rebecca Sophonow (Sophonow's wife)
115.Rick Stoppel (victim's father)
116.Rules of practice and procedure
117.Sergeant Biener
118.Sergeant Biener & Detective Bernard
119.Sergeant Biener & Mr. Whitley
120.Sergeant Biener's notes
121.Sergeant Huff's report
122.Sergeant Paulishyn
123.Sergeants Paulishyn and Wawryk
124.Sergeant Paulishyn's note
125.Sergeant Shipman
126.Sergeant Vandergraaf
127.Sergeant Wawryk
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128.Sergeants Wawryk and Paulishyn
129.Sergeant Wawryk's note
130.Shphonow
131.Sophonow's counsel
132.Sophonow's memo
133.Sophonow Inquiry
134.Taped conversation
135.Task force report of 1985
136.Telephone record
137.Terry Arnold
138.The Powers Company
139.The Winnipeg Sun
140.Thornton v. School District no. 57 [1978]
141.Transcript from the preliminary hearing (testimonies of Mr. Brodsky, Mr. Cheng,
Crown, Mr. Dangerfield, Mr. Doerksen, Mr. Janower, Mrs. Janower, Mrs. King, Mr.
Lawlor, Dr. Loftus, Inspector McCorrister, Mr. Whitley, Mr. Neufeld, Dr.
O'Shaughnessy, Sgt Paulishyn, Inspector Smith, Sgt. Biener, Sgt Wawryk, Dr.
Silverthorne, Mr. Whitley, Mr. Williamson, police, and some unknown testifiers).
142.Trial judge
143.Trial transcript
144.12 Unknown sources
145.W5 reporters
146.Winnipeg media
147.Winnipeg Police
148.Witnesses
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Appendix C: Crosstabulation Tables for Academic and Non-Academic with Other
Variables
List of Tables
1. Academic/Non-Academic X Modality
2. Academic/Non-Academic X Use
3. Academic/Non-Academic X Length
4. Academic/Non-Academic X Formal Citation
5. Academic/Non-Academic X Direct Quotes
1. Academic/Non-Academic X Modality
Acad_non * Modality Crosstabulation
0 32 30 62
9.0 37.0 16.0 62.0
.0% 51.6% 48.4% 100.0%
.0% 13.0% 28.3% 15.0%
.0% 7.8% 7.3% 15.0%
-3.5 -1.4 4.4
60 214 76 350
51.0 209.0 90.0 350.0
17.1% 61.1% 21.7% 100.0%
100.0% 87.0% 71.7% 85.0%
14.6% 51.9% 18.4% 85.0%
3.5 1.4 -4.4
60 246 106 412
60.0 246.0 106.0 412.0
14.6% 59.7% 25.7% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
14.6% 59.7% 25.7% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Modality
% of Total
Adjusted Residual
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Modality
% of Total
Adjusted Residual
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Modality
% of Total
acad
non
Acad_non
Total
neg neut pos
Modality
Total
Chi-Square Tests
25.994a 2 .000
32.521 2 .000
412
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 9.03.
a. 
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2. Academic/Non-Academic X Use
Crosstab
2 59 1 62
12.5 39.5 10.1 62.0
3.2% 95.2% 1.6% 100.0%
2.4% 22.4% 1.5% 15.0%
.5% 14.3% .2% 15.0%
-3.6 5.6 -3.4
81 204 66 351
70.5 223.5 56.9 351.0
23.1% 58.1% 18.8% 100.0%
97.6% 77.6% 98.5% 85.0%
19.6% 49.4% 16.0% 85.0%
3.6 -5.6 3.4
83 263 67 413
83.0 263.0 67.0 413.0
20.1% 63.7% 16.2% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
20.1% 63.7% 16.2% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Use
% of Total
Adjusted Residual
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Use
% of Total
Adjusted Residual
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Use
% of Total
acad
non
Acad_non
Total
0 evol juxt
Use
Total
Chi-Square Tests
31.284a 2 .000
40.072 2 .000
413
Pearson Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 10.06.
a. 
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3. Academic/Non-Academic X Length
Crosstab
45 17 62
35.3 26.7 62.0
72.6% 27.4% 100.0%
19.1% 9.6% 15.0%
10.9% 4.1% 15.0%
2.7 -2.7
190 161 351
199.7 151.3 351.0
54.1% 45.9% 100.0%
80.9% 90.4% 85.0%
46.0% 39.0% 85.0%
-2.7 2.7
235 178 413
235.0 178.0 413.0
56.9% 43.1% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
56.9% 43.1% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Length
% of Total
Adjusted Residual
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Length
% of Total
Adjusted Residual
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Length
% of Total
acad
non
Acad_non
Total
extended short
Length
Total
Chi-Square Tests
7.314b 1 .007
6.581 1 .010
7.621 1 .006
.008 .005
413
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.
72.
b. 
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4. Academic/Non-Academic X Formal Citation
Crosstab
46 16 62
48.5 13.5 62.0
74.2% 25.8% 100.0%
14.2% 17.8% 15.0%
11.1% 3.9% 15.0%
-.8 .8
277 74 351
274.5 76.5 351.0
78.9% 21.1% 100.0%
85.8% 82.2% 85.0%
67.1% 17.9% 85.0%
.8 -.8
323 90 413
323.0 90.0 413.0
78.2% 21.8% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
78.2% 21.8% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Formal
% of Total
Adjusted Residual
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Formal
% of Total
Adjusted Residual
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Formal
% of Total
acad
non
Acad_non
Total
 formal
Formal
Total
Chi-Square Tests
.690b 1 .406
.441 1 .507
.667 1 .414
.407 .250
413
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.
51.
b. 
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5. Academic/Non-Academic X Direct Quote
Crosstab
53 9 62
53.1 8.9 62.0
85.5% 14.5% 100.0%
15.0% 15.3% 15.0%
12.8% 2.2% 15.0%
-.1 .1
301 50 351
300.9 50.1 351.0
85.8% 14.2% 100.0%
85.0% 84.7% 85.0%
72.9% 12.1% 85.0%
.1 -.1
354 59 413
354.0 59.0 413.0
85.7% 14.3% 100.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
85.7% 14.3% 100.0%
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Direct
% of Total
Adjusted Residual
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Direct
% of Total
Adjusted Residual
Count
Expected Count
% within Acad_non
% within Direct
% of Total
acad
non
Acad_non
Total
 direct
Direct
Total
Chi-Square Tests
.003b 1 .955
.000 1 1.000
.003 1 .955
1.000 .543
413
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
N of Valid Cases
Value df
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(2-sided)
Exact Sig.
(1-sided)
Computed only for a 2x2 tablea. 
0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.
86.
b. 
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Appendix D: Crosstabulation Tables for Categories with Other Variables
1. Categories X Modality
2. Categories X Use
3. Categories X Length
4. Categories X Formal Citation
5. Categories X Direct Quotes
1. Categories X Modality
229
1. Categories X Modality (Continued)
230
1. Categories X Modality (Continued)
231
2. Categories X Use
232
2. Categories X Use (Continued)
233
2. Categories X Use (Continued)
234
3. Categories X Length
235
3. Categories X Length (Continued)
236
3. Categories X Length (Continued)
237
4. Categories X Formal Citation
238
4. Categories X Formal Citation (Continued)
239
4. Categories X Formal Citation (Continued)
240
5. Categories X Direct Quotes
241
5. Categories X Direct Quotes (Continued)
242
5. Categories X Direct Quotes (Continued)
243
Appendix E: Crosstabulation Tables for Formal Citation and Direct Quotes with Other
Variables
1. Formal X Modality
2. Formal X Use
3. Formal X Length
4. Direct X Modality
5. Direct X Use
6. Direct X Length
244
1. Formal X Modality
245
2. Formal X Use
246
3. Formal X Length
247
1. Direct X Modality
248
2. Direct X Use
249
3. Direct X Length
250
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